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This dissertation argues that composition’s ascendance to academic legitimacy 
in the mid-to-late twentieth century did not emerge as a challenge to FYC’s traditional 
gatekeeping function but rather represents the replacement of an outmoded formalist 
gatekeeping mechanism that served the dominant culture of industrial society with an 
identity-based mechanism that meets the needs of post-industrial capitalism. The project 
begins by revising popular views of process as a spontaneous source of composition’s 
legitimacy to demonstrate how process was consciously taken up—particularly by 
Literature PhDs facing a collapsed job market and seeking employment security in 
composition—as a specialized knowledge-base by which compositionists could claim a 
professional status for the field. This professional model positioned process pedagogy’s 
hallmarks of anti-formalism and progressive politics as the key components of 
professional composition. Subsequent movements in the field could thus demonstrate 
their superiority to previous work by revealing retained formalist or conservative 
assumptions in that work. As a result, compositionists turned increasingly to 
antifoundationalist theories to guarantee the politically resistant character of their 
pedagogy, a tendency that, by the 1990s raised questions of how to deploy 
antifoundationalist critique in the service of seemingly foundationalist political ideals.  
Theorists have resolved this problem by defining leftist “inclusion” in idealized, 
antifoundationalist terms; that is, as the elimination of all exclusion. Such an 
idealization, however, forces instructors to find ways to include yet also exclude student 
perspectives that embrace discriminatory discourses on a principled basis derived from 
moral, cultural, or ideological values. The prevailing method for escaping this bind is to 
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encourage students to retain nominally their exclusionary subjectivities but only by 
redefining those subjectivities as inherently “inclusive”—a method particularly evident 
in recent scholarship concerning religious students. Such approaches integrate students’ 
beliefs but only by stripping those beliefs of the exclusionary claims to truth that 
distinguish them as different. This pedagogy neutralizes student difference even as it 
seems to privilege difference through an ostensible inclusion, thereby obscuring the 
selective mechanism of the course. But such pedagogy also serves the needs of market 
intensification through the identity customization that is at the heart of global, post-
industrial capitalism. It does so by training students to embrace a range of niche 
subjectivities while ensuring those subjectivities do not interfere with participation in 
and acceptance of alternative identities that create new sites of consumption.
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Chapter 1: The Master Narrative of Composition History 
There is a common misconception, even among many compositionists, that the 
first-year composition course is meant to teach students how to write. While such a 
view seems reasonable, it takes too much about the course at face value. After all, even 
at its very inception the first-year course worked more to create a particular student 
subjectivity than it did to improve student writing. Early composition curricula at major 
universities generally derived from formalist assumptions about writing and emphasized 
the superficial correctness of students’ written products. Instructors taught the “rules” of 
writing—proper spelling, grammar and paragraph structure, syntax, punctuation, etc.—
and then assessed the practice of these “rules” in students’ writing of weekly or even 
daily themes. The rules students learned were in turn derived from the conventions of 
upper- and upper-middle-class white dialect the use of which was universalized by this 
pedagogy as the mark of “good writing.” Early pedagogy assumed explicit instruction 
in the rules of language would translate automatically to practice and, consequently, it 
offered little guidance in the actual act of composing while denying the rhetorical 
character of written communication. In other words, early composition courses carefully 
avoided helping students improve their writing. 
This practiced ineffectiveness, while perhaps not intentional, was certainly the 
point. Within the context of early writing curricula, the first-year class became a sorting 
mechanism to select students for advancement based on their cultural and social values 
as expressed through competency in upper-class dialects. Students with home 
discourses proximate to the dialect privileged in the writing classroom found it easier to 
succeed while those whose home discourses were significantly different from what 
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became “Standard English” had more difficulty or failed completely. Since the standard 
was naturalized as “good writing,” the inability to approximate the privileged dialect 
was similarly naturalized as the student’s individual failure to learn how to write. In this 
way non-standard dialects were characterized as indicators of an uneducated, unrefined, 
or even unintelligent individual. Instruction was primarily meant to show what good 
writing was and then have students accommodate themselves to the values and social 
identities bound up in the privileged discourse or wrestle with the implications of their 
failure. To teach writing effectively, even this kind of writing, would have ruined the 
effectiveness of the disciplinary function of first-year composition by giving everyone a 
more equal chance of success. 
The work of compositionists over the past 45 years or so to build a base of 
knowledge about writing through research and the use of sophisticated rhetorical theory 
and then impart this practical knowledge through student-focused, procedural 
pedagogies can be, and has been, widely understood as a rejection of these sorting 
practices. In addition, inasmuch as compositionists have seen themselves as rejecting 
the ineffective instruction of the past, they have also figured their work as a rejection of 
the exclusionary selections these formalist pedagogies (also known as current-
traditional rhetoric) performed for the dominant class. In other words, the work of 
teaching writing effectively is the work of resisting the oppression and injustices of 
existing hierarchies that would have the course select only privileged students for 
advancement. Composition is, of course, uniquely positioned to do this 
counterhegemonic work. Since the academy remains a key access point to the social 
mobility and social capital offered by higher education, and since the academy and the 
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professional world depend heavily on writing, composition’s mandate to teach writing 
makes it something of a special site for undermining the inequities of the status quo. 
With the relatively recent view of writing as an object worthy of study and the resulting 
development of Composition as a respectable academic discipline, the first-year course 
has become for many a site in which to resist the forces of the dominant culture rather 
than enact them. 
Histories of composition have commonly supported this perspective by 
embracing a binary master narrative that positions the pre-disciplinary past as 
monolithically dominated by exclusionary and ineffective writing instruction and the 
disciplinary present as initiated by compositionists through their rejection of these old 
practices. This historical narrative thus necessarily casts disciplinary composition as 
liberatory and counterhegemonic as a number of critics have noted. Louise Wetherbee 
Phelps, for example, has demonstrated that histories of Composition commonly turn on 
a shift from Composition as a “cultural indoctrination in literate traditions” (41) to 
Composition employing rhetorical and cultural analysis that questions “an unjust 
society” to work “toward its transformation” (41). Noting that this narrative of 
Composition’s history represents a “shift on the continuum from an ideological motive 
to a utopian one” (41), Phelps details how “the tale of that shift is a classic narrative of 
progress” (41), one that frames the field as democratic and progressive through its 
resistance to the devalued pre-disciplinary past. Summarizing a common strain in 
Composition historical scholarship Phelps writes, “In the founding moment, 
[Composition] rejected a sterile ‘current-traditional rhetoric’ for the study and teaching 
of writing as process” (41). From the perspective of these most recent developments, 
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initial resistance to current-traditional rhetoric and the short-lived prominence of 
expressivist and cognitivist process models represent limited and misguided gropings 
toward utopia establishing a myth of inevitable progress that began at the radical break 
with a rhetorically reductive and oppressive past. Through the binary division of 
Composition history, disciplinary-era compositionists become “the good guys, the 
‘progressives’” (Phelps 42) and disciplinary-era composition becomes an inherently 
progressive project. 
Virginia Anderson sees a similar binary narrative at work in the widely-accepted 
history of the field, one based on rhetoric’s banishment and return. As Anderson 
explains, in most histories of composition, rhetoric is championed as a subject that once 
was so prestigious it was “taught by the college president” (“Property” 450). But with 
the privileging of positivism and liberal humanism in the late 1800s, rhetoric “was 
dispossessed, kicked out of the exalted territory that literary studies was to claim” 
(“Property” 451). With rhetoric banished, so the narrative runs, writing was reduced to a 
set of formalist practices and was relegated to first-year classes that, because of this 
limited view of writing, could be taught by anyone. With the revival of rhetoric in the 
mid-twentieth century as a framework for theorizing and teaching writing, 
compositionists began to reject the reductive formalism of current-traditional rhetoric. 
This rejection granted writing instruction academic legitimacy and linked composition’s 
elevation to increased access for traditionally marginalized student populations 
(Anderson “Property” 452). Since a-rhetorical practices of the past supported the 
oppressive goals of “the capitalist ascendancy, disarming them [through a return to 
rhetorical instruction] means, for many, disarming as well the dominant culture making 
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way for the new compositionist dawn to illuminate the social, economic, and cultural 
possibilities” (“Property” 454). Anderson thus demonstrates how this narrative of 
banishment and return figures disciplinary Composition based on rhetoric as an 
inherently liberatory endeavor. 
Even more recently Donna Strickland has described dualist meta-narratives that 
work themselves through composition’s historical self-representation. The first of these 
narratives Strickland claims “has been plotted as tragedy” (5). In this narrative 
“Composition teaching . . . is a fallen and diminished version of the rhetorical education 
that formerly dominated the curriculum” (Strickland 5) but has since been undermined 
by current-traditional views of writing. While there are clear echoes of Anderson’s 
influence in Strickland’s critique, Strickland maintains that a heroic tale of resistance by 
writing teachers is typically paired with the tragic story. As Strickland explains, in 
popular histories “a more romantic story is told alongside the tragic one, rescuing 
composition from its degraded and marginal status by repositioning the composition 
class as a unique site of democratic politics and pedagogical commitment” (Strickland 
6). The historical counterpoint to the tragedy is the struggle of compositionists to assert 
a more rhetorical and democratic vision of writing instruction, one that has come into 
greater focus with the rise of the discipline. Strickland claims that, as a result, by the 
1990s scholars “increasingly represented composition studies and the composition class 
as uniquely counterhegemonic discursive sites” (6). Composition’s heroic resistance to 
its dark past allows histories of the field to define composition’s disciplinary identity as 
democratic and pedagogically-minded insofar as it continues to resist current-
traditionalist practices. 
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The binary of Composition’s master historical narrative allows widely-accepted 
histories to construct a preferred identity for the field that assures compositionists of the 
resistant character of their work. Through this binary perspective compositionists can be 
certain their work is counterhegemonic so long as it rejects formalist instructional 
practices. But as so often the case, this certainty is achieved only through 
oversimplification. Certainty regarding the liberatory nature of contemporary practices 
is possible only because the binary narrative de-contextualizes and de-historicizes the 
practices of the past and those of the present. In the typical narrative, eliminating 
formalist instruction from composition curricula is always an implied rejection of the 
dominant culture’s oppression because in that narrative current-traditionalist instruction 
always serves the interests of the dominant culture regardless of changing contexts, 
shifting power structures, or altered cultural conditions. Such a perspective is troubling 
not simply because it elides the nuances and complexities of the past but because it can 
obscure problematic aspects of current practice or support false assumptions that might 
lead us, through our research and teaching, to support pedagogical, social, and political 
structures we do not wish to support. 
Revising and Replicating 
To prevent this potentially dangerous oversimplification, recent histories of 
composition have attempted to complicate the reductive master narrative by focusing on 
local or micro histories. Drawing on postmodernist perspectives like those of Jean-
Francois Lyotard that critique master narratives as exclusionary and essentialist, 
scholars have sought out those historical sites and groups elided by traditional histories 
of Composition as a way of disrupting the binary master narrative of Composition’s 
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past. A number of these studies have appeared over the last 25 years including 
Jacquelyn Jones Royster and Jean C. William’s seminal article “History in the Spaces 
Left: African American Presence and the Narratives of Composition Studies;” Tom 
Fox’s “From Freedom to Manners: African American Literacy Instruction in the 19th 
Century;” Jessica Enoch’s book Refiguring Rhetorical Education: Women Teaching 
African American, Native American, and Chicano/a Students, 1865-1911; Barbara 
L’Eplattenier and Lisa Mastrangelo’s Historical Studies of WPA: Individuals, 
Communities and the Formation of a Discipline; Brent Henze, Jack Selzer, and Wendy 
Sharer’s 1977: A Cultural Moment in Composition; Patricia Donahue and Gretchen 
Flesher Moon’s edited collection Local Histories: Reading the Archives of 
Composition; David Gold’s Rhetoric at the Margins: Revising the History of Writing 
Instruction in American Colleges, 1873-1947; and David Fleming’s recent From Form 
to Meaning: Composition and the Long Sixties, 1957-1974. These localized histories 
and others have begun to provide illuminating accounts of less-examined or even 
unexamined sites from the history of writing instruction.  
Implied in the turn to microhistories as a means of challenging composition’s 
master narratives is the notion that the exclusion of often marginalized voices creates 
the oversimplified binary of composition history. These exclusions, it seems, allow 
popular histories to erect a monolithic pre-disciplinary past dominated by current-
traditional rhetoric against which the present can be opposed and declared 
counterhegemonic. By seeking out and including these oft-excluded sites in the history 
of the field, the past can be pluralized, rehabilitating the devalued term of the binary and 
thereby undermining the oversimplifications of the master narrative. But, unfortunately, 
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such a methodological solution already takes the basic assumptions of the binary as 
given and embraces the very universalization of pedagogical practices it wishes to 
challenge. Seeking out marginalized voices and sites of instruction as the means of 
pluralizing the practices of the past ensures that non-current-traditionalist practices are 
associated with access to higher education for those groups that current-traditional 
rhetoric commonly excluded. In essence, this approach presumes from the start that 
anti-formalist practices associated with the disciplinary era are inclusive and 
counterhegemonic, strengthening the association of pre-disciplinary and disciplinary 
practices with oppression and liberation respectively.  
Not surprisingly, then, these revisionist histories tend to replicate and even 
reinforce the master narrative they seek to disassemble. A brief examination of three 
examples from the list above demonstrates how these dynamics play out in the 
scholarship. Gold’s award-winning history of three marginalized sites of instruction in 
Texas in the late 1800s and early 1900s shows how admirable local histories can still 
support master narrative oversimplifications. In Rhetoric at the Margins, Gold takes up 
the work of dismantling the binary narrative explicitly. Noting how the term “current-
traditional rhetoric has become a convenient catchphrase and catchall for whatever 
historical pedagogical practices we have deemed reductive, impolitic, or inelegant” (1), 
Gold traces the oversimplification of composition’s master narratives to the use of 
“epistemological labels to define pedagogical approaches” and the assumption of “a 
direct line between ideology and pedagogy” (1). The tendency to trace composition’s 
history through mainstream educational sites such as Harvard has led composition 
histories to overlook other sites of writing instruction that might not only complicate 
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“the narrative of reductivism and decline associated with rhetorical instruction in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (4) but might also prevent misreadings “of 
historical practices that do not fit easily into contemporary notions of critical, liberatory, 
or student-centered pedagogy” (2). Challenging this binary, according to Gold, requires 
examining a “diverse range of student bodies and institutions” (7) and complementing 
“master narratives with finely-grained local and institutional microhistories” (7). 
Gold’s revisionist history engages these dual efforts by detailing the complex 
pedagogical practices of professors and students at three marginalized sites of higher 
education in Texas between 1873 and 1947—historically black Wiley College, Texas 
Women’s University, and East Texas Normal. The localized historical accounts Gold 
provides focus on the actual instructional practices of prominent figures and programs 
at each school to reveal how writing instruction at these institutions promoted highly 
rhetorical perspectives on communication that align in many ways with present views. 
At Wiley, figures like Tolson embraced the “epistemic functions” (Gold 33) of rhetoric 
and “placed great value on audience and in taking advantage of the kairos of the 
moment” (Gold 48) while composition instruction at Texas Women’s University often 
“took the form of genre-specific writing” (Gold 92) and “connected [student writing] to 
the world outside the classroom” (Gold 97). As Gold points out, students at East Texas 
Normal also “participated in a rich rhetorical environment” (133) that rejected the 
distinction between high and low culture (129), supported explicitly rhetorical practices 
on campus (135), and fostered democratic ends for higher education (148). In addition, 
the context of these institutions meant that when prescriptivist or current-traditional 
methods were employed, they often served to challenge the dominant culture by 
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granting marginalized students “access to the language of power” (Gold 17; 89). By 
focusing on more localized narratives of composition’s history, Gold undermines the 
easy categorization of pre-disciplinary composition and the a-rhetorical perspective that 
equates ideology and pedagogy in support of composition’s master narratives.  
The collection Local Histories: Reading the Archives of Composition edited by 
Patricia Donahue and Gretchen Flesher Moon also embraces localized history to 
undermine the common view of Composition’s past as monolithically current-
traditional and thereby challenge the reductive binary of popular histories. For Donahue 
and Moon localizing Composition’s history fragments that history in ways that 
challenge a number of reductive assumptions that characterize Composition’s historical 
master narratives.  As Donahue and Moon note, “From these local histories, one might 
begin to tease out several potential alternative histories” (3) which “challenge the 
dominant narrative of composition history, located primarily in elite research 
institutions, disrupting its apparent simplicity as the myth of origin and proposing 
alongside it a complicated and discontinuous array of alternative histories” (12). In 
place of a linear progression of historical development, the collection pursues the 
complexity and nuance of a plurality of histories that do not necessarily fit into a single, 
coherent narrative. 
But much like Gold’s history, the chapters of Donahue and Moon’s collection 
generally find more rhetorically-based instruction at work in sites such as historically 
black colleges and universities, women’s universities, and normal schools. Heidemarie 
Z. Weidner, for instance, frankly positions her local history of Butler University as 
complicating Albert Kitzhaber’s influential master “narrative of rhetoric’s decline 
11 
during the second half of the nineteenth century” (59). Weidner explains that Butler’s 
location in the Midwest and its mission to educate the less affluent through “dynamic, 
community-centered and practical education” (60) meant Butler was less beholden to 
Harvard’s pedagogical model based on current-traditional rhetoric. Instead, the culture 
of writing instruction at the university was characterized by an “energy and enthusiasm 
compelling theory and practice of rhetoric at Butler University” (62). Key to Butler’s 
program developed by women like Catherine Merrill and Harriet Noble were the 
practice of oral presentations in the form of so-called “rhetoricals” (Weidner 62), an 
early form of writing across the curriculum (Weidner 66) that used daily writing 
exercises and peer review (Weidner 65; 68) and drew from the most rhetorically-
informed textbooks available (Weidner 69-73). In this context even instructional topics 
and methods that are commonly linked with the devalued current-traditional past—such 
as a focus on style, conciseness, and coherence—became rhetorical tools to connect 
audience, purpose, and “accuracy of expression” (Grayson 385, qtd. in Weidner 66). As 
Weidner’s localized history demonstrates, the story of Butler’s writing program, helmed 
by important but often overlooked women professors, complicates the assumption of a 
monolithic past for composition and thus works to undermine the master narrative of 
composition’s history. 
Likewise, David Fleming’s book length study of the first-year writing program 
at Wisconsin, From Form to Meaning: Composition and the Long Sixties, 1957-1974, 
provides a detailed account of instructional practices and institutional politics at a 
specific location that challenges many conventions of the popular master narratives of 
composition history. In his attempt to account for Wisconsin’s 25-year abolition of first-
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year writing which began in 1969, Fleming challenges the assumption that pre-
disciplinary writing instruction was uniformly formalist in approach. Focusing on the 
impact of the socially and politically turbulent 1960s on Wisconsin’s first-year 
composition program, Fleming reveals that graduate student teachers (most of whom 
were literature students) took up rhetorically-based instruction in opposition to the 
official approach of the program that favored more current-traditional instruction and 
without access to the burgeoning process movement of composition going on 
elsewhere. According to Fleming, these GTAs saw accepted instruction as lacking 
relevance and even as supporting existing inequities and injustices in the way it avoided 
addressing pertinent issues of the day. As “committed and responsible teachers” 
(Fleming 92) these GTAs were “striving to do a better job in the classroom for their 
students” (Fleming 92) by seeking out relevant topics for writing prompts and more 
rhetorically-informed approaches that would enable students to address important 
political topics effectively. The question of “relevance” became a rallying point for 
these student-teachers and a “serious issue, especially given what was happening in the 
‘outside’ world at the time” (Fleming 104). Faced with what Fleming characterizes as 
an intransigent or apathetic faculty, these TAs took it upon themselves to develop 
“something different from what had been handed down to them—something else that 
spoke better to the times and to their students’ lives” (121). 
While the efforts of English GTAs at Wisconsin in the 1960s ultimately led the 
faculty to do away with the first-year course at Wisconsin from 1969 to 1994, their 
work paints a complex picture of pre-disciplinary composition instruction. Though “The 
‘official’ Freshman English of this period, even from the point of view of its defenders, 
13 
was a pedagogy of unabashed error hunting, teacher responding, and model following” 
(Fleming 128), the actual practices of instructors, especially the more radical TAs, were 
an effort to “vitalize the course that had been boring both students and instructors to 
death. What [the TAs] devised in its place was inordinately flexible in part because the 
old syllabus had been so rigid” (Fleming 128). Like the 1930s, which Fleming notes 
were a time of more rhetorically-informed writing instruction at Wisconsin, the actual 
practice of TAs at Wisconsin in the 1960s often reflected efforts to connect in-class 
writing with outside events and reflected a focus on revision, audience, and public 
discourse that undermined the officially formalist writing instruction the program itself 
privileged. Though Fleming does not explicitly assert that his purpose is to challenge 
the binary master narratives of composition’s history, he does note that “first-year 
writing is a space not only for acculturation but also for growth, change, even critique” 
(14). His focus on pre-disciplinary writing instruction and the method of localizing 
history suggest his account is answering the broader call of the field to complicate the 
oversimplified accounts of Composition’s past. 
We can see how each of these localized histories seek out marginalized groups 
or sites of instruction to complicate the monolithic view of Composition’s past. But, as 
noted above, this approach ultimately leaves in place the binary assumptions of the 
master narrative because it leaves in place the universalizations that make the binary 
possible. So while current-traditional rhetoric is shown to be applied for liberatory ends, 
as in Gold’s history of Tolson’s instruction, the turn to Wiley College to demonstrate 
this does little to challenge the idea that the dominant culture always employs current-
traditional rhetoric to support its agenda. With this universalization in place, the other—
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that disciplinary rejections of formalist pedagogy are always inherently 
counterhegemonic—necessarily follows. As a result these localized histories re-inscribe 
the assumed linkages between disciplinary practices and progressive, democratic 
politics. Gold’s discovery of the rhetorical writing pedagogy favored by disciplinary-era 
compositionists in the pre-disciplinary era at all-black Wiley College, Texas Women’s 
University, and East Texas Normal links the rejection of current-traditional gatekeeping 
with efforts across a variety of times and places to expand access to higher education 
and fight injustice through pedagogy. Weidner’s tale of the less-affluent students at 
Butler receiving highly rhetorical education makes similar associations by emphasizing 
the less-privileged status of Butler’s students and the existence of rhetorical writing 
instruction at Butler. Fleming’s history of Wisconsin’s program in the sixties reflects 
the assumption that disciplinary-era practices and progressive politics go hand in hand 
by framing the development of rhetorically-based, student-centered pedagogies as the 
work of GTAs who had nothing—no formal training in rhetoric, no access to the latest 
composition research, and few resources at their disposal—but their radical politics to 
draw on (115).  
These local histories ultimately craft a narrative in which disciplinary practices 
lie dormant in the pre-disciplinary past but are maintained—naturally, inevitably—in 
sites of educational resistance because disciplinary practices are inherently resistant 
insofar as they displace current-traditionalist writing instruction. Where there are the 
pedagogical practices and assumptions privileged by the discipline, there is also 
liberatory, resistant education and vice-versa. Not surprisingly, revisionist histories are 
explicit about how writing instruction at marginalized institutions pre-figures 
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pedagogical practices privileged in the disciplinary era. Gold, for example, explains 
how, in these marginalized locations, teachers assigned “arguments that were 
rhetorically situated, addressing narrow, contemporary, local topics that in many ways 
resemble the argument-based, rhetorically-situated assignments of contemporary 
practice” (139). While Gold notes explicitly that current-traditional rhetoric was part of 
Tolson’s approach at Wiley, he notes also just as explicitly that this rhetoric was 
consciously recognized as a rhetorical performance, not naturalized as inherently 
superior language. Weidner’s account finds peer review, an emphasis on revision, and 
even an early form of WAC in Butler’s program under the direction of Catherine Miller 
and Harriet Noble. Other chapters in Donahue and Moon’s collection make similar links 
such as Julie Garbus’ account of writing instruction at Wellesly in which she reads an 
early form of service-learning in Vida Scudder’s groundbreaking instruction1. And just 
as predictably, Fleming notes leftist Wisconsin University GTAs developed many 
instructional practices that the field of composition would come to value in the coming 
decades, perhaps most notably a humane and effective basic writing curriculum (89). 
The result, to put it into colloquial terms, is that these histories give disciplinary 
practices more “street cred” because those practices can be shown to have been central 
to efforts to support more inclusive and resistant higher education throughout history. 
                                                 
1 Donahue and Moon’s edited collection does include accounts of current-traditional rhetoric at work in 
certain marginalized locations. Kenneth Linbdblom, William Banks, and Risë Quay’s chapter, “Mid-
Nineteenth-Century Writing Instruction at Illinois State Normal University: Credentials, Correctness, and 
the Rise of a Teaching Class,” and William DeGenaro’s “William Rainey Harper and the Ideology of 
Service at Junior Colleges” both detail the use of current-traditional instruction at marginalized sites of 
instruction to impose the values of the dominant culture on students. But while these histories reflect an 
effort to provide a complex account of composition’s past, the fact that current-traditional rhetoric was 
present at some marginalized institutions does not trouble the collection’s implicit support of the binary 
master narratives of composition. That these accounts are included in the collection communicates that 
rhetorically-based, politically progressive instruction was not always enacted at marginalized 
instructional sites, but when it was enacted, it was at such sites. 
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These local histories do not reject the binary narrative but instead transpose it in 
its entirety into the pre-disciplinary past. In Gold’s, Weidner’s, and Fleming’s histories 
we can see clearly the “tragic” and “heroic” tales of Composition that Strickland 
describes. Locating rhetorical views of writing only in marginalized sites of higher 
education, these histories position the work of disciplinary-era compositionists that 
replicate these practices as continuing the heroic struggle to resist the forces of 
hegemony and thereby universalize current-traditional writing instruction as always 
serving those forces. This means of complicating the past does not undermine the binary 
but rather finds new locations in which it took place that have been overlooked by more 
sweeping narratives. Such a rhetorical maneuver leaves the tragic tale of composition’s 
displacement securely in place and even depends on it in many cases to build rhetorical 
force for more localized histories. Gold and Donahue and Moon explicitly position their 
narratives in direct opposition to what was taking place at the same time at Harvard and 
more prestigious schools. The binary is still between the tragic and heroic tales of 
composition, these tales are simply demonstrated to be working in any encounter 
between disciplinary and pre-disciplinary practice.  
Creating Industrial English: Access, Crisis, and Gatekeeping 
The attempted complications of Composition’s historical master narrative leave 
the binary dynamics of that narrative in place because they fail to question the 
universalization of current-traditional gatekeeping on which the narrative’s conceptual 
edifice is founded. Disciplinary Composition can be figured as inherently 
counterhegemonic because it rejects and works to undermine the current-traditional 
pedagogical practices that support the exclusionary interests of the dominant class. Yet 
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this preferred identity can only be claimed if histories of the field frame current-
traditional pedagogy as always supporting the interests of the dominant class, regardless 
of shifting historical, economic, or social contexts. To challenge the reductive master 
narrative of Composition’s history requires first challenging the universalization of the 
function of current-traditional pedagogy. Complicating the binary means 
contextualizing formalist pedagogy historically. Once this has been accomplished, we 
can begin to imagine and examine the elisions and oversimplifications necessary to 
universalize the service current-traditional pedagogy performs for the status quo.  
Historians of the field have generally agreed that first-year composition was 
created as part of the sweeping changes brought about in American society and higher 
education by the Industrial Revolution of the mid-nineteenth century.2 Higher education 
in colonial America worked to impart a narrow set of cultural values and generally 
applicable skills to students drawn primarily from the upper socioeconomic strata of 
American life. Such education prepared students for a limited number of professions 
such as doctor, lawyer, minister, or statesman and thus was “by and large meant 
primarily for those already financially secure who were getting ready to take their 
rightful roles as professionals and community leaders” (Berlin “Postmodernism” 47). 
Instruction was primarily oral reflecting the emphasis on oral communication in 
colonial public life with typical lessons involving individual students reciting passages 
in class from memory and responding to potentially extensive questioning from the 
instructor. Though in the Colonial Era students received training in rhetoric and writing 
throughout their education, this instruction emphasized classical languages like Greek, 
                                                 
2 There were, of course, two industrial revolutions, one in the later 1700s driven primarily by advances in 
steam power and the second in the mid-to-late 1800s initiated in large part by the widespread availability 
of electricity. 
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Latin, and Hebrew which were thought to improve students’ thinking and ability to use 
the vernacular both as a matter of course and by dint of the examples provided by 
prominent classical orators and authors. The use of classical language also helped sort 
out uninvited student populations. Entrance exams required knowledge of Greek and 
Latin as well as mathematics ensuring only the affluent could attend college because of 
the prohibitive expense involved in obtaining the instruction necessary to pass the 
exams. 
By the 1870s, American higher education was going through a series of 
transformations brought on by the Industrial Revolution that directly challenged the 
methods, purposes, and position of colonial colleges in U.S. society. Starting in the mid-
1900s, the Industrial Revolution was a period of “accelerating and unprecedented 
technological change” (Mokyr 82), particularly in the use of electricity, that made 
possible entirely new forms of manufacturing. These developments and “The 
widespread use of electricity from the 1870s onwards changed transportation, 
telegraphy, lighting, and, not least, factory work by diffusing power in the form of the 
electrical engine” (Castells 39). The large-scale mass production the electrical engine 
supported transformed the entrepreneurial economy of the colonial period into a 
corporate economy that increasingly depended on qualified experts applying scientific 
and technical knowledge to organizational and production processes. The mechanized 
factories appearing all over the eastern seaboard of the U.S. in the last half of the 
nineteenth century required engineers, chemists, and machinists and large-scale 
industrial husbandry taking place further west required experts in agriculture, 
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refrigeration, and transportation. The sheer size and rapid expansion of industrial 
factories meant companies needed more of these various experts than ever before. 
The need to communicate over long distances and to distant audiences that the 
functioning of a large corporation created meant that writing rather than speaking 
quickly became the primary method of business communication. Writing needed to be 
precise and appear less context dependent for meaning than spoken language. The 
complicated hierarchical structure of new corporations multiplied the kinds and 
amounts of writing that took place in business; reports, memos, instructions, 
schematics, and policies became increasingly familiar aspects of doing business. 
Managerial expertise involving new literacy skills were also in high demand. In the face 
of new and rapidly changing conditions, “Complex industrial firms needed a corps of 
managers who could size up needs, organize material, marshal evidence, solve 
problems, make and communicate decisions” (Ohmann 93). As printing methods and 
the production of written material became more efficient and thus cheaper in the last 
half of the century, writing for personal consumption and information dissemination 
among the general public began displacing speech as the primary means of public 
address. Colonial society had been largely oral but very quickly industrial society 
revealed itself as committed primarily to the written word.  
The colonial college with its focus on oral recitation and the production of a 
gentlemanly class was ill-equipped to meet the educational needs of an industrial 
economy. The professional training offered by the colonial curriculum was too limited 
to provide necessary technical skills while socialization into the values and cultural 
preferences of the elite was likewise out of step with industrial society. In the new 
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economy “a knowledge of Latin and Greek did not seem . . . to have the practical value 
that a knowledge of civil engineering or mining technology did” (Kitzhaber 19). These 
new realities allowed self-taught entrepreneurs and innovators of working- or middle-
class origins to circumvent the regulatory mechanism of the colonial college. Charles 
William Elliot, named president of Harvard in 1869, worried over the unsettling 
regularity of men from the working classes “leaping from farm or shop to court-room or 
pulpit” (Qtd. In Douglas 126). In addition, the Morrill Act of 1862 with its mandate to 
provide practical education to the industrial and commercial classes provided the 
resources for state universities to become another means of skirting the socialization 
into elite culture that the colonial college imposed (T. Miller 123). “These new state 
institutions,” Kitzhaber explains, “founded squarely on the notion that it was the 
responsibility of American colleges to offer a wider selection of courses than had been 
commonly available before, were very influential in breaking up the older pattern and in 
supplying a new one for the next century” (12). State institutions offered specialized 
training in technical fields that allowed students to advance themselves in the new 
economy. The more accessible land-grant institution were thereby able to increase the 
supply of technical experts and thus threatened to displace more established colleges as 
the mechanisms for regulating social advancement. 
The need to reaffirm their position forced more established colleges to 
emphasize their role in certifying the professionals who made industrial production 
function smoothly. In this way, “The increasingly competitive social spirit that brought 
[working and middle-class] students to college imposed a ‘credentialing’ function 
schools had perhaps always had in theory, but had never had to take quite so seriously 
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before” (Halloran 166). This credentialing function was a means of maintaining the 
relevance of these institutions and of asserting their regulatory function in society, but it 
required significant changes to what was taught, how it was taught, and to whom it was 
taught. Because this involved in many cases addressing modern language preferences 
and because traditional language instruction limited the college’s capacity to meet labor 
demands, language instruction was particularly affected by these developments. As 
Halloran argues, “The nineteenth-century ‘revolution’ [in language instruction] is of 
course none other than the Industrial Revolution, seen from the perspective of writing 
and written communication” (170). Colleges began increasingly to offer instruction in 
the vernacular as part of their language instruction and began to offer courses in Latin 
and Greek as electives. The result was that “From about 1883 onward, the classics 
declined in power and prestige, and the star of the modern languages rose” (Parker 11).  
This process was not immediate and the transition to vernacular instruction was 
extremely embittered as established Classics scholars fought the transition (Veysey 
“Plural” 74)3. But with the advent of the Industrial revolution this transition was all but 
inevitable and happened with relative rapidity.  
These changes, in language instruction in particular, resulted in expanded access 
to higher education. Without the exclusions imposed by classical language requirements 
a broader section of the population could now attend college. So while the old 
university had excluded as a matter of course, “The new university encouraged a 
meritocracy, opening its doors to anyone who could meet the entrance requirements (a 
growing number, due to the new free high schools), offering upward mobility through 
                                                 
3 The Modern Language Association was formed in 1883 in part to coordinate efforts to implement 
modern language instruction in college curricula in the face of fierce opposition.  
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certification in such professions as agriculture, engineering, journalism, social work, 
education, and a host of other new professional pursuits” (Berlin “Reality” 21). The 
logistics of handling a flood of new students brought on by expanded access and the 
expectations of competitive individualism driving many students to seek certification 
gave writing a new role in college instruction. As Halloran demonstrates:  
The larger numbers of students made the old system of oral recitation 
and disputation unworkable, and writing was a means by which larger 
numbers of students could demonstrate whether they had learned what 
was being taught. The new competitive spirit of the society gave a much 
greater importance to the business of ‘sorting’ students, of determining 
which ones were superior and which ones merely adequate, and here too 
writing recommended itself as a means. Because written work could be 
evaluated more precisely, it allowed for a more meticulous sorting of the 
students. (166) 
 
The focus on language itself that writing offered was to be central to its function in the 
negotiations of power structures and new methods of exclusion designed to maintain 
social hierarchies in the more open college of the late nineteenth century.  
Writing could take on this role so fully in part because of the same social 
disruptions that were affecting American culture. Dialect, which had for some time been 
developing into a marker of social class membership, became particularly important as 
a means of demonstrating membership in the upper class. As Connors explains, 
“Throughout the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s there is evidence that the developing class 
system in America was based on linguistic as well as economic criteria. America was 
developing a native gentry, and gentry were increasingly expected to speak and write 
with propriety as well as dress with elegance and shoot with skill” (“Crisis” 87). Dialect 
increasingly became a sign of one’s social standing so that “The mark of the educated 
was now the use of a certain version of the native language, a version that tended to 
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coincide with the dialect of the upper middle class, the group that had customarily 
attended college” (Berlin “Writing” 72). In the lingering tradition of colonial learning, 
“educated” meant personal refinement via familiarity with the privileged cultural 
expressions of the elite demonstrated individually through one’s language use. As Eliot 
of Harvard was to argue, “I may as well abruptly avow, as the result of my reading and 
observation in the matter of education, that I recognize but one mental acquisition as an 
essential part of the education of a lady or a gentleman—namely, an accurate and 
refined use of the mother tongue” (rptd. in Brereton 46). Students who were not using 
their “mother tongue” in ways associated with rigor, refinement, and intelligence were 
thus not being fully educated. To speak well was to have developed one’s tastes and 
character—to have been educated (Crowley “Composition” cf 75-77). 
Harvard’s new English composition entrance exam reflected these assumed 
links between dialect and education. The 1874 prompt directs applicants to write “a 
short English composition, correct in spelling, punctuation, grammar, and expression” 
on a subject “taken from one of the following works: Shakespeare’s Tempest, Julius 
Caesar, and Merchant of Venice; Goldsmith’s Vicar of Wakefield; Scott’s Ivanhoe and 
Lady of the Last Minstrel” (rptd. in Brereton 47). This first exam presumes knowledge 
of literature and a facility with “correct” English or, rather, the formalized conventions 
reflecting the dialect of the social and cultural elite suggesting connections obtaining 
between the two. Thus, the exams formally instituted increasingly widespread 
assumptions linking dialect, culture, and education held by the broader society. With its 
demand that students write grammatically correct English to discuss the works of 
Shakespeare, Goldsmith, and Scott, this first English composition exam formally 
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established connections between grammatically and mechanically correct English and 
familiarity with the culture of the elite class as expressed in works of literature—and 
then linked both to preparation for higher education. If colleges had to let more people 
in, they would do so on their own terms. 
Until the later nineteenth century, students and their language practices were, 
“by modern standards extraordinarily homogenous, guaranteeing a linguistic common 
ground” (Russell 35) and reflecting a social and cultural homogeneity as well. 
Expanded access meant that the linguistic and cultural diversity of the university 
increased as a broader range of dialects began to be heard in the halls and classrooms of 
academe than ever before. When Harvard reported that nearly 50% of all applicants 
were failing the entrance exam in composing English, it seemed things had gone too far. 
As A.S. Hill was to lament, even five years after the exams were in place, “Those of us 
who have been doomed to read manuscript written in an examination room . . . have 
found the work of even good scholars disfigured by bad spelling, confusing 
punctuation, ungrammatical, obscure, ambiguous, or inelegant expressions” (rptd. in 
Brereton 46). Adding to this sense of failure, political and cultural backlashes against 
the influx of immigrants, particularly from non-English speaking countries, in the 1870s 
and 1880s further connected a narrow set of language practices with a sense of 
propriety, character, and national culture. The widely-held view of the situation was that 
America faced a literacy crisis, one that “was a genuine disaster in the minds of 
Americans, especially educated Americans. The idea that the best American prep 
schools, and even the best American colleges, were turning out ‘illiterates’ deeply 
shocked our increasingly nationalistic sensibilities” (Connors “Crisis” 89). Education 
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was failing not only to produce students who could use English with propriety, but was 
allowing national culture and individual character to fall by the wayside. 
As a representation of the failure of colleges to immerse students fully into the 
elite culture, the literacy crisis was, in effect, a demand that colleges expand access to 
meet the needs of the industrial era while answering to the expected exclusions of the 
colonial period. What colleges needed was a means of reasserting the values of the 
dominant culture as dominant within the new context of industrial education. How the 
crisis was defined determined of course the response and ensured that new methods of 
language instruction would ultimately support the dominant class in the new era. More 
specifically, writing provided the answer. The new focus on writing in higher education 
highlighted the differences of the language practices of middle-class, working-class, and 
students of various ethnic backgrounds from those of the elite. 4 The relatively 
stabilizing character of written text also allowed for greater formalization of the 
language conventions deemed appropriate by the dominant culture with the result that 
“the production of writing was often presented as the product of rules separate from the 
idiosyncratic personality of the writer” (Brody 101). In this way, colleges began 
developing an effective sorting mechanism that would simultaneously grant wider 
access to higher education for practical and economic reasons while still enacting the 
socialization of students into the privileged values of the dominant culture. 
                                                 
4 Paul Kei Matsuda has explained how remedial writing instruction for second-language learners in 
higher education was also developed during this period. Matsuda writes, “It was also during this period 
[of the formation of composition] that language differences in the composition classroom became an 
issue because of the presence of a growing number of international students, and many of the placement 
options for second-language writers were created (Matsuda and Silva; Silva)” (643). For more see 
Matsuda, Paul Kei. “The Myth of Linguistic Homogeneity in U.S. College Composition.” CCC 68.6 (July 
2006): 637-51. 
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The changes in the entrance exam themselves suggested the solution. The very 
logic of testing applicants for admission on their ability to use English at the college 
level presupposed that incoming students should already be prepared to write for 
college (Berlin “Writing” 61). By requiring college-level writing in an entrance exam, 
Harvard’s administrators and professors suggested that the ability to write “correct” 
English was a prerequisite for higher learning rather than a result of it; at the time the 
exams were instituted, Harvard required three years of “upper division work” (Berlin 
“Reality” 23) including a required Sophomore course in rhetoric as part of its students’ 
education in writing. Through the establishment of an entrance exam on English 
composition, Harvard shifted the blame for the literacy crisis in higher education and 
the poor writing of college graduates onto the rapidly multiplying high schools and 
preparatory schools (Berlin “Reality” 23). The emphasis on superficial correctness in 
the exams made such a rhetorical maneuver possible by framing writing as a basic skill 
and a remedial subject. Poor student writing—most commonly associated with the 
dialects of ethnic minorities or the working classes—became an issue to be addressed 
and dealt with as early and as quickly as possible in the curriculum.   
The infamous English A course at Harvard was born out of the need for 
remedial work in writing that the entrance exams revealed. As Crowley relates, 
widespread failure on the exam demanded that faculty “install course work in order to 
remedy the deficiencies discovered by the exam” (“Composition” 73) and since the 
exam (and the broader society) characterized good writing as superficially and 
mechanically correct writing, so too the course emphasized these aspects of written 
expression. Yet the focus on correctness in the exam and the course that followed it 
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could be effective as a sorting mechanism only in relation to the cultural function of 
higher learning, a function that was to be carried out through the establishment of 
literature as a field of study and subject for teaching. The increased literacy rates among 
the general public meant that literature had by the late 1800s become more important as 
an expression of national culture throughout the nineteenth century. Writing instruction 
had been one of the primary purposes of English departments before the exams, but 
once writing was relegated to a remedial activity, something else was needed to take its 
place. Literature recommended itself to replace rhetoric because it addressed two key 
discourses of the industrial college/university by combining “scientific research” with 
“Arnoldian humanism” (Graff 3). To make literature as an object of study tenable, 
literary discourse was increasingly figured as a distinct and privileged discourse by 
those who studied it—an expression of timeless truths that did not depend on context 
for their meaning and that required specialized training to understand. In support of this 
idea, literary texts were increasingly divorced from the methods of their production and 
were figured more and more as “unmediated expressions of experience” (Crowley 
“Composition” 85).  
But as the exams themselves suggested, if cultural refinement was acquired 
through the study of literary works, mechanical correctness in written English was the 
marker of one’s fitness to appreciate the cultural benefits of literary study. The study of 
literature thus became the domain of the truly literate—that is, functionally and 
culturally literate—while the composition course was the site of those who needed 
remediation before they could move on to the real work of college (Crowley 
“Composition 95). The English A course was dedicated to exposing the craft (or lack 
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thereof) in student texts through the hyper-correctness that remedial instruction imposed 
as part of its mandate. The conscious craft that students from the non-elite classes were 
put through in the first-year course made “both teachers and students vividly aware of 
the enormous difference between student writing and that of the (doubly meant) 
‘masters’” (S. Miller 66). Literary texts became the standard for great writing that 
students were expected to live up to but which, because it was abstracted from its own 
production, guaranteed students could never attain it. Literature, thereby, “dominated as 
both the goal of and justification for writing instruction” (S. Miller 31). Literature 
courses, as the goal of achieving good writing, created a standard students could never 
attain since student texts were, by the very nature of composition instruction, mired in 
the processes of their own production5. The result was that “composition courses 
decreed that some students’ language was nonstandard, effectively disenfranchising 
nonelite linguistic communities and legitimizing the power and authority that already 
accrued to an educated and wealth minority” (Brody 124-5). The dynamics of writing 
and literature, the low and high of the English department, were firmly established and 
played their parts to impose the culture of the elite on those with whom they now shared 
access to social mobility through education. 
We can see then that what marked this pedagogy as an unjust gatekeeping 
mechanism rather than the imposition of educational rigor was its claim to assess 
individual student ability to write when in fact it actually assessed students’ ability to 
                                                 
5 David Russell notes how the devaluing of student writing was also tied to an assumption that writing 
and literacy were a single set of a-contextual practices held by practitioners of a variety of disciplinary, 
social, and professional discourses. Russell writes, “Because academics and other professionals assumed 
that writing was a generalizable, elementary skill and that academia held a universal, immutable standard 
of literacy, they were constantly disappointed when student writing failed to measure up to the local, and 
largely tacit, standards of a particular social class, institution, discipline, or profession by which they were 
in fact judging writing” (“Writing” 6). For more see Russell, David R. Writing in the Academic 
Disciplines: 1870-1990: A Critical History. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1991. 
29 
embrace and deploy the dialect and values of the dominant culture. This ability to 
impose a single, explicit cultural standard on students made current-traditional rhetoric 
particularly suited to supporting the status quo of the industrial era. This kind of writing 
instruction formed the basis of an educational model designed to ensure that the 
increased access to higher education required by the changes brought on by the 
Industrial Revolution were accomplished alongside indoctrination to the cultural values 
and standards of the dominant class. It also functioned to produce workers who could 
communicate effectively and efficiently through a shared cultural standard. Finally, and 
arguably most importantly, a single cultural standard toward which the socially mobile 
aspired created a consumer public that fit well with the production capabilities of 
industrial era manufacturing. Industrial production was rigid and expensive and thus 
required any new product to generate profit. More than a few commercial failures could 
be more than enough to bankrupt a company. The existence of a consumer public 
characterized by its adherence to a single cultural standard, particularly one that helped 
new members of the growing middle class feel more secure of their status, allowed 
companies greater certainty of profits when designing and marketing new products on a 
mass scale.  
This fit of current-traditionalist pedagogy to industrial function was, as we have 
seen, no accident but rather the result of a complex process directed by the historical 
conditions in which it developed. The changes brought about by the rapid technological 
development that characterized American society in the latter half of the 1800s imposed 
reforms on the education system, particularly in writing instruction, meant to bring 
higher education in line with the needs of an industrial society. These reforms facilitated 
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greater access to higher education leading to a greater diversity of skill and preparation 
among students. The difference in educational experience and outcomes of these 
students from those of more traditional student populations heightened existing 
anxieties about shifting social structures and challenges to the status quo brought on by 
the Industrial Revolution. The resulting literacy crisis articulated these fears imposing 
on educators a mandate to attend to the demands of the new era while ensuring existing 
social hierarchies could be maintained. The response necessarily took up the 
increasingly valued and imminently effective means of sorting students—that is, 
writing—and fitted it to the needs of the dominant culture in the industrial era. Without 
the context of an industrial society, current-traditional pedagogical models would not 
have come about nor would their continued use necessarily serve the interests of the 
upper classes. 
Post-Industrialism and the Binary Narrative 
Those of us who teach writing today do so in a post-industrial society. Post-
industrialism—as well as a number of related terms such as “the knowledge economy,” 
“the information age,” “the network society,” and “post-fordism”—typically refers to 
major economic, social, and cultural changes taking place in industrialized nations from 
the mid-twentieth century to the present. Originally theorized by sociologist Alain 
Touraine in 1969 and Daniel Bell in 1973, the economic aspects of post-industrialism 
have been reductively described as a shift from manufacturing goods to providing 
services but more accurately involves the centrality of “the production and distribution 
of knowledge and information, rather than the production and distribution of things” 
(Drucker “Post-Capitalist” 182). The “knowledge economy” of the post-industrial era 
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works not simply through the effort to create new knowledge and apply it to improve 
existing processes which was, in fact, a key feature of the industrial era’s rapid 
technological production. Instead, post-industrialism is distinguished by the fact that 
“knowledge is now being applied to knowledge” (Drucker “From” 30) and used 
“systematically and purposefully to define what new knowledge is needed, whether it is 
feasible and what has to be done to make knowledge effective” (Drucker “From” 30). 
The application of knowledge to knowledge makes post-industrial approaches pervasive 
throughout every aspect of the economy because of its applicability to all productive 
processes inasmuch as they represent the enactment of knowledge itself. Economically, 
then, post-industrialism is “the emergence of information processing as the core, 
fundamental activity conditioning the effectiveness and productivity of all processes of 
production, distribution, consumption, and management” (Castells 17). 
This seismic shift in the social and economic landscape has fostered and has 
itself been supported by the rapid development of information technology. Significant 
advances in information technology beginning in World War II, but accelerating 
exponentially with the invention of the microprocessor in 1971 and the pervasiveness of 
the personal computer in the 1980s, has been “at least as major a historical event as was 
the eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution, inducing a pattern of discontinuity in the 
material basis of economy, society, and culture” (Castells “Network” 30). In much the 
same way as the electrical engine expanded the capacity of the human body to labor, so 
these new technologies work, in many ways, expand the capacity of the human mind to 
process information. By their very design these new information technologies represent 
the technological expression of an application of knowledge to knowledge. Serving 
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increasingly as the means of economic, political, and social interaction, these 
technologies have contributed significantly to an increased focus on information and its 
processing throughout industrialized society. The instantaneous communication and 
information processing made possible by digital technologies has increased the 
flexibility of markets, production, culture, and even the continued development of 
information technology itself.6  
These technologies, then, are one of the results of post-industrialism and one of 
its driving forces. The production flexibility they facilitate has further diminished the 
importance of industrial era categorizations, practices, and assumptions. The ability to 
work from home using digital technology, the production facilitated by digital 
technologies (in the form of fan fiction, YouTube video parodies, Facebook posts, etc.) 
that are now key components of consumption itself, and the transnational 
communication supported by the Internet reflect the power of information technology to 
make “most of the standard industrial classifications meaningless” (Kumar 56).  As 
Manuel Castells explains: 
the historical oppositions between craft production and large-scale 
manufacture, between mass consumption and customized markets, 
between powerful bureaucracies and innovative enterprises, are 
dialectically superseded by the new technological medium, which ushers 
in an era of adaptive organizations in direct relationship with their social 
environments. By increasing the flexibility of all processes, new 
information technologies contribute to minimizing the distance between 
economy and society.” (Castells “Informational” 17) 
 
                                                 
6 The rapid obsolescence of digital technology suggests the increased flexibility this technology creates 
both in terms of the development of new technologies and the response to and guidance of consumer 
interactions with those technologies. The rapid development of information technology facilitated by 
previous developments in information technology are perhaps the most blatant example of knowledge 
applied to knowledge processes and the flexibility this facilitates.  
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Indeed, the boundaries that organized industrial society have become, in many ways, 
impediments to the production of wealth and the expressions of culture in post-
industrial society. The post-industrial world is a permeable world. 
This applies increasingly to national boundaries and marks post-industrialism as 
inseparable from the globalization characteristic of the past half-century. The focus on 
information and its dissemination through communications technologies reduces the 
importance of the location of corporate entities as they become less constrained by 
material resources, proximity to target consumers, or their cultural and historical ties 
with a particular nation-state. As Lester C. Thurow has observed, “Today knowledge 
and skills now stand alone as the source of comparative advantage” (201) meaning that 
“it is impossible to contain or control economic activities within the borders of 
traditional nation-states” (Kumar 9). Global dispersion and the resulting 
decentralization of corporate hierarchies reflect the affordances of flexibility as 
companies seek out competitive advantages such as reduced labor costs, lax regulations, 
or support for technological innovation that exist in particular parts of the world.7 
Global markets have likewise become more significant but, in turn, require a greater 
responsiveness to cultural and contextual market differences. As Krishan Kumar has 
                                                 
7 The significant increase in corporate executive salaries in terms relative to other workers in recent 
decades suggests decentralization is not as prevalent as is often claimed. But as Christopher Newfield and 
Greg Grandin have noted, CEO salary increases result from the emphasis on finance and short-term profit 
for shareholders in the corporate world. Companies themselves become consumable products to be sold 
for profit according to their financial standing. This figuring of companies as simply financial entities 
results in large part from the creation of global financial markets that resulted from the end of the 
Smithsonian Agreement in 1971 which ended the U.S. currency reliance on the “gold standard” allowing 
global market forces to determine currency value making finance as knowledge of currency exchange, 
central to corporate business. Global financial markets, the figuring of companies in financial terms, and 
the resulting CEO salaries reflect many of the characteristics of post-industrialism. For more see 
Newfield, Christopher and Greg Grandin. “Building a Statue out of Smoke: Finance Culture and the NYU 
Trustees.” The University against Itself: The NYU Strike and the Future of the Academic Marketplace. 
Eds. Monika Krause, Mary Nolan, Michael Palm, and Andrew Ross. Philadelphia, PA: Temple UP, 2008: 
57-70. 
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observed, “The world market, that is, is socially differentiated, and products have to be 
specifically designed and aimed at particular segments” (208).8  
Efforts to address ever more narrowly-circumscribed markets increases 
customization and fragmentation which render mass production and mass consumption 
less and less profitable for companies or desirable for consumers. The flexibility 
facilitated by turning knowledge toward understanding and improving knowledge 
processes through flexible technologies “gives rise to flexible specialization” (Kumar 
68) in post-industrial societies so that “Production is customized, geared to highly 
specific wants and needs in a constant state of flux” (Kumar 68). The result has been 
production processes that reframe the consumer market as more of a collection of 
individuals rather than a mass public that Robert Reich describes as the move from 
“high volume production of standard commodities” (47) to the creation of targeted, 
“high value” (48) commodities—commodities that have great importance to a relatively 
narrow section of the consumer public. Unlike the industrial era which focused on 
selling fairly standardized products “which requires persuading many customers of the 
virtues of one particular product, taking lots of orders for it, and thus meeting sales 
quotas” (Reich 49), companies of the post-industrial knowledge economy focus on 
“knowledge-based products and services [and so] can customize their offerings” to 
“determine customers’ changing patterns, idiosyncrasies, and specific needs” (Davis 
and Botkin 161). Information technologies themselves increasingly reflect this reality 
                                                 
8 A prominent example of this customization is the production of Paramount Studio’s 2014 film 
Transformers: Age of Extinction the fourth film in the extremely popular Transformers franchise. A 
modified version of the film was released in China that included Chinese celebrities and the winner of a 
talent contest that took place in China before production began. American audiences saw a version 
without these Chinese actors included, unless, of course, they downloaded the Chinese version from the 
Internet. 
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by managing information in such a fashion that it “can be processed, selected and 
retrieved to suit the most specialized, the most individualized requirement” (Kumar 37). 
The trend toward individualization and customization supported by the 
assumptions and practices that define post-industrialism thus put direct pressure on the 
privileged position of the mainstream in post-industrial life. As value is increasingly 
derived from the individuality of a given consumer experience the mainstream or mass 
experience is proportionally diminished in value. As a 2006 article in Business Week 
claimed, “We’ve had a change from ‘I want to be normal’ to ‘I want to be special’” 
(Qtd. in C. Anderson 169). Not only is the mass marketing and mass consumption of the 
industrial era becoming less effective as a business model, the individualization and 
customization of consumption and the identities such consumption practices support 
mean that the mainstream has become associated culturally and socially with narrow-
mindedness, intellectual and cultural simplicity, and blind acceptance of domination. A 
prime example are the contemporary “hipsters” who in many ways defines their edgy 
elevation above the vulgar herd by the extent to which their tastes and interests remain 
obscure to the general public. So fully has this perspective infused post-industrial 
culture that, as Jeff Pruchnic points out, “the chance of promoting or participating in 
some movement or action of ‘resistance’ has emerged as the fundamental appeal for 
selling almost anything, whether it be cheeseburgers, cars, or politicians” (68). The 
associations of individualization with resistance works to frame decentralization and the 
disruption of industrial-era categories as democratization and empowerment which 
make for very strong appeals indeed.9 In the self-referential knowledge economy of 
                                                 
9 In his essay “Ironic Encounters: Ethics, Aesthetics, and the ‘Liberal Bias’ of Composition Pedagogy” 
which I discuss in more detail in chapter 3, Pruchnic discusses the extension of the rhetorical power of 
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post-industrial society, rejection of the mainstream is fast becoming the mainstream 
itself. 
Post-industrialism, then, represents a significant departure from the dynamics 
that guided industrial society. Certainly industrial social and economic practices have 
not completely disappeared, but the characteristic conditions of industrial society—
manufacturing-based economies, mass production and consumption, the privileging of 
standardization and uniformity—can no longer claim to inform basic social, cultural, or 
economic structures in the post-industrial era. The significance of these changes, if 
composition’s history of the arrival of the industrial era are any indication, suggest that 
writing instruction and higher education have likely been involved in these 
developments. Certainly digital technology has become an increasingly important part 
of scholarly discussions in composition journals and of pedagogical content in writing 
classrooms in recent decades. The prominent role of communication in post-industrial 
society and its rapid diversification in places of social and political power likewise 
suggest changes to perceptions of writing and the function of writing instruction. 
Situating Composition within this context and within its historical development seems 
important not only for understanding how to teach writing more effectively but to 
understanding our own assumptions about what writing is and how it should be taught.  
Traditional histories of composition, however, do not provide the opportunity to 
take up these important considerations because of the way they necessarily exclude the 
emergence of post-industrialism from composition’s historical narrative. As we have 
                                                                                                                                               
resistance and  marginalization to social and political realms by drawing on the example of an event at 
Pennsylvania State University called “Conservative Coming Out Day” in which conservative students 
appropriated the discourse of marginalized groups such as the LGBTQ community to denounce the 
assertion of leftist perspectives in college classrooms. For more, see Pruchnic, Jeff. “Ironic Encounters: 
Ethics, Aesthetics, and the ‘Liberal Bias’ of Composition Pedagogy.” JAC 30.1-2 (2010): 53-93. 
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seen, the sorting and subjectivity produced by formalist pedagogy emerged within and 
expressly serves the needs of industrial society. The mass uniformity these pedagogies 
attempt to impose on student values is counterproductive to the needs of the status quo 
in post-industrial society. By universalizing current-traditionalist gatekeeping as always 
serving the needs of an oppressive dominant culture, then, composition’s binary history 
universalizes the conditions served by that pedagogy; that is, it tacitly universalizes the 
conditions of industrial society. In this way, widely-accepted histories of the field 
obscure the emergence of post-industrialism. But there are more troubling implications 
here. Inasmuch as composition’s counterhegemonic identity depends on universalizing 
the function of formalist pedagogy, it too depends on excluding post-industrialism from 
composition’s history. To incorporate post-industrialism into histories of composition 
would complicate the universalization of industrial society that traditional histories of 
the field tacitly accomplish when they frame a rejection of formalism as inherently 
counterhegemonic. In other words, it would seem that composition’s rise to 
disciplinarity can only be figured as resistant or counterhegemonic if it obscures the 
very conditions in which it currently operates and, in fact, which coincide with its 
emergence. 
This rhetorical effect of composition’s master narrative suggests that introducing 
the post-industrial context into composition history will effectively complicate the 
binary of the master narrative itself. It also suggests why efforts at historical revision 
that fail to challenge the conceptual underpinnings of that master narrative tend to focus 
on complicating the pre-disciplinary past. All of which raises questions about the field’s 
construction of its history, its preferred identity, and its emergence into disciplinarity. 
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Why has composition’s history excluded the emergence of post-industrialism? Another 
way of asking the same question might be why has a counterhegemonic identity become 
the preferred identity of the field? Who benefits from the construction of this identity 
and how do they do so? What is the relationship between composition’s rise to 
disciplinarity and the development of post-industrial society? What effect does the 
construction of this identity through opposition to industrial era gatekeeping have on 
disciplinary perspectives on writing, on the teaching of writing, and on students in 
writing classes? 
In what follows I will an attempt to answer these questions by arguing that 
composition’s rise to disciplinarity represents the construction of a selection mechanism 
that serves the specific needs and interests of the dominant class/culture in the post-
industrial era. The historical process by which disciplinary composition has come to fill 
this role is akin to the process by which selection mechanisms based on current-
traditional pedagogy developed in tandem with the advent of industrial society. Yet, 
while industrial era sorting operated through the naturalization of upper-class dialects, 
post-industrial sorting functions through the imposition of a particular politico-ethical 
perspective naturalized by a view of rhetorical communication as thoroughly anti-
foundational. By excluding the possibility of foundationalist beliefs in rhetoric, widely-
accepted theories of rhetoric make it possible for instructors to ostensibly assess 
students according to their rhetorical competency while in fact assessing students for 
their willingness to adopt the fluid identities required by the niche market economics 
that drive post-industrial capitalism. Integral to the creation and implementation of this 
sorting process, I will argue, was the legitimization of composition as a full-fledged 
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academic discipline that depended on a rejection of formalist pedagogies and that could 
direct the pedagogical content and practices of the course from the perspective of this 
rejection. In short, first-year composition is still not just about teaching students to 
write. 
In chapter two I begin introducing the post-industrial context into Composition’s 
disciplinary history to demonstrate that Composition became a discipline as a direct 
result of changes brought by the emergence of post-industrialism. Drawing on previous 
work that notes the importance of the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 
initiating the research agenda around which disciplinary Composition formed, I depart 
from typical histories by arguing that the launch of Sputnik and the resulting NDEA 
represent the arrival of the post-industrial era. Implicit in the NDEA was the notion that 
something was wrong with U.S. higher education which in turn meant that the solution 
required a better understanding of how students learn and how knowledge is made—the 
application of knowledge to knowledge. In this context, ineffective formalist 
pedagogies became increasingly untenable as did the traditional exclusions this 
pedagogy supported. The mid-1970s literacy crisis that resulted from falling test scores 
in the wake of the advent of Open Admissions in 1970 attempted to re-establish 
industrial era instruction through the “back-to-basics” movement. Writing instructors 
were faced again with the need to accommodate new developments while assuaging the 
anxieties of the status quo which they did by using Process pedagogy to claim 
professional, disciplinary status for Composition. The claim to professional status—
initially supported by the turn to the scientific discourses of cognitivist process—
worked to assure the public of the rigor of instruction while also allowing 
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compositionists to resist re-implementing formalist pedagogies. While successful, this 
rhetorical positioning figured process movement hallmarks of anti-formalism and 
inclusive, progressive politics as what it meant to do composition professionally. 
Chapter three argues that the use of this professional model has directed 
subsequent developments in the field in ways that have led compositionists to define 
idealize political inclusion in anti-foundationalist terms. Tracing the debates over 
cognitivism, expressivism, and social process methods in the scholarship of the late 
1970s and 80s, I reveal that cognitivism and expressivism were ultimately excluded 
from mainstream composition theory by being associated with current-traditional 
rhetoric or, in other words, being show to operate outside the boundaries of the recently 
established anti-formalist professionalism. This use of anti-formalism required ever 
expanding definitions of formalism—first as superficial correctness, then as a failure to 
theorize invention, and finally as the retention of foundationalism—leading anti-
formalism to be eventually defined as anti-foundationalism. Such a definition puts 
pressure on Composition’s accepted professional model since anti-foundationalist 
critique challenges the progressive political ideals that make up part of Composition’s 
claim to professional standing. This contradiction, problematically apparent in James 
Berlin’s published pedagogical research, was ultimately resolved in the late 1990s by 
scholarship that idealized inclusion in anti-foundationalist terms—that is, as the 
exclusion of exclusion itself. Such a resolution, however, works only by displacing the 
contradiction onto less powerful practitioners since this idealization is impossible to 
enact in actual practice. 
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The impact of this idealization on pedagogy and how its results align with the 
needs of post-industrial capitalism makes up the focus of chapter four. I examine the 
increasing focus on teaching students of faith in Composition scholarship since the late 
1990s, demonstrating that much of this scholarship draws its exigence from the need to 
include, yet also exclude, students beliefs that results from the idealization of inclusion 
discussed in chapter three. I show how this contradictory effort derives from instructors’ 
acceptance of anti-foundationalist critique and conceptually opposed foundationalist 
democratic ideals. Next I detail how post-industrial niche-market economics depend 
upon both an intense association with a particular identity and a fluid conception of 
identity that allows for multiple self-identifications. Having demonstrated the centrality 
of this fluid identity to both consumption and production in post-industrial capitalism, I 
then explain how the relationship between disciplinary composition and the first-year 
composition course replicates the traditional relationship between literature and 
composition in the industrial-era. This relationship imposes idealized inclusion on 
individual instructors as a professional mandate—in other words, it creates an ideal that 
must be enacted in the classroom. I then analyze pedagogical attempts at idealized 
inclusion by Jennifer Seibel Trainor and Shannon Carter to show how efforts to resolve 
the inclusion/exclusion contradiction in practice leads instructors to encourage the fluid 
identity required by post-industrial market economics. This pedagogy operates as a 
gatekeeping mechanism insofar as it claims to assess students’ rhetorical competency 
while actually assessing their willingness to surrender the political positions supported 
foundationalist beliefs. I conclude by drawing out the implications of these 
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developments for Composition scholars, teachers, and students in the context of post-
industrial education and the corporatized university in which it exists.  
A historical account of Composition that includes the post-industrial context 
inevitably puts pressure on Composition’s binary historical narrative, though it may not 
be in a form many of us want to accept. But this new perspective creates ways to engage 
more effectively with the very challenges it exposes. Having recognized the inadvertent 
complicity of disciplinary Composition in supporting the interests of the dominant 
classes in a post-industrial era, we can take a more nuanced view of the pre-disciplinary 
past, seeing the work of often vilified figures like Charles Elliot and A.S. Hill as well-
intentioned, if misguided. We can then learn from their experience how we might create 
systemic correctives to expose our blind spots and force us to constantly re-examine the 
purposes to which our work is put by the institution and society around us. We can also 
begin to see the story of English as the story of first-year gatekeeping with the rise and 
fall of Literature and the fall and rise of Composition as part of the same story about the 
establishment of one sorting mechanism that was discarded for another. Such a view 
helps us think more carefully about how departments address new developments and 
how the splitting off of Composition programs from English departments—while not 
necessarily a bad thing—is not necessarily the key to more liberatory instruction either. 
This historical work, then, is essential for navigating the difficult decisions we face 
today. It is work I will now take up in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Post-Industrialism and the New English 
The importance of federal funding provided by the National Defense Education 
Act (NDEA) of 1958 in establishing a research agenda on which the discipline of 
Composition was constructed has been widely recognized by composition historians. In 
his landmark book The Making of Knowledge in Composition: Portrait of an Emerging 
field, Stephen North, for example, provides a succinct but authoritative account of how 
the composition course became Composition (capital “C”) as a result of emergency 
federal funding after the Soviet launch of Sputnik I in 1957. Drawing on the work of 
Arthur N. Applebee, North explains that the 1950s were marked by a general reform 
movement in humanities education away from progressive concerns about the needs of 
students toward an articulation of field-specific knowledge around which disciplines 
like English could define themselves. What made this reform different by the time of 
the 1960s was the perception of it by many involved “as a national issue with a new 
urgency—as, really, a Cold War crisis, a matter of national defense” (North 11). When 
the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite (the aforementioned Sputnik I) the 
American education system came in for serious critique with lawmakers and educators 
scrambling to find out why the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets and to make up lost 
ground.  
The response from Congress was the NDEA, a law designed to improve U.S. 
education, especially in math and science, through increased federal funding. While the 
NDEA “provided money for educational reforms on an unprecedented scale: for 
research, for curriculum design and testing, for professional training . . . the original 
legislation did not make provision for English” (North 11). Left out of the funding loop, 
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the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) took up lobbying Congress for 
money, their most prominent effort being the publication of The National Interest and 
the Teaching of English in 1961. This document, penned and published in an 
astonishingly short twelve months, argued forcefully and successfully for the central 
role of English in helping defend national interests through education. In response 
Congress authorized federal support by expanding the application of the funds 
delegated by the Cooperative Research Branch of the U.S. Office of Education under 
Public Law 531. The result was “Project English” which involved funding “basic and 
applied research (over thirty projects were funded in the first year alone); curriculum 
study centers to produce new materials for classroom use; and conferences and 
professional meetings designed in general to increase professional involvement and in 
particular to outline needed areas of research to guide future funding” (Applebee 201). 
Based on the work of Project English and continued lobbying by the NCTE and the 
MLA, Congress would officially expand NDEA funding to English in 1964. 
The material support and the mandates of federal funding led to a number of 
changes in the world of English Studies. Not the least of these was, as North explains, 
changes in “English teachers’ self-perception as professionals” (12). The focus provided 
by federal money led English teachers at all levels to begin to see themselves as 
addressing a set of “shared common problems” (Applebee 213). But Congressional 
support also put pressure on the traditional structure of English departments. For while 
Literature had always been the centerpiece of the English department and curriculum, 
“it could not attract the sough-after Federal support” (North 13) being perceived as “less 
easily amenable to the ‘scientific’ modes of inquiry favored for government support 
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than either language or composition” (North 12). Composition and linguistics were, 
however, another matter. The evident practicality and applicability of writing and 
language use that were central to these areas of study and teaching made both more 
likely to win federal dollars.  
The existing knowledge about composition, however, fell far short of what was 
needed to fit it to the rapidly developing reform movement of the 1960s. Composition 
could no longer rely on the knowledge of practitioners who developed curriculum and 
pedagogical wisdom by trial and error or by relying on conventional wisdom or simply 
by turning to what was most easily taught. In the race to win federal support, a more 
research-based form of expertise was necessary. Something more than this collection of 
“lore” as North has termed it, was needed—“something, in short, that looked like 
acceptable, formal, academic inquiry” (15). While these realities demanded changes in 
composition, they also provided compositionists with the means to elevate the field to a 
position of academic respectability. Instructors of composition now had “a way out of 
their academic ‘ghetto’—or, more accurately, a way to transform that ghetto, to make it 
a respectable neighborhood” (14). Though practitioner knowledge would be utterly 
supplanted by researched-based expertise, composition would become an academic 
field developing in time all the accoutrement of disciplinary knowledge production and 
dissemination. As North argues, “Federal interest in English per se on this scale was 
relatively short-lived, but the momentum generated by the intense interest of these few 
years launched modern Composition” (12). 
But the NDEA response to Sputnik was more than simply the result of a national 
panic over the state of U.S. education. The NDEA was, in many important ways, one of 
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the early harbingers of the emerging post-industrial era in which knowledge and 
information processing would serve as the foundation of economic, political, and social 
power. The NDEA reflected the turn toward the post-industrial application of 
knowledge to knowledge in that its mandate to improve education entailed an implicit 
call to apply learning and knowledge to how learning took place and how knowledge 
should be organized in the “discovery and development of new principles, new 
techniques, and new knowledge” (NDEA 1581). Congress would supply the funding, 
but this very funding suggested the expectation of effective instruction that produced 
results and this would require better knowing how knowing itself took place and how 
new knowledge was made. The implication was, then, that the launch of Sputnik 
reflected the Soviet’s superior application of knowledge to learning and that this was to 
be the source of power in a highly technologized near future. In addition, the launch 
itself was a physical representation of knowledge applied to knowledge insofar as it 
served as a powerful piece of propaganda communicating not simply superior 
manufacturing capacities (the Soviets were far outmatched in this capacity by the U.S.; 
parts of Sputnik I were actually made of wood!) but superior command of knowledge 
and knowledge making processes. The post-industrial era had, in many ways, begun. 
North’s historical perspective, and that of many other composition historians, is 
thus broad enough to account for the material changes brought about by the Sputnik 
launch and the NDEA response but remains narrow enough to prevent these events 
from undermining the universalizations that support traditional master narratives. By 
failing to recognize the NDEA and Sputnik as markers of the emerging post-industrial 
context, accounts like North’s fail to see the denouncing of practitioner lore in favor of 
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scholarly expertise for what it was—the abandonment of industrial-era language 
instruction and the beginning of a search for a post-industrial writing pedagogy. This 
limited perspective prevents us from fully contextualizing composition’s rise to 
disciplinarity or the privileged disciplinary practices that result from it. When we 
recognize the post-industrial nature of the crisis that the NDEA represents, it becomes 
evident that the rapid changes in language instruction that took place from 1960 to 1980 
in American colleges and universities were direct responses to the need for and 
implementation of post-industrial instruction in writing. As I will argue in this chapter, 
then, composition became a discipline not as a result of the heroic rejection of current-
traditional rhetoric by composition instructors nor because of short-term funding or 
research-based expertise, but because of the emergence of post-industrialism and the 
reforms this new social, cultural, and economic context demanded. 
To demonstrate how composition’s rise to disciplinarity resulted directly from 
the advent of post-industrialism, I will first demonstrate that securing the federal 
funding by which English would remain relevant in a post-Sputnik world necessarily 
involved dismantling the departmental and pedagogical dynamics that supported 
industrial-era composition. The reforms brought about by the post-industrial realities 
the NDEA was meant to address led to a widespread rejection of formalist definitions of 
writing, the secondary status of composition, and the traditional exclusions enforced by 
industrial-era gatekeeping. The process movement and its connections to Open 
Admissions policies of the late 1960s and 1970s was more the result of the collapse of 
industrial gatekeeping in the face of a new post-industrial order than the cause of that 
collapse. The literacy crisis that attended this collapse amounted to an attempt to 
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maintain existing power structures by re-implementing industrial-era writing 
instruction. To resist this effort, reformist writing instructors turned to research as a way 
of demonstrating their expert knowledge and to thereby claim a professional status that 
would allow them to pursue reforms as they saw fit. The new tenure lines in 
composition and basic writing programs that the literacy crisis pushed administrators to 
create allowed compositionists to pursue research even as it enabled them to frame 
professional composition in opposition to the pedagogies and politics favored by the 
“back-to-basics” movement. The literacy crisis and the reform movement worked 
together to create professional composition which would be defined in terms of post-
industrial writing instruction—anti-formalist in its method and inclusive in its politics.  
The Turn to Process as Post-Industrial Writing 
As social, technological, and cultural developments of the post-World War II 
period increasingly reflected the advent of a post-industrial society, higher education 
had to change to remain viable. The NDEA, with its call to improve the effectiveness of 
education, was a recognition on the part of lawmakers—even if they did not articulate it 
explicitly—that industrial-era instruction was ill-equipped to address the educational 
needs of a post-industrial context symbolically represented by the launch of Sputnik. 
Structured around the use of formalist writing instruction as a sorting mechanism for 
industrial society, English was particularly affected by these changes. That English was 
excluded from NDEA funding indicated that the standardized cultural reproduction 
industrial-era English accomplished through an emphasis on Literature and the use of 
ineffective writing instruction no longer served desired ends. Post-industrial education 
required effective instruction, the creation of new knowledge, and “that no student of 
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ability . . . be denied an opportunity for higher education” (NDEA 1581) all of which 
threatened to make English irrelevant. Accommodating the demands of a post-industrial 
society thus meant dismantling the departmental dynamics and the formalist pedagogies 
that developed as a response to the industrial revolution. In other words, the emergence 
of post-industrialism demanded a turn to anti-formalism in English writing instruction.  
That scholars and teachers recognized the challenge to industrial-era English 
posed by the NDEA is evident in the way lobbying efforts worked to distance the role 
and importance of English in terms that de-emphasized industrial-era English’s focus on 
literature in favor of an equal division among linguistics, composition, and literature. 
This reframing of English resulted from defining English in post-industrial terms—that 
is, as a body of knowledge uniquely applicable in the acquisition and development of 
new knowledge and its dissemination. As The National Interest argued, English filled 
this special role through its emphasis on language and literacy instruction: “Because 
language is the vehicle for ideas, command of language is important in every subject. 
The task of educating students to use language is the special responsibility of the 
English teacher, but his success or failure ultimately affects instruction in all other 
subjects” (17). English was essential for outpacing the Soviets because English was a 
post-industrial discipline. Knowledge of English was the application of knowledge to 
the processes of acquiring and using new knowledge making it central to all forms of 
learning. But if English was important because it taught “language” then its work was 
not primarily dictated by helping students appreciate great literature. As might be 
expected, The National Interest positioned the writing and language study that made 
English relevant as equal to the study of literature arguing specifically that, “English 
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and its teachers should focus on the study of language, literature, and composition” 
(26). This assertion undermined the secondary status of Composition and the primacy of 
Literature—at least theoretically—and thereby reflected the dismantling of industrial-
era English that attended making English relevant in a post-industrial world.  
In its focus on literacy instruction, The National Interest reflected other reform 
efforts of the time such as the Basic Issues conferences of 1958 and the report of the 
College Entrance Examination Board’s (CEEB) Committee on English from 1959. The 
influential Basic Issues conference report entitled “Basic Issues in the Teaching of 
English” and published in 1959 was a key part of a general reform movement in the late 
‘50s to define English via its disciplinary-specific knowledge rather than its particular 
enactment of progressivist concerns for student needs and experiences. As Applebee 
characterizes the report, “The most important assertion was that English must be 
regarded as a ‘fundamental liberal discipline,’ a body of specific knowledge to be 
preserved and transmitted rather than a set of skills or an opportunity for guidance and 
individual adjustment” (193). The underlying assumption of the report, and that of the 
CEEB Committee, was that knowing what defined the subject of English would reveal 
the proper sequence for introducing students to that knowledge. Tellingly, both reports 
reached similar conclusions. The Basic Issues report asserted, “Our only vested interest 
is the development of an increasingly higher degree of literacy in young American 
citizens” (6) and the CEEB report argued that “language, primarily the English 
language, constitutes the core of the subject” and that “the study and use of the English 
language is the proper content of the curriculum” (Qtd. In Shugrue 26). 
51 
These reforms articulated a perceived need to reformulate English in terms of its 
disciplinary-specific knowledge and how that knowledge could best be organized for 
instruction. At least for the Basic Issues conferees, the implications of redefining 
English in this way included questioning the traditional purpose of writing instruction 
and its place in the English department. If literacy was the core of the discipline, then all 
literacy instruction was a matter of disciplinary expertise. The result was that 
“composition acquired status as the third leg of a tripod describing English curricula, 
along with linguistics and literature” (Lloyd-Jones “Composition” 73). Consequently, 
the report concluded its discussion of writing instruction by asking the important 
question, “Can the teaching of composition be raised to the same level of academic 
respectability as the teaching of literature?” (12). As Berlin notes, “the mere fact that 
the question could be entertained by a group of scholars representing the MLA signaled 
a new attitude toward freshman composition . . .” (125). While the CEEB Committee’s 
definition did not necessarily undermine an emphasis on literary language—the 
Committee attended primarily to literature in its report—their definition did align with 
the Basic Issues report findings and included a detailed and rigorous description of 
suggested writing pedagogy.  
But if making English relevant in this new context meant rehabilitating, at least 
to some extent, the standing of composition within the department, it also meant 
abandoning the industrial-era methods of instruction that went along with composition’s 
second-class status. The National Interest argued that English’s role in teaching 
language made it indispensable for improving instruction in all disciplines, thereby 
calling on composition, linguistics, and literature to justify its importance. But by 
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calling on composition, “the ‘service’ course, so long considered the dirty work” (North 
13) because it “could attract [Federal] money” (North 13), the NCTE lobbying efforts 
were embracing the tricky rhetorical position of touting the effectiveness of a 
composition pedagogy that was decidedly and purposefully ineffective, at least as it was 
represented in most textbooks, handbooks, and much practitioner lore. In addition, 
current-traditional rhetoric marked composition as a remedial subject and writing as a 
set of basic formal features that anyone could teach. Current-traditional rhetoric would 
need to be explicitly abandoned if writing were to become a more important part of 
what made English relevant and if that relevance depended on effective instruction. 
The reports of the Basic Issues and the CEEB Committee on English had argued 
that improved effectiveness in instruction depended first on defining the disciplinary-
specific knowledge of English. This perspective was echoed in Jerome Bruner’s widely 
influential The Process of Education, Bruner’s report on the proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 1959 conference on learning processes. In his report, Bruner, a 
Harvard professor and cognitive psychologist, argued perhaps most significantly that 
“any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at 
any stage of development” (13). For Bruner, instruction began not with “a skill but a 
general idea, which can then be used as a basis for recognizing subsequent problems as 
special cases of the idea originally mastered” (17). Students would take up the basic 
methods and approaches of a given field and return to problems and questions that 
required ever more complex applications of disciplinary knowledge. The inductive 
nature of the approach demanded a clear articulation of the disciplinary knowledge 
students were to discover for curricula to be designed effectively. This “spiral” 
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curriculum as it was commonly referred to, reflected the idea that defining the 
knowledge of the discipline was key not only to knowing what to teach, but to knowing 
how to teach it. Effective instruction meant having expert knowledge in both what one 
knew and how one came to know it. 
The case the NCTE made to Congress addressed the ineffectiveness of formalist 
instructional practices by positioning them as no longer effective due to changing 
conditions and the solution as more training in knowledge of the subject matter of 
English. According to The National Interest writing was growing more complex in an 
increasingly technological age and required greater capacities on the part of students 
and teachers. The report explained that despite the reality “that the scientific, political, 
and industrial practices of a century ago are too rudimentary today, we have not faced 
the fact that simple literacy is not enough” (National Interest 23). Indeed, the 
increasingly sophisticated structures of modern life—the “more corporate and more 
interdependent organization in all institutional life” (National Interest 25)—meant that 
effective communication was increasingly essential for individual achievement and 
societal functioning. The “shrewd presentation of the importance of English to national 
welfare” (Applebee 199) of The National Interest framed the poor teaching of such an 
essential subject as English as one of the primary reasons English deserved NDEA 
money. “Poorly prepared teachers of English,” the report argued, “have created a 
serious national problem” (26) with “national concern about the deficiencies in English 
instruction” becoming “almost commonplace” (27). Part III of the report, entitled “The 
Status of English Teaching Today” focused almost entirely on improving teaching in 
English and improving teaching conditions. English teachers, especially writing 
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instructors, could no longer be allowed to implement whatever hodgepodge of 
practitioner lore they saw fit. The effectiveness of such practices was too uncertain. The 
influence of the latest reform movements and Bruner’s “spiral” curriculum were evident 
in where The National Interest located the key to improved pedagogy: “What the 
teacher must study and understand is the complex, incremental nature of the subject, the 
way in which language develops, the way in which understanding and appreciation 
evolve” (27). Teachers would need to be trained in what constituted the knowledge of 
the discipline in order to teach English—linguistics, literature, and composition—
effectively. 
As noted above, the NCTE’s initial lobby was not able to convince Congress to 
include English in the NDEA but did secure funding for English in 1961 through an 
extension of the U.S. Office of Education’s Cooperative Research Program. The 
U.S.O.E. funding created what became known as “Project English” which involved a 
number of research projects, professional conferences, and curriculum study centers 
designed to create new pedagogical materials at various universities across the country. 
Other programs that emerged from the late 1950s shift in emphasis to disciplinary 
knowledge concentrated on teacher training in that knowledge as well. The CEEB 
report emphasized teacher training and development; As Applebee explains, “Of the 
fourteen specific recommendations in the first chapter of the report, for example, all but 
three dealt with certification requirements and teaching conditions” (197). In addition, 
the Commission created a number of summer teacher training institutes in 1962 which 
would influence the design of future curriculum developments such as those initiated by 
the Office of Education’s Project English. This pedagogy took up curriculum 
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development in ways that reflected earlier reforms by seeking to develop a “‘beefed-
up,’ content-oriented curriculum for the schools” (Shugrue 35). 
Disciplinary content was, however, precisely what industrial-era composition 
lacked. If the recent reform recommendations were right, composition instruction could 
hardly become more effective without a basis of knowledge from which to organize and 
sequence writing curricula. But in the rush to implement reforms instructors could not 
wait for the development of such knowledge despite the research funding provided by 
Project English. The initial study centers were to complete their work in 3 to 5 years 
meaning “there was no time for the fundamental rethinking or even the basic research 
that might have generated radical change” (Applebee 203). Curriculum continued to 
focus on literature and its teaching leaving little in the way of new composition 
curriculum that would guarantee improved instruction in writing. While none of the 
research studies funded by Project English in its early years “concerned themselves 
more than peripherally with literature” (201), reflecting the outward face of a new 
English, study centers themselves were more varied in their approach to and 
incorporation of literature into new pedagogy.10 Certainly long-standing traditions of 
the importance of literature can account for this reality in the actual practice of 
designing curriculum, but there was little disciplinary knowledge in composition 
available to counter this impulse. Composition could no longer be neglected. 
Kitzhaber, who served as chair of the Project English study center at Oregon 
University, lamented the inadequate knowledge base for Composition in a paper 
presented at the 1963 CCCC and later published as “4C, Freshman English, and the 
                                                 
10 The Project English study center at Oregon University chaired by Albert Kitzhaber made literature a 
primary focus of the curriculum. 
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Future.” Initially decrying the “bewildering variety” of pedagogies at work in the 
freshman course, Kitzhaber explains the increasingly difficult position this puts 
Composition in vis-à-vis other fields receiving Federal support. Kitzhaber notes, “The 
gap [between math and science and English] is wide enough already to cause acute 
uneasiness; and the wider it gets, the more untenable will be the position of those of us 
who have direct responsibility for the course” (131). While other subjects had already 
embraced the reform movement emphasizing the importance of studying school 
subjects as organized bodies of knowledge, English—especially composition—was 
falling behind precisely because it did not have a unified research approach. The 
answer—reflecting the influence of the Basic Issues report and the assumptions of 
Bruner’s “spiral” curriculum—was to define a subject matter and become experts in it 
through research. Kitzhaber argued: 
if we in the English teaching profession are serious about wanting to 
make radical improvements in the teaching of composition, whether in 
school or college, we shall have to start asking fundamental questions 
about the act of writing, and asking them in a way that will make it 
possible to get answers based on more than hunches and personal 
theories and long-established custom. (133)  
 
Kitzhaber’s laments are hard to argue with but they also reflect the direct challenge to 
the industrial-era notion that writing instruction required no particular expertise. In an 
era when new knowledge worked as the source of political power, inexpert instruction 
was unacceptable. 
The NCTE formally recognized this reality by commissioning Richard 
Braddock, Richard Lloyd-Jones, and Lowell Schoer to assess the state of research in 
composition in 1961 as part of an attempt to improve the teaching of composition. 
Braddock, et al.’s famous report, Research in Written Composition collected 504 
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examples of previous research and found existing research to be in a woefully 
inadequate state. “Today’s research in Composition taken as a whole,” the most often 
quoted passage from the report explains, “may be compared to chemical research as it 
emerged from the period of alchemy: some terms are being defined usefully, a number 
of procedures are being refined, but the field as a whole is laced with dreams, 
prejudices, and makeshift operations” (5).11 Many of the studies Braddock, Lloyd-
Jones, and Schoer examined were conducted by education faculty intent on addressing 
the needs of the student in the classroom rather than the specific knowledge that post-
industrial reform efforts were undertaking. But if the existing research was not up to 
par, collectively it did support a basic challenge to industrial era instruction. The studies 
collected pointed at least to the fact that “the teaching of formal grammar has a 
negligible or, because it usually displaces some instruction and practice in actual 
composition, even a harmful effect on the improvements of writing” (37-38). In other 
words, industrial era assumptions about writing were wrong and needed to be replaced 
by new forms of expert knowledge. 
As reform efforts converged in 1963, the form of post-industrial writing 
instruction began to take shape. Michael F. Shugrue observes, “The exhilaration of the 
profession late in 1963 can scarcely be overestimated. The federal government had 
finally recognized its obligations to the humanities and had, with significant amounts of 
money, begun a program to improve instruction in English through basic research” (37). 
This was particularly true for composition for which 1963 was “a fulcrum year” 
(Connors “Composition” 202). With formalist instruction becoming increasingly 
                                                 
11 As a response to the findings of the survey, Braddock founded the journal Research in the Teaching of 
English in 1965. 
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untenable in the face of reforms and the need to define a disciplinary knowledge on 
which writing instruction could be based, discussions of composition began to turn 
toward the processes of composing and finding a base of knowledge with which to 
describe those processes. The important 1963 CCCC—which Lisa Ede and Andrea 
Lunsford describe as a “watershed” moment in composition history (10)—exhibited this 
approach with its conference theme “The Content of English” and the emphasis on 
composing processes among a number of presenters. The content with which to 
properly organize the understanding and teaching of those processes for many 
prominent presenters was rhetoric whether of the “new rhetoric” or classical variety. 
The conference included seven important papers on rhetoric, including Wayne Booth’s 
“The Rhetorical Stance,” Edward P.J. Corbett’s “The Usefulness of Classical Rhetoric,” 
and Francis Christiansen’s “A Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence” that discussed 
Christiansen’s rhetorical model developed as part of his work at the University of 
Nebraska Project English study center. 
Certainly the prominence of important papers on rhetoric at the ’63 CCCC had a 
number of sources including recently completed work by Stephen Toulmin and Thomas 
Kuhn on novel articulations of rhetorical principles. But the influential discussion of 
rhetoric in this instance and its coincidence with developments that demanded a 
disciplinary knowledge for effective, anti-formalist writing suggests connections 
between the importance of rhetoric at the conference and the reforms in English spurred 
by the NDEA and the post-industrial context its passage represented. At that very 
conference, the CCCC passed two resolutions accepting rhetoric as “an integral part of 
the freshman course” and arguing that “rhetorical principles should be the 
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organizational principle of the freshman English course and the evaluating criteria for 
grading student papers’. (Connors “Composition” 206) Reforming composition required 
rejecting formalist practices and defining a disciplinary knowledge base from which to 
construct new, more process-oriented writing pedagogies. As North, Connors, and Ede 
and Lunsford note, 1963 was a pivotal year in composition, but it was a pivotal year 
because reform-minded compositionists were articulating the model for post-industrial 
composition that would characterize reforms from that point on. When the NCTE 
finally secured NDEA funding with the 1964 publication of The National Interest and 
the Continuing Education of Teachers of English—a detailed account of the 
developments of Project English and directions for future reforms—these trends only 
became further instantiated. Industrial-era composition was not to be abandoned 
overnight, but “advances” in composition would from this point on would exhibit the 
turn to the composing process and the application of an established knowledge base in 
efforts to understand and teach that process.  
While the publication of Research in Written Composition by Braddock, Lloyd-
Jones, and Schoer revealed the need for further research on writing and writing 
instruction, compositionists tended to draw from existing traditions or expert knowledge 
borrowed from other disciplines as there were few material supports for writing-specific 
research to be done by those that could actually apply it to the course. Christiansen’s 
already mentioned sentence rhetoric was influenced heavily by work done in linguistics 
and classical rhetoric. Gordon Rohman and Albert Wlecke’s influential work on “pre-
writing” drew most directly from Bruner’s cognitive psychology and process-based 
model of education. Edward P.J. Corbett turned to the weighty tradition of Classical 
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rhetoric to create his 1965 textbook, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student and 
even argued in a 1967 article entitled “What is Being Revived?” that “What we seem to 
need now is a rhetoric of the process rather than of the product . . .” (172). Richard 
Young, Alton Becker, and Kenneth Pike’s 1970 textbook Rhetoric: Discovery and 
Change used a complex tagmemic grid that appropriated cognitivist problem-solving as 
a means of generating new arguments by playing two sets of concepts against each 
other (one from a triad of physics metaphors and the other from a triad of linguistics 
metaphors). Even the famous disagreement between American and British scholars at 
the Dartmouth Conference in 1966, inasmuch as it concerned composition, generally 
amounted to a debate over whether disciplinary knowledge or student experience should 
form the basis for rejecting overly formalist pedagogies.12  
These appropriations, whatever their intentions, were understood and explicitly 
articulated as rejections of industrial-era formalist composition. Indeed, opposing the 
use of cognitivism, rhetoric, or linguistics in composition to current-traditional 
formalism became something of a trope in composition scholarship of the 1960s. In his 
1964 CCC article, “Pre-writing: The Stages of Discovery in the Writing Process,” 
Gordon D. Rohman draws on Bruner’s piece, “Art of Discovery” to redefine “good 
writing” in opposition to the uninformed, traditionally formalist definition arguing “We 
                                                 
12 The complexities of the debates at Dartmouth fall outside the scope of this project and, of course, 
provide complications to this oversimplified assessment. For example, the debate did not split entirely 
between Americans and British scholars for one thing. In addition, the focus of the conference was 
defining English, not simply composition. But the debate divided primarily, as Joseph Harris points out, 
between the American’s focus on disciplinary knowledge and the British focus on teaching. The 
Americans at Dartmouth generally hoped to define English according to any number of potentially 
disciplinary-specific knowledge bases such as linguistics, literacy, and established literary traditions. The 
British were more interested in students’ responses to English instruction than imparting a disciplinary 
knowledge. The British version of Process—or the growth model—would influence a number of the 
American scholars but would ultimately be aligned with “expressivism” and, as I will discuss later, be 
mostly dismissed for very specific historical reasons. For more on the debate at Dartmouth see Harris, 
Joseph. A Teaching Subject: Composition since 1966. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996. 
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submit that ‘good writing’ is that which has involved a writer responsible enough to 
discover his personal context within the ‘subject context,’ and ‘bad writing’ is that 
which has not. (In neither case is ‘correctness’ an issue. ‘Bad writing’ can be, often is, 
flawlessly ‘correct’)” (108). And in his 1968 “A Method for Teaching Writing,” Peter 
Elbow proposes a rhetorically-based approach to writing instruction that calls on 
students to find an authentic voice with which they might address shifting writing 
contexts. Opposing his methods to formalist writing instruction, Elbow claims that 
traditional instruction cannot ensure good writing for “A student who has [an authentic 
voice] may make spelling and syntactical errors, he may organize his papers badly and 
reason badly; and his sentences may contradict all the structural canons of what is 
currently called good prose” (120). Proper writing is not necessarily a mark of good 
writing and so instruction in mechanics and surface features should not form the basis 
of writing instruction. 
The need to improve writing instruction in order to secure federal funding 
demanded the rejection of ineffective and uninformed current-traditional pedagogies in 
favor of instruction based on some identifiable disciplinary-specific knowledge base. 
Lacking sufficient expertise, material support, or individual professional incentive to 
conduct basic research on writing, compositionists appropriated what knowledge they 
could from linguistics, rhetoric, psychology, and semantics. For a number of specific 
rhetorical reasons I discuss below, widely-accepted histories of the field have figured 
the use of these knowledge bases as the initiators of the turn away from current-
traditional formalism, finding ample evidence in the use of these influences in 
pedagogical reforms of the time. While this borrowing did help advance and no doubt 
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influenced the development of anti-formalist, or process-based, pedagogies, it is more 
accurate to understand the role of linguistics, psychology, and rhetoric as the 
“disciplinary knowledge” to which reform-minded compositionists turned once the 
NDEA had demonstrated the need to abandon current-traditional formalism in order for 
English to remain relevant. The educational demands of the post-industrial era that the 
NDEA represented, forced compositionists to embrace an anti-formalist pedagogy and 
to seek the requisite disciplinary knowledge base that would inform that new pedagogy 
wherever they might.  
Post-Industrial Pedagogy and Inclusive Politics 
As we have seen, these reforms necessarily meant taking apart the departmental 
dynamics and perspectives on language through which English served the purposes of 
the dominant culture in the Industrial era. But while dismantling industrial-era English 
did not necessarily mean certainly did not mean dismantling the dominant culture, it did 
involve a tacit rejection of the traditional exclusions that industrial English supported. 
Current-traditional pedagogies had characterized the dialects of upper- and upper-
middle-class whites as “proper” or Standard English. By framing the use of a specific 
dialect as “good writing,” formalist instruction obscured the inherent disadvantages 
some students faced in accommodating an academic discourse so divergent from their 
home discourse. Current-traditional formalism thus naturalized the exclusion of poor, 
minority, or linguistically diverse students as a failure on the part of the individual 
student to learn to write “properly.” The increasingly widespread association of 
industrial-era writing instruction with an inexpert past meant that student failures, 
especially the failure of what was commonly called the “disadvantaged” student was a 
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failure of the new English to enact its expertise on the subject of writing instruction. As 
the report of the “Composition Courses for the Unprepared Freshman” workshop of the 
1969 CCCC would put it,  
Failing such students becomes an admission, in part, that English is 
unteachable, that the students are unteachable, that English teachers 
cannot adapt to changing needs, and that ethnic and cultural 
disadvantages cannot be overcome. Instead of continuing to be 
entrenched behind traditional clichés and courses, teachers and 
administrators, impelled by growing concern, should be instigating 
research into an educational problem peculiar to this decade. (248)  
 
Effective instruction was instruction that could teach all students to improve their 
writing, especially disadvantaged students.  
Not surprisingly then, the intellectual developments and curricular reforms that 
marked the emergence of this new English from the beginning concerned themselves 
rather explicitly with addressing less capable or “disadvantaged” students. In his 
description of the “spiral” curriculum Bruner emphasized its applicability to all 
students, particularly those commonly left out of discussions of effective curricula. 
Noting that teaching should focus on student excellence, Bruner explains that the term 
“excellence”: 
here refers not only to schooling the better students but also to helping 
each student achieve his optimum intellectual development. Good 
teaching that emphasizes the structure of a subject is probably even more 
valuable for the less able student than for the gifted one, for it is the 
former rather than the latter who is most easily thrown off track by poor 
teaching. (9) 
 
The effort to reach every student found a receptive audience in English departments 
looking to reframe themselves for a public and a Congress ready to fund expert 
knowledge creators who could support the nation’s interests through education. As 
Shugrue explained in 1968, “[Bruner’s] emphasis on reaching every student has become 
64 
as essential a consideration in curriculum planning in English as the search for an 
underlying structure in the field” (28). Expertise in teaching English was acquired by 
knowing the discipline but demonstrated by reaching the disadvantaged student 
however that student might be defined.  
The connections between reforms, research, and expanded inclusion in English, 
especially writing instruction, were prominent throughout the rest of the 1960s. No less 
than seven of the Curriculum Study Centers created by Project English directly 
addressed the effect of curricula on students of less privileged backgrounds—cultural, 
social, economic, or linguistic (Shugrue 31-32). In a 1962 conference talk, published as 
part of the conference report Improving English Skills of Culturally Different Youth in 
Large Cities, Marjorie Smiley, director of the Hunter College Project English study 
center, argued that minority and low-income students “are in certain specific ways 
deprived” and so often need “much more practice in the many phases of language 
readiness that teachers take for granted among middle-class children” (55). The 
traditional instruction that met the needs of a narrow section of the student population 
was insufficient in accomplishing the goals of inclusive instruction that the latest 
research, educational theories and the NDEA itself demanded. As Steve Parks has 
observed, “process advocates focused on the protection of a student’s language. At 
academic conferences, such as Dartmouth, and in academic works, such as Ken 
Macrorie’s Uptaught (1970), arguments were made for increased attention to the 
knowledge and language that students brought into the classroom” (69). A single dialect 
was increasingly perceived as a potential impediment to the learning of disadvantaged 
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students. As a result, accepting the usual exclusions of writing instruction became a 
mark of an instructor or researcher’s uninformed and inexpert approach.  
As reforms progressed through the 1960s these projects became formalized by 
various professional bodies. The descriptive rather than prescriptive approach to 
language in structuralist and then socio-linguistics provided “scientific” research-based 
justifications for embracing the plurality of student language and their influences are 
evident in the official studies and resolutions. In 1965, for example, the NCTE Task 
Force on Teaching English to the Disadvantaged published a study of 190 programs 
entitled Language Problems for the Disadvantaged in which the task force concluded 
that “children be permitted to operate in the dialect of their community at the lower 
levels of elementary school education, and that direct instruction in the use of standard 
informal English be begun no earlier than the intermediate elementary grades” (271). 
Four years later the NCTE passed a resolution “On the Need for Courses Reflecting the 
Cultural and Ethnic Reality of American Society” in which the influence of this 
descriptive turn of effective instruction was evident. The resolution, which applied to 
“all of [the NCTE’s] appropriate commissions and committees and related professional 
organizations,” called for working “actively to educate [NCTE] members and the total 
American community to an understanding that social dialect is not an index of 
intelligence, capability, or learning ability” (34). The anti-formalism that marked 
expertise in English and that had become an integral part of new developments in 
English increasingly involved defending the plurality of student languages.  
Such reports and resolutions, of course, reflected as well the political context of 
their time which around the country, and on college campuses in particular, involved 
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radical challenges to the political and educational status quo. The rise of the New Left 
and its social activist politics in the late 1950s and 60s led to a surge of political 
activism centering on institutions of higher learning. A number of varied but related 
movements such as the student power movement, Black Power, and the women’s 
liberation movement began staging protests and activist events on college campuses 
across the country. Students demanded greater say in their own education and a less 
authoritarian approach to instruction. As part of this explicit politicizing of the college 
campus, student groups like the Students for a Democratic Society also called for 
greater “relevance” in college curricula, challenging what seemed the willful 
disconnection of course content from the social injustices of American society and U.S. 
politics, especially in relation to the war in Viet Nam. Many students objected to 
becoming part of a system they saw as inherently supporting a military-industrial 
complex built on racism, sexism, and imperialism. Textbooks and assignments that 
excluded the voices of black or women authors were seen as tacitly perpetuating 
injustice society through education.  
As the one course every student had to take First-Year Composition came in for 
a disproportionate share of criticism.13 But part of this focus on writing had to do with 
the increasingly politicized nature of language and its use in education. Questions 
regarding language and its role in excluding students became a central focus of 
criticisms emerging from the New Left, the Black Panthers, and more radical scholars 
                                                 
13 Sharon Crowley relates an extreme example of the ire activist students could unleash at first-year 
writing. Crowley writes “During the late 1960s, students began to express their dissatisfaction with 
business as usual in the freshman writing class” that students at Iowa, as part of an anti-war movement, 
burned down the composition building. Sometimes this dissatisfaction was expressed quite compellingly: 
at the University of Iowa, for example, the rhetoric building was burned down” (“Composition” 203). For 
more see Crowley, Sharon. Composition in the University: Historical and Polemical Essays. Pittsburgh, 
PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1998. 
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within the university itself. As part of their political goals, “the Black Panthers had tried 
to link Black English to a general critique of U.S. society” (Parks 165). The Black 
Panthers asserted the legitimacy of Black English as a dialect in an attempt to challenge 
the class-based, racially segregated U.S. society that excluded Black English from the 
main stream. Advocates of women’s liberation likewise pointed to the sexist language 
that made up American language norms whether spoken or written.  
By 1969 the New University Conference—a group of leftist English professors 
and educators who sought to use the clout of professional organizations like the NCTE, 
the MLA, and the CCCC to effect political and social change—were announcing in an 
open letter penned by Paul Resnikoff that “Linguists and English teachers should 
concentrate not on trying to teach everyone to speak and write upper middle class white 
dialect but rather on changing the attitude of society that discriminates against other 
dialects” (265). These political movements and the critiques they employed highlighted 
the political character of choosing a particular language to teach in school. Though 
writing instructors and researchers might have had their own reasons for turning away 
from current-traditional rhetoric and its traditional exclusions, the political activism of 
the 1960s increasingly made embracing the plurality of students’ language a political 
action. As Parks explains “although process advocates were not necessarily linked to 
the New Left, as the 1960s drew to a close, certain elements of their rhetoric became 
permeated by and associated with the New Left and progressive social movements” 
(70). The anti-formalism of 60’s reforms would only become more of a political 
statement as time went on.  
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The creation of Open Admissions policies in 1970 at the City University of New 
York brought a practical urgency to the reforms of the previous decade and the politics 
of language instruction. Under Open Admissions, any student with a high-school 
diploma could attend university and the result was an influx of students who were less 
traditionally prepared for college writing than educators were used to. This influx of 
“students that differed in socioeconomic background, culture, gender, and discourses 
not only from the instructors but also from each other probably threw a much brighter 
spotlight on the ineffectiveness of composition” (Goggin 39). Under these conditions 
and facing student writing that they had trouble even reading, more and more instructors 
embraced anti-formalist pedagogical reforms in place of product-focused instructional 
methods for which these new students, coming as they often did from poor school 
districts or from home discourses that used “non-Standard” dialects, were often utterly 
unprepared. In addition, the sheer number of students Open Admissions brought to the 
university put enormous pressure on teachers tasked with grading multiple finished 
student products in a single semester. Those instructors still relying on product-focused 
pedagogies found themselves ill-equipped to handle the workload but as Sharon 
Crowley explains, “Early advocates of process tactics . . . turned to them as means of 
relieving the pressure put on teachers by the institutional situation of composition” 
(194). A focus on the process of writing seemed a more effective and humane way to 
teach many Open Admissions students to write and allowed instructors to ease the 
burden of teaching by using in-class writing, peer review, and revision activities 
characteristic of process pedagogies. 
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But if Open Admissions provided one more impetus for rejecting current-
traditional rhetoric, it also strengthened the connection between anti-formalism and a 
leftist politics. The most immediate and visible cause of the new admissions policies 
was the protests carried out by black and Puerto Rican students demanding greater 
access to education at Columbia university in 1969. This “radical” political action and 
the resulting policy changes meant that Open Admissions “along with federal, state, and 
local affirmative action policies put the highly charged issue of accommodating 
culturally diverse students at the center of debates in higher education” (Henze, et al. 
13). The issue was access and was highly politicized suggesting as it did a challenge to 
existing social, racial, and class structures. As Jerome Karabel explained, writing in 
1972, “The way in which a society distributes its rewards is a profoundly political 
matter, and as long as the occupational structure remains linked to the educational 
system, the admissions process is inherently political” (38). Opening the doors to 
students from populations traditionally marginalized in American society amounted, on 
one level, to challenging the existing system that marginalized them. And the doors 
were definitely opened; from 1974 to 1978 the number of African American students 
enrolled in college went from 821,930 to 960,804, the number of Hispanic students rose 
from 287,432 to 370,366, and Native American students increased from 52,876 to 
66,264 (Deskins 20).  
The turn toward anti-formalism in writing instruction as a means of helping 
these students succeed was, then, a political act that aligned such instruction with 
progressive inclusive politics. Process based pedagogies became what James Marshall 
calls a kind of “political-pedagogical protest” (47) meaning that, as Marshall explains, 
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many process advocates “were rebels, or tried to be. We did inhale. We self-consciously 
set ourselves up as outsiders, and then we gloried in it” (48). Anti-formalist pedagogies 
went from being a means of improving the standing of English in terms of funding and 
educational theory to a progressive political movement aligned with many of the goals 
of the New Left. The ideas expressed in Donald Murray’s 1972 manifesto “Teach the 
Process, not Product,” were not exactly new when Murray published them. “For 
example,” James Zebroski observes “the very phrase ‘from product to process’ was 
circulating for years before it was widely printed and took on the tone of a political 
slogan” (110). But after political activism of the late 1960s and the advent of open 
admissions it became a political slogan, declaring explicitly the connection between the 
anti-formalism that characterized post-industrial English and the progressive politics of 
the New Left. What started primarily as a rejection of industrial-era composition 
designed to ensure the relevance of English in a new age, had become a political 
movement that tinged reforms of writing instruction with a progressive politics that 
would characterize the field thereafter. 
The political-pedagogical movement that began to grow out of the educational 
reforms and political activism of the 1960s and which was galvanized by the debate 
over Open Admissions policies granted impetus for ever more formal assertions of the 
assumptions of post-industrial English instruction. Perhaps the most assertive of these 
was the CCCC Students’ Right to Their Own Language (SRTOL) resolution of 1974, 
ultimately published in 1976. SRTOL reflected all the developments of post-industrial 
reforms. The resolution draws on a research-based anti-formalism for its justification 
arguing “Language scholars long ago denied that the myth of a standard American 
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dialect has any validity” (ncte.org). It then points to the political nature of the willful 
ineffectiveness that characterizes industrial-era composition stating that “The claim that 
any one dialect is unacceptable amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its 
dominance over another. Such a claim leads to false advice for speakers and writers, 
and immoral advice for humans” (ncte.org). Instead, the resolution implies, effective 
instruction is necessary and the training that supports teacher expertise will enable these 
teachers to “respect diversity and uphold the right of students to their own language” 
(ncte.org). The hallmarks of post-industrial reforms—effective instruction through the 
rejection of formalist ineffectiveness, attention to disadvantaged students, instructor 
expertise, and leftist politics—had become the official position of Composition’s key 
professional organization. In other words, Composition had officially embraced post-
industrial English.  
Process as Expertise 
Histories of composition have commonly figured Janet Emig’s 1971 study, The 
Composing Process of Twelfth Graders, as initiating a distinct “process movement,” 
qualitatively different from what came before that would itself lead to the formation of 
the discipline. According to North, the study “arguably stands as the single most 
influential piece of Researcher inquiry—and maybe any kind of inquiry—in 
Composition’s short history” (197). Emig’s monograph, “a slight, 151-page NCTE 
research report, which was published without fanfare in 1971 and sold at the time for 
under five dollars” (Nelms 108) accomplished this influence by the sheer force of its 
innovations and insights. Perhaps most important among these was that “composing 
processes were as idiosyncratic as the people who deployed them and the occasions on 
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which they were used” (Crowley “Composition” 202), a discovery that spoke to the 
complexity of writing and that “remains an idea central to composition theory” (Nelms 
108). In addition, as Emig herself explains, previous studies of composing were 
“experiments in instruction” whereas the purpose of her study, “on the other hand, is to 
attempt to describe how student writers usually or typically behave as they write with 
minimal direct intervention by the investigator” (21). The results were “rewarding 
enough to make further investigation of this process seem worthwhile” (North 197) 
leading compositionists to turn increasingly to basic research on composing processes. 
This trend, in turn, established a base of research knowledge that granted composition 
greater academic legitimacy as a field and provided the basis for the creation of the 
discipline (Crowley “Composing” 191; Fleming “Rhetoric” 33). 
As novel as Emig’s study seemed, the work very much positioned itself within 
the context of 1960s reforms developed in response to the demands of post-industrial 
education. The descriptive effort on Emig’s part might have been “an expedition into 
new territory” (Buxton, v), but calls for such basic research, like those made by 
Kitzhaber and Research in Written Composition eight years earlier, had been a key 
feature of initial reforms; Emig cites Research in Written Composition directly as a 
source of both the exigence for her study and its methodology (2; 19). Like earlier 
reformers, Emig criticizes current-traditional pedagogy as an inexpert, uninformed, and 
“neurotic activity” (99), arguing that “There is little evidence . . . that the persistent 
pointing out of specific errors in student themes leads to the elimination of these errors, 
yet teachers expend much of their energy in this futile and unrewarding exercise” (99). 
The attention the study’s results indicated should be paid to process-oriented “reflexive 
73 
writing” (Emig 37)—writing that played a “contemplative role” in “relations between 
the writing self and the field of discourse” (Emig 37)—was necessarily more inclusive, 
being a form of writing which “the ‘average’ and ‘less able’ student . . . can do best and, 
often, far better than the ‘able,’ since there is so marvelous a democracy in the 
distribution of feeling and of imagination” (Emig 100). Research in The Composing 
Processes demonstrated the need for anti-formalist instruction which Emig aligned with 
leftist politics by attacking the five-paragraph theme, as Marshall notes, in “the 
language we used to voice our other protests at the time—the language we used to 
satirize militarism and narrow forms of patriotism” (47). 
That same context also spoke, however, to the novelty and rarity of works like 
The Composing Processes. The vast majority of composition instructors had little 
material support or time to conduct research nor was there much incentive in English 
departments to do so. Basic research was part of the effort to improve instruction but 
such work required time, money, and energy unavailable to most writing teachers and 
low on the list of research priorities for tenure-track English, even in the early 1970s. 
Emig’s own dissertation, on which her 1971 study was based, was itself extremely 
difficult to complete because of a similar lack of support. Her dissertation took nine 
years to complete during which time Emig went through ten different advisors the lack 
of direction available to her and the sense that research on composing was not 
important. Her dissertation took her nine years to complete during which time Emig 
went through ten different dissertation advisors. That Emig had such difficulty as a 
graduate student researching composing in the Education department at Harvard 
suggested the difficulty an adjunct instructor or a faculty member of an English 
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department that still based its raison d’etre on the study of literature would have 
conducting methodologically sound basic research on the composing process. This fact 
alone accounts for the widespread appropriation of research from other disciplines and 
the variety of approaches that characterized efforts to find a disciplinary knowledge 
base on which to reform writing instruction in the 1960s. It also explained the relative 
dearth of any mention of Emig’s groundbreaking research in the pages of CCC in the 
years immediately following its publication. Much would need to change for the 
potential impact of Emig’s work to find purchase among compositionists.  
Change was not long in coming. The reforms of the 1960s had been supported 
by prominent voices in composition but had not been without controversy, particularly 
among the broader public. The popular backlash to reforms, commonly called “back-to-
basics,” advocated a “return” to a pedagogical focus on the fundamentals of a given 
subject, the “basics” that allegedly made more complex work possible. As it related to 
writing this meant demanding a current-traditional approach that taught students the 
“basics” of grammar, spelling, syntax, and sentence and paragraph structure. In the 
minds of many, instructional reforms and pedagogical experimentation had pursued 
various forms of academic fancy or political relevance or both at the expense of these 
essential components of writing instruction. As early as 1971 Janet Ross could voice a 
weary lament in CCC that “Those of us who teach freshman composition are 
accustomed to the complaint from parents, employers, and other educators, ‘Students 
can’t write. They aren’t taught grammar anymore’” (179). Certainly complaints about 
the state of education were nothing new but tied as reforms were to the unruly 1960s, 
the exclusion of these tedious, yet necessary, aspects of writing reflected not only 
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questionable teaching but controversial politics and increased the calls to return to the 
alleged basics. By 1973 “Across the country the demand was rising for traditional 
schooling or conservative alternatives. ‘Back to basics’ was a spreading slogan, and a 
new name, ‘fundamental school,’ was growing popular. Our youngsters weren’t 
learning to read and write as well as they used to, the argument ran” (Willhelm 46).  
Complaints about the basics would grow louder with the implementation of 
Open Admissions policies. Standardized test scores in all subject areas had been on a 
slow but steady decline since the 1963-64 academic year which had in part called forth 
the back-to-basics rhetoric. Students’ scores on verbal skills measured by the SAT fell 
from 478 in 1962-63 to the 430s by the end of the decade and mathematics scores 
dropped from 502 to the 470s (“Why” par. 2). The influx of less traditionally prepared 
students that Open Admissions made possible drove scores down even further. During 
the 1973-74 year the combined scores slipped a full 11 points raising alarm bells among 
parents, administrators, and the public at large (“Why” par. 2). The passage of the 
SRTOL resolution by the very people charged with teaching students to read and write 
coupled with falling scores raised serious questions about what exactly students were 
being taught and why. As Time magazine claimed in 1977 the answer to “why those 
falling test scores?” was “Perhaps too much TV, certainly too little hard work in 
school” (“Why” par. 1)14 It all seemed clear evidence that the permissiveness of 60s 
reforms in terms of grammar instruction and drill in mechanics were at fault for 
students’ inability to write.  
The result was a full-fledged literacy crisis. As Lisa Ede points out, “the 
‘dominant ideological climate’ of the 1970s was such that a material reality that could 
                                                 
14 It is difficult not to indulge in pointing out the non-standard character of this sentence. 
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have been viewed positively as a sign of the increased democratization of higher 
education in America—the presence of a new group of students who were the first in 
their family to attend college—was interpreted instead as a literacy crisis” (66). 
Certainly much of the popular press favored that interpretation with prominent 
publications like Time (“What Schools Cannot Do,” April 1973; “They Shall Not Pass,” 
Dec. 1973), U.S. News and World Report (“Why 1.4 Million Americans Can’t Read or 
Write—And the Remedies Proposed,” Aug. 1974), and Education Digest (“The Right to 
Read,” Nov. 1974) making alarmist claims about the state of education in general and 
literacy education in particular. But it was in 1975 when Time published “Can’t Anyone 
Here Speak English?” in August of 1975 followed closely by Merrill Sheils’ widely-
read Newsweek piece, “Why Johnny Can’t Write,” in December of the same year, that 
the discussions of the alleged problems with literacy instruction reached a sense of 
crisis resulting in widespread calls among the public for something to be done.  
Predictably, the answer involved rolling back the reforms of the 1960s and a 
return to the “basics.” For Sheils blame rested entirely with recent reforms, their focus 
on process, and the new perspectives on language that this focus supported. Dismissing 
the typical scapegoat of television, the effects of which “might be counteracted if 
students were required to learn the language in the classroom” (2), Sheils argues that 
“Even where writing still is taught, the creative school discourages insistence on 
grammar, structure and style” (3). Specifically the villains were the new theories being 
applied to writing by instructors looking for novel approaches. “Teachers in the 
classroom” Sheils argued, have ignored the essential basics because they “have come 
increasingly under the sway of the structural-linguistic dogma” (3) which asserted that 
77 
“there are no real standards for any language, apart from the way it is commonly 
spoken” (3). The result of these developments was the SRTOL resolution, what Sheils 
calls an “extraordinary policy statement,” adopted by well-meaning but misguided 
teachers who failed to see that not teaching Standard English was itself a form of 
oppression (3). “Those who would teach English,” Sheils writes “must also once again 
insist that not all writing is equally admirable” (5).The answer for Sheils—and many 
others—was a return to the disciplining effect of tighter standards, themselves 
articulated as the “basics.” 
Despite the emphasis on writing skills in much of the reporting, the crisis had 
less to do with students’ ability to write and more to do with anxieties about the 
changing social and economic context. Sheils’ primary concern, for example, was not 
about the literacy skills of students or the effect on the economy. The real worry was the 
effect of expanded access to education on civilization itself: “If the written language is 
placed at the mercy of every new colloquialism and if every fresh dialect demands and 
gets equal sway, then we will soon find ourselves back in Babel” (Sheils 5). Failing to 
impose a single standard dialect—which in turn represents a single set of cultural 
values—risks degeneration into barbarity. As unfounded as this position is, Sheils and 
other critics were not entirely wrong; a particular way of life was collapsing—industrial 
society. The expanded access that drove down test scores precipitating the crisis had 
been facilitated by new approaches to writing intended to meet the needs of post-
industrial society. The attempt to return to the “basics” of industrial-era instruction was, 
in part, an attempt to reassert the industrial context that those basics served and so 
reflected anxieties about the passing of the industrial era on the part of those in power in 
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industrial society. Jerome Karabel notes a similar reaction to Open Admissions policies 
by immigrant families who established themselves through a “meritocratic system of 
higher education” which “will enable them to transmit their status to their children” 
(40). But the development of an equality-based system of access that did away with the 
meritocratic restrictions on access “threatens these people (and, more widely, the 
‘haves’ of American society) precisely because it challenges the legitimacy of the 
principle that justifies their position” (Karabel 40). By calling for industrial-era writing 
instruction, the crisis amounted to a demand that the power structures of the industrial 
era be ensured despite the shifting context. 
But if the crisis made a case for industrial-era writing instruction, it also made 
one of a sort for post-industrial pedagogies. The crisis highlighted for composition 
instructors just how distinct their reformist perspectives had apparently become from 
widely accepted views of writing among the general public. The widespread support for 
“back-to-basics” in the popular press suggested that the traditional exclusions and 
formalist pedagogies of industrial-era writing instruction represented a lay perspective. 
If industrial-era writing instruction was the lay approach, then the anti-formalism of 
post-industrial approaches reflected an expert perspective developed since the passage 
of the NDEA. That process-based, left-leaning pedagogies seemed only to appeal to 
those who taught composition for a living, at least if the press were to be believed, only 
further suggested that writing instructors were professionals possessed of an exclusive 
and unique expertise. What that expertise consisted of was itself informed by the crisis. 
The industrial pedagogy advocated by the public figured writing as a remedial skill 
involving the application of a simple set of formal rules. The knowledge the public did 
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not possess, the knowledge that positioned compositionists as experts was precisely the 
knowledge that writing was a complex phenomenon that could not be reduced to the 
basics as they were traditionally conceived.  
Efforts to respond to the crisis, particularly in the primary professional 
organization of writing instructors, the CCCC, were clearly focused on demonstrating 
that expertise. The CCCC themed its 1976 meeting “What’s Really Basic?” as a call to 
respond to the public furor. As Lloyd-Jones explains “Clearly, the ‘really’ was intended 
to suggest that popular discussions were not getting the point” (“Afterword” 52). Just 
how much the public missed the point was made clear by Carl Klaus in a December 
1976 CCC article entitled “Public Opinion and Professional Belief.” Responding to “the 
sound and fury of all the news I’ve been hearing lately about bad writing and all the 
remedies about how to make it better” (335) Klaus argues that “being professional” 
about teaching writing means knowing “as much about writing as we can” (337). 
Product-focused instruction that equates writing “with marks on a page, rules of 
grammar, forms of expression. . .” (Klaus 337) creates a simplistic view of teaching 
writing in which “all you have to do is memorize the rules and apply them in your 
teaching” (Klaus 337). But writing, of course, was not as simple as the post-industrial 
turn to process made clear. As Klaus notes, “if you conceive of writing not simply as a 
product but also as a process, if you conceive of it as a complex mental activity, which 
brings together, through language, a writer, the universe of experience, and an audience, 
then you will find the requirement [to know about writing] to be very complex and 
demanding” (337). Those who understand writing as a process can see the true character 
of writing as a complex phenomenon that only experts could teach. 
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In 1977 in the first-ever CCCC Chair’s address, Richard Lloyd-Jones made a 
similar argument by describing composition in terms strikingly similar to those used by 
The National Interest to frame English as a post-industrial discipline. Responding 
directly to the literacy crisis—“When the press report a crisis there is a crisis, and we 
are it” (“Center” 24)—Lloyd-Jones claimed that writing instructors, “are the ones at the 
center who reach to all other disciplines and to all other people” (“Center” 27). 
Recognizing the centrality of writing to all learning simultaneously reveals its rhetorical 
character and thus its complexity. Noting that “the choices in the language are mostly to 
be determined on rhetorical grounds rather than on linguistics ones,” (“Center” 26) 
Lloyd-Jones explains “if the audience is different, if the situation is different, if the 
amount of explanation is different, it is no longer it. It is other” (“Center” 26). The job 
of composition instructors is no less than to “master the spaces between everything” 
(“Center” 2?) in order “to make a coherent whole of all this diversity” (“Center” 27). In 
other words, composition instructors possess a unique knowledge and specialized 
expertise—they are “interdisciplinary scholars”—who are aware of the complexity of 
writing on which its central position in the university depends. By contrast “Those 
people who believe that there is one correct form of English” Lloyd-Jones explains, 
“simply deny this rhetorical choice and insist on ontological certainty” (“Center” 26). 
To embrace the view of writing as simple is not only to misunderstand what writing is, 
but also to demonstrate one’s lack of expertise in teaching it. 
The knowledge of writing’s complexity that marked compositionists’ 
professional expertise and placed writing at the center of all education justified anti-
formalist pedagogies and inclusive reforms as well as the construction of disciplinary 
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mechanisms through which to pass on that expertise. William F. Irmscher made these 
connections explicit in his 1979 Chair’s address explaining first that compositionists 
“are concerned with one of the most essential and valuable resources of anyone’s 
education: the ability to write” (240). The reforms against which the popular press raged 
were evidence that writing instructors “have acquired new expertness; we have learned 
new approaches” (240) which in turn meant that calls for “back-to-basics” were beneath 
serious consideration. Irmscher argued, “To those who do not fully appreciate the 
complexity of our enterprise,”—that is, the non-professional public—“we can now say, 
‘You are outdated,’ ‘You are misguided,’ ‘You are naïve,’ ‘We’ve gone that route 
before and it doesn’t work’” (240). By 1980, Frank D’Angelo could describe a proposal 
for a graduate program in composition and rhetoric based on the claim that writing and 
rhetoric were worthy of research (420) and the idea “that composition can provide a 
unifying center for English studies as well as for the liberal arts” (423). That teaching 
writing required the expert knowledge of writing’s complexity became a rallying cry in 
response to the literacy crisis. As Ellen Barton explains, “From Lloyd-Jones’s address 
in 1977 to Nell Ann Pickett’s in 1997, CCCC Chairs have made similar, if not identical, 
arguments for the complexity, challenge, and importance of teaching writing in the 
university” (236-7).  
But if a recognition of the complexity of writing defined expert knowledge in 
composition, then there had to be basic underlying principles that defined that 
complexity and the boundaries of that knowledge. Failing to define those basic 
principles only undermined compositionists’ claims of professional expertise: “By the 
time we bicker about definitions [of what is basic], we have lost whatever authority we 
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had with the public to claim competency in dealing with basics” (Lloyd-Jones “Center” 
26). For Klaus that research was found in other fields meaning writing instructors 
should possess some expertise in a range of disciplines including “psycholinguistics, 
sociolinguistics, and linguistic anthropology” (337). But increasingly the consensus 
would be that knowledge of the complexity of writing as the basis for compositionists’ 
expert status demanded research that specifically revealed the principles that 
demonstrated that complexity. Echoing his earlier work with Braddock and Schoer in 
1963, Lloyd-Jones argued, “We need more demanding training programs for teachers; 
we need research programs for scholars. We need our journals not only to deal with 
what to do on Monday but to demonstrate our right to a central function in the 
academy” (“Center” 29). Research on composition would need to show the complexity 
of writing and, as we have seen, complexity meant the composing process.  
Such research and the methods employed to conduct it, as Vivian I. Davis 
argued in her 1978 address, would thus need to be composition-specific. Because 
composition required a unique expertise, “we cannot depend on others to have the 
required sensitivity to the complexities of the composition process that we have” (Davis 
29) but must “develop experimental designs and identify analytical methods especially 
adaptable to our own discipline” (Davis 29). The varied approaches and plurality of 
appropriations that characterized the reforms of the ‘60s would need to be replaced by a 
more coherent set of agreed-upon basic assumptions and methodologies so that 
compositionists could claim the expertise necessary to protect the profession. Without 
such research “We don’t know what we are doing” (Davis 28) and “become easy prey 
for those who have their own vested interests for claiming to be able to appraise our 
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teaching” (28). Claiming the expertise that would allow writing instructors to 
implement the anti-formalist pedagogies so many outside the profession were clamoring 
about required identifying clearly “the questions to which we need answers” (Davis 28) 
and providing “guidelines for future studies so that our research and experimentation 
will follow the needs of the profession rather than the special interests or circumstances 
of the individual researcher” (Davis 28). 
Fortunately, the pursuit of this researched knowledge was increasingly 
becoming a realistic possibility. Under pressure from the public resulting from 
perceived literacy crisis, administrators began to pour funding into new remedial 
writing programs intended to bring test scores up to expected standards and improve the 
writing of “unprepared” Open Admissions students. As Ede explains “the existence of a 
media-supported literacy crisis was the most specific and powerful catalyst for the 
creation of new tenure-line positions in composition in the 1970s” (68). Basic writing 
programs expanded and as new writing program director positions were created, 
“brand-new professors increasingly were hired specifically to work as administrators” 
(Strickland 82). The new positions were faculty positions in writing and thus 
represented positions that required the application of academic training in teaching and 
research. Colleges were taking the literacy crisis seriously and results were expected. 
The literacy crisis had made basic writing “one of the few boom segments of the 
academic economy in this period” (Zebroski 108).  
This boom in basic writing was attended by a simultaneous bust in Literature. 
That bust began in 1969, “the year in which professional saturation occurred in British 
and American literature, the year in which there were literally more candidates for 
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faculty positions than there were jobs . . .” (Fleming “Form” 73). Over the next few 
years, the professional prospects for PhDs in English would only worsen. Budget cuts 
and staff reductions were widespread in the early 1970s with 74% of private four-year 
institutions, 66% of public four-year institutions, and 41% of two-year colleges cutting 
faculty and staff from 1971-1974 (Alm, Erhle, and Webster 153). By the 1973-1974 
academic year, the bottom had fallen out of the market for the traditional English 
professor teaching Literature (Zebroski 107).15 The teaching of Literature was no longer 
a viable profession for the majority of PhDs in English and would not regain its 
viability. In fact, the prospects grew even dimmer in the following years as 
“Appointments in literary studies decreased by over 65 percent between 1972 and 
1978” (Henze, et al. 20). Suddenly, graduates of English PhD programs who wanted a 
career in academe had nowhere to go except into basic writing programs or the other 
viable area in English—technical and business writing—which were often part of the 
same program.  
The combined result of this collapse and the expansion of basic writing was that 
many graduate students trained in Literature began taking jobs in Composition. The 
realities of the job market and the creation of tenure lines in composition meant 
composition was no longer a stepping stone to teaching literature in the future but 
                                                 
15 Marc Bousquet puts pressure on the notion that the poor employment prospects for English PhDs is 
simply a result of the fluctuations of the “market.” Instead, Bousquet reads the collapse of the labor 
“market” as a result of a deliberately created labor conditions that position graduate students and adjuncts 
as the primary labor force for teaching composition (cf 19-27). The numbers from this era suggest that 
Bousquet’s arguments apply specifically to this period. David Fleming points out that “In fact, from 
1953-54 to 1963-64, the number of graduate teaching assistants in public U.S. universities tripled, from 
11,352 to 31,083” (71-2) and so actually “outpaced the rise in undergraduate enrollment, which also grew 
spectacularly, from 493,817 to 1,005,173” (71). The connections between post-industrial economics and 
the increased use of contingent labor suggest the collapse of literature had much to do with the emergence 
of post-industrialism. For more on Bousquet’s take on the “market” see Bousquet, Marc. How the 
University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage Nation. New York: New York UP, 2008. 
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demanded the full application of one’s graduate training and experience. The 
seriousness with which these new faculty took their positions is reflected by how many 
converts from literature became luminaries in writing studies. This group included 
Patricia Bizzell, Lisa Ede, Linda Flower, James Berlin, Victor Vitanza, Richard Inkster, 
Sharon Bassett, David Bartholomae, Charles Kneupper, and Sam Watson. Many of 
these and others embraced additional training and preparation in seminars of the late 
1970s sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities and facilitated by 
figures like Richard Young and William Coles. To put it another way, compositionists 
not only had the opportunity to conduct the research to back up their claims to expertise, 
the field was increasingly populated by people who expected this work to be their 
profession and expected research to be a part of that profession. 
With these developments in material support, opportunity, and the exigence to 
embrace basic research brought about by the literacy crisis, research on composing that 
could demonstrate the underlying complexity of writing would become an increasingly 
prominent part of the work of composition. Mina Shaughnessy’s extremely popular 
Errors and Expectations published in 1977, with its revelation of the logic and 
complexity of thought underlying the errors of basic writers, provided an exemplary 
model of such work. Emig’s study also revealed the complexity of writing and clearly 
modeled the empirical research composition needed. In addition, it was available at the 
moment of crisis and communicated its results in the privileged discourse of scientific 
theory that would serve compositionists’s claims of professional expertise so well. Emig 
and Janice Lauer were invited to give the keynote addresses at the 1976 CCCC with 
both emphasizing research and scholarship in composing while “seven regular sessions 
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on research drew overflow crowds” (Lloyd-Jones “Afterword” 52). The turn to anti-
formalism that had initiated the original calls for the creation of discipline-specific 
research were finally able to be fulfilled.  
The empirical methods and cognitivist theories Emig’s study employed had been 
the subject of the rather vicious debate between Janice Lauer and Ann Berthoff in the 
pages of CCC over the course of 1971 and 1972, but in the latter half of the decade, 
talk-aloud protocols, case study methodology, and the use of psychological theories of 
cognition to describe the complexity of the writing process became markers of the most 
prominent research in the field. Linda Flower and John Hays published their “Problem-
Solving Strategies and the Writing Process” in CCC in 1977 outlining a cognitive 
model of the composing process that “would soon generate a series of essays, a 1978 
conference, and a set of essays based on that conference, Cognitive Processes in 
Writing, edited by their Carnegie Mellon colleagues Lee Gregg and Erwin Steinberg in 
1980” (Henze, et al. 34). In 1979 Sondra Perl’s Emig-influenced study, “The 
Composing Processes of Unskilled College Writers” made her test subject “Tony” and 
her method for coding talk-aloud data famous among compositionists. That same year, 
Irmscher explained in his Chair’s address that “The cognitive structure of individuals 
determines their potential for learning and writing. To the extent that the existing 
cognitive structure is clear, stable, and organized, it facilitates learning” (244). 
Research, it seems, did not so much discover the composing process, as the turn to 
process had been forced to discover research. 
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The Post-Industrial Discipline 
The history of the field demonstrates that composition’s disciplinarity was 
ultimately a result of the emergence of post-industrialism. The post-industrial demand 
for effective writing instruction required English departments to abandon current-
traditional views of writing and writing instruction and to rethink, at least in theory, the 
departmental hierarchies constructed on those views. In keeping with reform efforts of 
the late 50s, compositionists sought out the disciplinary-specific knowledge base 
necessary to make the new anti-formalist instruction effective and thereby maintain the 
relevance of English in a post-industrial age. Effective instruction reached all students 
and thus the rejection of an ineffective and uninformed formalist instruction meant also 
a rejection of the traditional exclusions it supported. With the implementation of Open 
Admissions policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the inclusive character of these 
new pedagogies created a backlash in the form of a literacy crisis that called for 
reinstating industrial era composition and the social structure it was expected to 
maintain. 
In response to this crisis, compositionists defended reforms as a reflection of 
their own expertise, an expertise defined as the recognition of the complexity of writing. 
Such a claim figured post-industrial writing instruction, terms process pedagogy, as 
professional writing instruction and thereby positioned the anti-formalist assumptions 
and inclusive politics of that pedagogy as markers of professionalized composition. As 
Richard Ohmann explains, claiming professional expertise requires convincing the 
public that the profession offers a service to society that “is a needed one, that only 
certified practitioners can meet the need, that they understand it better than their clients 
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do, and that they will supply it . . . in the interests of the client and by extension of the 
whole society” (227-8). The perceived literacy crisis took care of proving the need for 
expert composition instruction while the complexity that anti-formalist reforms 
addressed demonstrated the superiority of professional understanding to the public’s 
privileging of the basics. The effectiveness of this instruction, demonstrated by its 
inclusivity, spoke to the ways in which professional writing instructors served the 
interests of their clients and the deliberative democracy that characterized American 
society. Anti-formalist focus in composition pedagogy became, then, the method of a 
professionalized writing instruction while inclusive, democratic education became its 
professional goal. 
The funding for writing programs spurred by the alleged crisis provided the 
material support for enacting that expertise in a disciplinary manner in the form of 
tenure lines and expanded writing programs. The period immediately following the 
initial public panic about literacy instruction in America, 1975-1980, saw the rapid 
establishment of the mechanism for constructing, disseminating, and replicating newly 
claimed expert knowledge of anti-formalist and thus inclusive views of writing. Of the 
23 composition and rhetoric journals founded between 1950 and 1990, 14 were founded 
between 1972 and 1982 and 9 (a full 41% of the total) of those were founded between 
1975 and 1980 (Goggin 36). Graduate programs in composition and rhetoric began to 
spring up across the country as the claims of compositionist expertise became further 
instantiated and implied the necessity of training a new wave of professionals in 
writing. As Strickland observes,  “Of the sixty-five graduate programs listed in Rhetoric 
Review’s 1999 survey, only eight report founding dates before 1977 (‘Doctoral 
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Programs’). During the four-year period 1977-1980, fourteen programs, or almost a 
quarter of all currently existing graduate programs in rhetoric and composition were 
founded” (Strickland 77). Among these fourteen were programs that would become 
prominent centers of composition and rhetoric such as Carnegie Mellon University’s 
graduate program started in 1978 and Purdue University’s which began that same year.  
Since knowledge of the complexity of writing defined the expertise that justified 
the professional status of compositionists, that knowledge could not be seen to be the 
result of historically specific and rhetorically situated processes. The reforms and the 
turn to research that marked compositionist expertise had to be figured as the result of 
intellectual advances the knowledge of which distanced the expert instructor from the 
uninformed public. Expertise was “proven” through a narrowed historical perspective 
that obscured the role of post-industrialism and the literacy crisis by crafting 
Strickland’s “heroic tale” in which compositionists drew from the latest developments 
of other disciplines to reject current-traditional rhetoric and take up the research focus 
that an increased understanding of writing’s complexity demanded. The history of 
disciplinarity became the story of various geniuses whose discoveries advanced 
composition’s development in the face of opposition from the less informed or 
politically conservative. In such a narrative, Emig’s truly influential and insightful work 
became the sole source of the turn to research rather than a model compositionists took 
up to address the very real rhetorical exigence for research created by the literacy crisis. 
But if research conducted to understand and demonstrate the complexity of writing was 
the work of professional composition, then professional composition as a qualitatively 
distinct period began with figures like Emig “around 1971” as Crowley phrases it (??). 
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The appropriations of other research and theories from other disciplines in the 1960s 
were not efforts to find a disciplinary-specific knowledge base from which to teach the 
composing process but influences and early gropings toward the truth that pushed 
composition toward process.  
But if the process era was the beginning of the profession, what came before 
was pre-professional and thus characterized entirely by the inexpert current-traditional 
perspectives that define lay perspectives on writing. Since instruction before process 
was pre-professional, it was current-traditionalist through and through. Such a binary 
historical view supports the idea of a distinct break with the past that in turn emphasizes 
anti-formalism and inclusive pedagogy as what it means to “do” composition 
professionally. That this professional model was a response to the literacy crisis would 
have far reaching implications that were themselves obscured by the binary master 
narrative that naturalized that model. As I hope to demonstrate in the coming chapters, 
by demanding a response that attended to the anxieties of those in power over the 
expanded access of post-industrial education, the literacy crisis set in motion the 
process by which a post-industrial gatekeeping mechanism would be established. That 
the professionalization of post-industrial anti-formalism and inclusive pedagogy was the 
response to the crisis meant that this model was to be integral to that process. The 
universalization of anti-formalism as politically inclusive would do more than obscure 
the origins of disciplinary composition. It would, as we will see, obscure its 




Chapter 3: The Contradiction of Post-Industrial Composition 
In a book chapter entitled, “Writing at the Postsecondary Level” and penned in 
2006, Russell Durst concludes a survey of the intellectual developments in composition 
of the last 20 years with a briefly stated but rather sweeping complaint about the 
discipline. Durst laments that, on the whole, composition as a field is failing to produce 
innovative intellectual activity, or, put more bluntly, “the field presently finds itself in 
something of a rut” (98). Durst describes that rut in part as the widespread agreement 
about the usefulness of process pedagogies arguing, “few compositionists seriously 
challenge the approaches put forward by writing process adherents in the 1970s and 
1980s continuing to emphasize prewriting, revision, collaboration, conferencing, and 
critical reading” (98). For Durst, the danger in this broad agreement is that the field 
requires at least some dissensus in the face of a received orthodoxy for composition to 
remain innovative and, thus, important. The idea that writing is a process has become so 
widely accepted as the nature of writing and as a guiding principle for writing 
instruction that it has, according to Durst, actually stunted the development of new 
approaches to teaching and theorizing writing.  
Paul Kei Matsuda has explained the enormous success of process pedagogies as 
the result of a rhetorical trope that Matsuda argues has determined how subsequent 
developments in composition have been successfully represented as advances in 
disciplinary knowledge. Matsuda argues in his essay “Process and Post-Process: A 
Discursive History” that the process movement’s self-representation depended on 
asserting that “composition pedagogy before the process movement was 
methodologically monolithic” (68), characterized chiefly by its current-traditional focus 
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on students’ written products and the enforcement of superficial correctness in writing. 
This reductive representation of pre-process composition instruction operated as “a 
caricature against which the process movement developed” (Matsuda 71). In this trope 
of caricature and opposition, the emergence of process in the 1970s was the moment of 
transformation from an older, misguided, and naïve approach to a methodologically 
sophisticated and theoretically informed understanding of writing and writing 
instruction. Opposed to current-traditionalism, Process represented itself as all that the 
caricature of current-traditional rhetoric was not. For Matsuda, this model of 
oversimplification and rejection evident in “the discursive construction of current-
traditional rhetoric” (70) ensured the success of the process movement which in turn 
“served as an impetus for the development of composition studies” (70).  
And as we saw in the previous chapter, the rhetorical construction of expertise in 
response to the literacy crisis of the mid-1970s required the kind of radical split between 
the process and pre-process eras such a caricature would support. A number of scholars 
and historians also agree with Matsuda that process advocates have generally worked 
hard to distinguish the process movement from previous writing instruction models by 
fashioning a reductive view of writing instruction in the pre-process era. Susan Miller 
has argued that, “‘current-traditional rhetoric’ or ‘product’ theory appears to have been 
created at the same time that process theory was, to help explain process as a theory 
pitted against old practices” (110). George Pullman agrees explaining that the current-
traditional rhetoric against which the process era defined itself was not “a theory but 
was instead a shorthand and off-the-cuff way of alluding to the way the tradition of 
rhetoric was currently being purveyed in the Freshman Composition textbooks” of the 
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time (22). By opposing itself to a time when there were allegedly “no other traditions, 
no other practices” (22) than current-traditional rhetoric, Process established itself as the 
first legitimate, concerted effort to think carefully about writing and writing instruction.  
According to Pullman, such oversimplification and opposition provided Process with its 
master narrative of the “triumph of compassion and empiricism [over the forces of] 
tradition and prejudice” (16). As I noted in chapter one, Phelps reads the myth of 
progress driving the binary master narrative of composition history as beginning with 
the process movement of the ‘70s.  
Interestingly, Matsuda understands the rhetorical positioning of more recent 
theoretical and pedagogical developments in the field as informed by this rhetorical 
trope deployed with such success by Process advocates. This is especially true among 
supporters of post-process theories whom, Matsuda explains, have ironically begun to 
use the process movements’ own rhetorical model against it (74). Post-process 
discourse, Matsuda explains through an analysis of claims made by John Trimbur and 
Thomas Kent, offers a reductive reading of process, associating it narrowly with 
cognitivist and expressivist views while claiming the terrain of “the social” for itself 
(Matsuda 73). Having so narrowly defined process, Kent, Trimbur, and others are able 
to use social aspects of composing to claim greater explanatory power for post-process 
approaches to writing. Thus, just as the process advocates opposed process pedagogies 
to an oversimplified view of pre-process composition as dominated by current-
traditional rhetoric, so now post-process discourse “seems to be on its way to 
constructing its own narrative of transformation with process as the necessary 
caricature” (Matsuda 74). For Matsuda, then, the rhetorical trope created by process 
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continues to inform the rhetorical self-representations of more recent developments in 
writing pedagogy and theory.  
Matsuda’s discursive history thus provides an important critical perspective on 
the notion of intellectual progress underlying composition’s development. But the 
explanatory possibilities of that history are limited by the form/content binary on which 
it operates. Certainly in Matsuda’s account current-traditional rhetoric as the “content” 
of the caricature and process’s empirical, theoretical, and pedagogical sophistication as 
that of the opposition are key to understanding the success of the process movement. 
For Matsuda, however, only the form of the model—the act of caricaturing and 
opposing the caricature—informs the rhetorical representation of new developments, 
not the opposition between current traditional rhetoric and anti-formalist pedagogy. The 
very success of the process movement that Durst laments is evident in Matsuda’s own 
history in that Matsuda sees only the form of the trope influencing subsequent 
developments and not the content. Matsuda’s history can only explain why post-process 
takes up the trope of caricature and opposition but not why the social approaches of 
process became the privileged terms in the post-process reconfiguration of that trope. In 
other words, a discursive history needs to consider the impact not only of the fact that 
process employed caricature and opposition, but also what it set up in opposition to that 
caricature and how that works with the trope of caricature and opposition to inform the 
subsequent direction of the field.  
In this chapter, I will argue that the professional model of anti-formalism and 
leftist politics established in response to the literacy crisis has not only guided 
developments in the field since its establishment in the 1970s but has led 
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compositionists to define rhetoric and democratic inclusion in idealized, anti-
foundationalist terms. To explain how these developments took place, I will first 
demonstrate how the professional model of anti-formalism and leftist inclusion created 
the rhetorical conditions that allowed social process advocates to assert the superiority 
of rhetorical approaches to process in the so-called “social turn” of the 1980s. This 
social turn led compositionists to equate rhetoric with anti-formalism making rhetoric 
the critical method of professional composition and the key to achieving the critical 
goal of inclusive pedagogy. Next I will show how the rhetoric employed by social 
process advocates to assert the superiority of the rhetorical approach demanded the 
expansion of the definition of formalism. The corresponding expansion of the definition 
of anti-formalism led, eventually, to anti-formalism becoming equated with anti-
foundationalism and thus anti-foundationalism becoming figured as the means to 
accomplishing democratic pedagogy. The critical power of anti-foundationalist critique 
suggested just such a role for anti-foundationalist theories in professional composition, 
but also raised the problem of how to use anti-foundationalist critique to forward 
seemingly foundationalist political ideals. Faced with this challenge, composition 
theorists idealized inclusion by defining it in idealized terms—that is, as the exclusion 
of all exclusions—that seemed to link inclusion with an anti-foundationalist critique. 
While this idealization appeared to resolve the contradiction facing the rhetorical 
construction of professional composition, it did so only by displacing that contradiction 
onto individual instructors as an ethical mandate to include, but simultaneously exclude, 
any students who embraced discriminatory beliefs on a principled basis. 
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The Search for Professional Knowledge 
The need for a definable set of basic principles to support compositionists’ 
claims to expertise pushed writing instructors to define their approaches in ever more 
narrow terms. As we have seen, reformers in the 1960s had turned to a number of 
different disciplines and traditions to locate a knowledge base on which to ground anti-
formalist composition pedagogies. The work of Bruner and Piaget had been major 
influences laying the foundations for the cognitivist models of the composing process 
that became prominent in the 1970s. Linguistics, including socio-linguistics and later 
Noam Chomsky’s transformational generative grammar had provided the researched 
support for attending to a variety of student languages that anti-formalist pedagogies 
necessitated. The “rhetorical revival” of the late 1950 and 1960s had demonstrated its 
impact at the 1963 CCCC and in the work of such figures Edward P.J. Corbett, Wayne 
Booth, and even Francis Christiansen. Among the most amenable of legitimizing 
traditions for instructors working in English departments, however, was what came to 
be called “expressivism,” an approach to teaching writing that embraced humanistic and 
literary traditions to define composing as a highly individual act dependent for its 
success on the revelation of the authentic self through writing.  
As embedded in traditional literary ideals as expressivism could appear to be, its 
challenge to current-traditional rhetoric emerged from the shifting cultural and social 
conditions of World War II that represented the forefront of the information age and the 
communications course it spawned. The communications courses came about as part of 
the interest in semantics and general education in the 1930s. These courses only became 
a prominent feature of higher education, however, after World War II when the military 
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employed communications courses to train GIs to process and disseminate information 
effectively and as a means of accommodating the influx of veterans attending college 
on the GI Bills (George and Trimbur 683). The course’s accessibility and 
communications instructor’s willingness to employ “permissive,” student-centered 
models appealed to the new demographic of student veterans and positioned the 
product-focus of first-year composition and its concerns with “correctness” as 
outmoded and ineffective. The communications movement proved so popular at its 
height that it eventually spawned “courses at over two hundred colleges and 
universities” (George and Trimbur 683). As a result, “By the late 1940s . . . the 
communications course was well positioned, and in more ways than one, to take on 
freshman English” (Heyda 666). 
Their disciplinary territory threatened, English faculty began denouncing 
communications courses in the 1950s as crudely utilitarian and swayed by mass 
commercial culture. For composition instructors ensconced in the literary traditions of 
English, “the ‘generation of communication’ must have seemed to be the heralds of 
social utility and ‘life adjustment’ skills without the redeeming connection to language 
and literature sponsored by English studies” (George and Trimbur 688). English faculty 
opposed composition to communications as the site of complete individual development 
available only through the cultural refinement of an English-based view of writing as 
self-expression. As Kenneth Oliver argued in 1950, communications courses are 
insufficient because they attend only to the “immediate social purpose” (3) of language 
and ignore the “cultural uses of language—i.e., the expression of personal human 
experience via poetry, essay, fiction, or drama” (Oliver 3 qtd. in Heyda 672). Only 
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composition courses, housed in the traditional site of humanistic language study in the 
university, could provide the necessary instruction to help students defend themselves 
against the stultifying effects of the modern world’s mass commercialization. 
But if writing was to prevent the dehumanizing effects of mass communication 
by privileging the individual’s voice, the standardized conformity imposed by current-
traditional instruction and its demand that students write according to a prescriptive set 
of rules simply would not do. Writing instruction that would take up the liberal 
humanist traditions which in turn would protect first-year composition from being 
overrun by communications would need to focus on other aspects of writing to develop 
the student’s personal expression. Diana George and John Trimbur note this anti-
formalist strain in the expressivism of Ken Macrorie as it appears in a pair of articles 
from 1958 and 1961. George and Trimbur explain that when Macrorie articulates in 
1961 “the dual doctrine of writing as epistemic (‘writing not only reflects but generates 
thought’) and as expressive (‘You know who you are . . . in a special way from reading 
your thoughts on paper’ [207]), we know we are now on the verge of the process 
movement . . .” (690). The expressivist approach emerging from the struggle with 
communications thus forwarded an understanding of writing that challenged formalism 
and linked that challenge, because of this same struggle, with the defense of the 
individual in the face of a commercially and politically conformist society.  
Before the literacy crisis of the 1970s, expressivist pedagogies mingled with 
cognitivist process models and rhetorical approaches, often in the work of a single 
reformer. Gordon Rohman’s work on pre-writing drew heavily from Jerome Bruner’s 
cognitivist theories as part of an effort to help the individual student in the expressivist 
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project of self-actualization (108). Peter Elbow’s “A Method for Teaching Writing” of 
1968 embraced a view of writing centered on the effect of writing on its audience with 
an expressivist focus on the author’s ability to fully represent his or her individual self 
through writing. Elbow proposed assessing student work according to “whether it 
produces the desired effect on the reader” (115). But for Elbow achieving this effect 
required communicating an authentic voice, leading Elbow to conclude that revealing 
the self through words “is a root quality of good writing and that we should try to teach 
it” (120). Even Emig’s empirical study, while it relied heavily on cognitivist theories of 
creativity and imagination, combined cognitivist approaches with more expressivist 
views of writing in the expansion of writing from merely extensive practice to a 
reflexive one (Harris 58). After the crisis, the need to define expertise more narrowly 
according to a set of shared principles made the various appropriations seem 
increasingly incompatible and therefore more difficult to combine explicitly into an 
acceptable whole.  
As a result of the need for a definable disciplinary knowledge, compositionists 
began engaging in a number of debates in the late 1970s and early ‘80s over the proper 
theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding and teaching the 
composing process. This appropriation of theories and research from other disciplines 
that marked the reforms of the 1960s had, by this time, led writing instructors to 
appropriate a number of perspectives amenable to the professional model erected as a 
response to the literacy crisis. As Fulkerson explains in his 1979 article “Four 
Philosophies of Composition” compositionists in the late 1970s embraced four basic 
approaches to writing. These included “expressive” (philosophies emphasizing the 
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writer), “mimetic” (emphasizing correspondence of writing with reality), “rhetorical” 
(emphasizing the effect of writing on the reader), and “formalist” (emphasizing the 
internal characteristics of a given text) (343). Not surprisingly, given the emphasis on 
professionalization and the form it took in the wake of the literacy crisis, Fulkerson 
admits in 1979 that “formalists are hard to find these days” but that “adherents to the 
other three positions”, all associated with process pedagogies, “are not” (“Four” 344). 
The developments of the 1970s had led compositionists to construct a model of 
professional composition that rendered current-traditional rhetoric unacceptable, at least 
as an explicitly articulated pedagogical approach, and, coupled with the effort to create 
a post-industrial method of writing instruction of the ‘60s, had narrowed an acceptable 
view of writing to some form of one of the other three philosophies. 
The defining approach of disciplinary composition would narrow further by the 
end of the 1980s with the so-called “social turn” in composition, the emphasis on the 
exogenous aspects of writing as a social practice that paralleled the continued 
development of the discipline in the ‘80s. In a 1990 follow-up piece to his 1979 article, 
Fulkerson explains that despite the lack of “shared axiological presumptions” that 
characterized composition in 1979, “Composition Studies now shows the emergence of 
a significant consensus: the widely-held position today is a rhetorical axiology” 
(“Composition” 411). By the end of the 1980s, compositionists had come to explain 
composing—at least in the scholarship and journals privileged by the discipline—as a 
chiefly rhetorical phenomenon dependent primarily on audience for its success. As 
Fulkerson describes the general view of compositionists at the time, “Good writing, the 
sort of writing that we hope to enable students to produce, is contextually adapted to, 
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perhaps even controlled by, its audience (discourse community), addressed or invoked, 
or both” (“Composition” 417). Fulkerson is quick to note, however, the historical nature 
of this development. He writes, “The importance of audience may now seem obvious to 
us” but “A concern for audience was not standard in composition scholarship or 
textbooks a decade ago” (416). The turn away from “self-expression, discovery, and 
actualization . . . [or] . . . the acontextualism of formalist rules” (“Composition” 416) 
were part of a historically and rhetorically situated process. Tracing the major 
developments of that situated process reveals that the professional model of 
composition that developed in response to the needs of an emerging post-
industrialism—that is, an anti-formalist method combined with an inclusive educational 
politics—created the rhetorical conditions that allowed the consensus regarding a 
rhetorical axiology to emerge.  
Even as early as 1979 the dominance of cognitivism was slipping in composition 
in the face of the rhetorical axiology. The landmark cognitivist process essays that 
would influence the articulation of composition theory and pedagogy among the 
mainstream of compositionists were finished by the mid-1980s. Fulkerson notes the 
increasing prominence of the rhetorical perspective noting that “In almost any issue of 
College Composition and Communication, several writers espouse the fourth 
philosophy, the rhetorical one” (“Four” 346). As I noted in chapter two, the CCCC had 
resolved in 1963 that rhetoric should be the foundation of first-year writing instruction. 
In addition, rhetoric had a longstanding tradition that reached back to the beginnings of 
Western culture allowing it to impart legitimacy to composition in a kind of reflected 
glory. Cognitivism employed the rhetorically powerful discourse of science but as the 
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debate between Lauer and Bertfhoff demonstrates, its prominence in the mid-1970s was 
an uneasy one with few humanities-trained writing instructors comfortable with its 
jargon and methods. The effort to define composition as a distinct discipline made the 
use of expressivism, indebted as it was to literary traditions, potentially damaging to the 
standing of composition in relation to literature within English departments. Rhetoric 
was, then, already widely touted by composition instructors at the time.  
Within the context of the established professional model, any of the four 
philosophies that would serve to circumscribe the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge 
would necessarily have to reflect the anti-formalism and generally leftist politics that 
defined that knowledge. If composition possessed such a knowledge, which the rhetoric 
of professionalization demanded it to possess, one of the privileged philosophies would 
embody that expertise most clearly. Another way to think of this prospect was that those 
philosophies that were not the defining knowledge of composition would of necessity 
exhibit current-traditional views of writing, support conservative politics, or both. That 
expressivist, cognitivist, and rhetorical, or social, process perspectives all favored a 
rejection of the current-traditional focus on superficial correctness meant the effort to 
define composition’s basic principles involved locating and revealing the current-
traditionalism hidden in a particular approach. Because professional composition was 
defined by its anti-formalism and inclusive politics, demonstrating the retention of 
current-traditional or conservative tendencies in one of the philosophies amounted to 
demonstrating that that philosophy lay outside the acceptable boundaries of expert 
knowledge in composition. While rhetoric was already an important grounding for the 
discipline, the professional model of composition created the conditions that allowed 
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the rhetorical axiology to emerge as dominant and for the social turn to take place by 
providing a shared standard among compositionists with which social process advocates 
could effectively critique expressivist and cognitivist approaches as existing outside of 
professional composition.   
Professional Composition and the Social Turn 
The impact of composition’s newly established professional model is evident in 
many of the texts that were most influential in driving the turn to a social perspective on 
composing. These texts typically defined anti-formalism itself as a rhetorical approach 
to composing by framing other prominent models as latently current-traditionalist 
because they ignored some aspect of writing’s complexity to which rhetorical views 
attended. To connect current-traditional rhetoric with expressivist or cognitivist process 
models and thereby eliminate expressivism or cognitivism from the domain of 
professional composition, many social process advocates had to expand the definition of 
current-traditionalist formalism so that it could be more easily aligned with 
expressivism and cognitivism. As a result, many social process scholars framed 
expressivism and cognitivism in reductive ways that made connections with current-
traditional rhetoric easier to construct rhetorically. 
Richard Young’s influential 1978 book chapter, “Paradigms and Problems: 
Needed Research in Rhetorical Invention” employs the standard of professional 
composition to denounce expressivism by linking expressivism directly to current-
traditional rhetoric. Young begins his critique lamenting that the use of current-
traditional rhetoric remains a dominant force in teaching writing. Borrowing the term 
from Daniel Fogarty’s 1959 book Roots for a New Rhetoric, Young describes the “overt 
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features” of current-traditionalism as:  
the emphasis on the composed product rather than the composing 
process; the analysis of discourse into words, sentences, and paragraphs; 
the classification of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and 
argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation) 
and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); the preoccupation with the 
informal essay and the research paper, and so on. (398)16 
 
These features expressly represent the form of writing that Macrorie and other 
expressivists directly opposed for its stifling structure and lack of individuality. 
Young’s characterization of current-traditional rhetoric amounts, then, to an admission 
that expressivism appears anti-formalist. Expressivist ideas, as developed in the work of 
Macrorie, Elbow, Donald Murray, and others had played a key role in denouncing the 
very formalist pedagogies that Young describes precisely because those pedagogies had 
not allowed for the full expression of the individuality of the writer that made writing 
effective. 
The formalism of the expressivist perspective lay, then, in less obvious 
assumptions it shared with current-traditional rhetoric about invention. Departing from 
Fogarty’s view of current-traditional rhetoric as Aristotelian in its assumptions, Young 
figures current-traditional rhetoric as defined primarily by its adherence to informal 
inventional procedures (Hawk 23). After equating vitalism and expressivism, Young 
draws a direct connection between vitalism and current-traditional rhetoric arguing that 
“Vitalism, with its stress on the natural powers of the mind and the uniqueness of the 
creative act, leads to a repudiation of the possibility of teaching the composing process, 
hence the tendency of current-traditional rhetoric to become a critical study of the 
products of composing and an art of editing” (??). In other words, the product-focus of 
                                                 
16 While Fogarty is recognized as coining the term current-traditional rhetoric, Young’s essay popularized 
the term and thereby helped establish the notion of a binary history of the field. 
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current-traditional rhetoric was the result of an expressivist view of invention as the 
result of unteachable genius. As a result, neither current-traditional rhetoric nor the 
more explicit version of expressivism could theorize invention as part of the composing 
process. 
This reality framed expressivism as incapable of participating in the process 
revolution and thus as serving as a form of expert writing instruction. Drawing from 
Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts, Young figures invention as a paradigmatic 
problem developing in the “normal science” of traditional writing instruction. Because 
of current-traditionalism’s informal approach to invention, invention itself becomes “a 
fundamental educational problem for which current-traditional rhetoric offers no 
solution” (400). The linking of expressivism and current-traditional rhetoric makes 
invention the problem with current-traditionalism because theorizing invention is 
precisely what expressivism as the pedagogy of romantic genius cannot do. In Young’s 
view, then, the return of invention as a recognized component of written composition 
drives the turn toward process pedagogy since only process pedagogy can allow 
invention to emerge fully into its own:     
It is no accident that the shift in attention from composed product to the 
composing process is occurring at the same time as the reemergence of 
invention as a rhetorical discipline. Invention requires a process view of 
rhetoric; and if the composing process is to be taught, rather than left to 
the student to be learned, arts associated with the various stages of the 
process are necessary. (401) 
 
Young’s rhetoric draws on the process movement’s allegedly scientifically superior 
formal theorizing about composing over alleged mystical, superstitious lore of current-
traditionalism but in doing so figures current-traditional rhetoric as informal and 
process as formal (Hawk 25). Young’s redefinition of current-traditional rhetoric 
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“reveals” the formalist assumptions of expressivism which prevent it from attending to 
the full complexity of the composing process and demonstrate expressivism’s inability 
to serve as an expert form of writing instruction. 
Young’s highly rhetorical characterization of current-traditional rhetoric and his 
framing of invention as the source of the turn to process not only naturalizes process as 
an intellectual advance but rhetoric, which accommodates invention, as the source of 
process pedagogy. Byron Hawk notes the interested position from which discusses 
expressivism arguing that “Young needed classical rhetoric as an authoritative basis for 
the discipline” (25). As Hawk himself points out, this rhetorical positioning has been 
repeated a number of times when influential composition scholars and historians have 
“worked to find a solid basis for rhetoric and composition’s disciplinary status and 
generally did so at the expense of some scapegoat category, whether it is characterized 
as current-traditional rhetoric, literature, romanticism, expressivism, vitalism, or 
articulated in some amalgamation of these discourses” (Hawk 16). All of these 
scapegoats have been rendered such through an association with either the conservative 
politics or current-traditional practices (or both) positioned beyond the limits of the 
process-composition model. As we will see, social compositionists became adept at 
expanding and fluidly defining the central characteristic of other process models in 
order to position these other models as extra-compositional. 
Social process advocates were also able to deploy this model successfully to 
critique cognitivist theories of process as well. Patricia Bizzell famously terms these 
cognitivist models “inner-directed” theories which she distinguishes from more 
rhetorically-based, “outer-directed” perspectives on the composing process.  Bizzell’s 
107 
critique of “inner-directed” cognitivist approaches such as those favored by Flower and 
Hayes relies heavily on demonstrating the misalignment of these theories with the 
professional model of composition. While inner-directed approaches emphasize the 
composing process, their efforts to stabilize and universalize that process fail to address 
the full complexity of writing leading to current-traditional classroom practices. As 
Bizzell explains them, inner-directed theories typically figure the use of language in 
specific situations “as out-growths of individual capacities” (“Cognition” 77) leading 
inner-directed theorists to figure individual language capacities, experience with a 
particular language, social and cultural conditions of language use, and engagement of 
specific writing situations as “isomorphic” or all operating on “the same basic logical 
structures” (“Cognition” 77). From such a perspective, “the basic structure of the 
language cannot change from location to location because this structure is isomorphic 
with the innate mental structures that enabled one to learn a language, and hence 
presumably universal and independent of lexical choice” (Bizzell “Cognition” 77). 
Cognitivist views of the composing process stabilize the process of writing by situating 
it wholly within the individual and aligning it with unchanging cognitive structures.  
Inner-directed cognitivist theories, then, reduce the complexity of writing by 
ignoring the shifting rhetorical conditions of the social and political context that makes 
writing a complex act, as Lloyd-Jones had made clear in his Chair’s address.17 While 
cognitivist theories attend to the impact of audience, “The changes made to 
accommodate an audience, however, are not seen as substantially altering the meaning 
                                                 
17 David Bartholomae’s important 1985 essay “Inventing the University” offers a very similar critique of 
the work of Linda Flower as does Marilyn Cooper’s 1986 piece, “The Ecology of Writing.” Flower 
herself has been convinced enough of these critiques that she has turned toward a more socially-informed 
model of composing as she explains in her 2008 book Community Literacy and the Rhetoric of Public 
Engagement.  
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of the piece of writing because that is based on the underlying structure of thought and 
language” (Bizzell “Cognition” 79). This lack of complexity reduces also the function 
of writing, making writing secondary to the act of thinking; “Writing does not so much 
contribute to thinking as provide an occasion for thinking—or, more precisely, a 
substrate upon which thinking can grow” (“Cognition” 85). By universalizing the 
cognitive structures of the writing process, inner-directed theories “assume that 
although each writing task will have its own environment of purposes and constraints, 
the mental activity involved in juggling these constraints while moving to accomplish 
one’s purposes does not change from task to task” (“Cognition” 82). The 
universalization and stabilization cognitivist theories impose on the writing process 
reduce the complexity of writing to a single effort to help students develop their innate 
capacities for language use.  
As anti-formalist pedagogies depend upon and demonstrate the full complexity 
of writing, the simplicity of writing in cognitivist models promotes a formalist approach 
to teaching. Because writing as an expression of thinking is only a matter of lexical 
choice, teaching students to write becomes little more than teaching the basics. Bizzell 
writes, “Writing does not so much contribute to thinking as provide an occasion for 
thinking—or, more precisely, a substrate upon which thinking can grow. Beyond minor 
matters of spelling, diction, and so on, we do not have to worry about how students are 
going to find out about the features of written language because these are already 
innate” (“Cognition” 85). But the link between cognitive structures and language use 
suggests particular language forms reflect a more developed capacity to use language 
rather than a response to the expectations of a particular discourse community. In their 
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efforts to focus on teaching a particular set of discourse conventions, “some inner-
directed theorists treat one set of lexical choices as better able than others to make 
language embody the innate structures. Insofar as these better choices fall into the 
patterns of, for example, a ‘standard’ form of a native tongue, they make the standard 
intellectually superior to other forms” (“Cognition” 77). Because of their overly 
simplistic understandings of writing, cognitivist views of the composing process result 
in current-traditional practices of teaching the “basics” of Standard English. In other 
words, cognitivist models are forms of inexpert instruction. 
Bizzell’s challenge to cognitivist models of composing reveals much about the 
demise of the use of sentence combining. According to inner-directed theories, to 
improve students’ cognitive abilities with language, instructors need only provide 
students with “patterns of correct syntax, which we can then ask students to practice 
until they internalize the patterns. Sentence-combining exercises offer such pattern 
practice” (78-9). Robert Connors has convincingly explained how once popular 
sentence combining pedagogies were discredited precisely because of their inherently 
formal nature that connected them too directly with more traditional pedagogies 
associated with current-traditional rhetoric. Tracing the development of sentence 
combining pedagogies back to the New Rhetoric of the early 1960s, Connors notes that 
scholarship in the field’s major journals and at conferences demonstrates that interest in 
sentence combining reached a peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Several studies 
revealed that sentence combining improved student writing in the eyes of teachers and 
other academics not only at the sentence and paragraph level, but in more global aspects 
like the structure and logic of arguments. Despite the apparent successes of sentence-
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combining, “After the mid-1980s, the sentence rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s were 
gone, at least from books and journals” (108). The dates that mark the beginning and 
end of sentence combining are significant as they mark the period of transition from 
formalist to axiologically diverse anti-formalism, to the consolidation of anti-formalism 
under the banner of social process.  
Not surprisingly, the primary difficulty that seems to have undone sentence 
combining was the field’s anti-formalism. For those opposed to sentence combining 
“The first and most obvious of the lines of criticism that would engulf sentence 
rhetorics was what we might call anti-formalism—the idea that a pedagogy based in 
form rather than in content was automatically suspect” (Connors “Erasure” 110). The 
exercise-based nature of sentence combining pedagogy linked it too directly to “the old 
workbook ‘drill and kill’ exercises that had stultified students since the 1920s” as set of 
approaches that faced an established resentment “against all pedagogies based in the 
older ideas of exercises as ‘mental discipline’” (115). Developing students’ fluency with 
formal features through imitation exercises harkened back to pre-process pedagogy. The 
support sentence combining advocates drew from behaviorist psychology and its 
emphasis on unconscious imitation disturbed expressivists and only strengthened its 
links with current-traditional rhetoric’s alleged rote learning of superficial correctness. 
The greatest challenge sentence pedagogies faced was, thus, “The great difference 
between the early New Rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s [that had helped spawn 
sentence combining] and the work that came after it” between “the New-Rhetoric 
acceptance of atomistic formal levels up until the late 1970s and the later rejection of 
them” (Connors 110). Sentence combining had emerged before the establishment of the 
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new model of process-composition had come into its own and only survived as long as 
it did in the new post-process environment by trading on the allegedly empirical 
revolution created by the Process movement. As the model of process-composition was 
redefined and increasingly narrowed, sentence combining was doomed. 
In his 1988 article, “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Classroom” Berlin 
similarly positions cognitive and expressive process models as unprofessional by 
linking them with the reductive views of writing favored in current-traditional rhetoric. 
For Berlin, though, the connection with current-traditional pedagogy is exhibited 
through a shared ideological alignment with the oppressive status quo. In his discussion 
of cognitivist models of process, Berlin wastes little time positioning cognitive rhetoric 
as inexpert by asserting that “Cognitive rhetoric might be considered the heir apparent 
of current-traditional rhetoric . . .” (480). Berlin is able to make this claim by defining 
current-traditional rhetoric—in an interesting counter to Young’s view—by its 
“positivistic epistemology, its pretensions to scientific precision, and its managerial 
orientation” (480). Cognitive rhetoric makes “similar claims to being scientific” (480) 
and in so doing naturalizes existing conditions, figuring “obstacles to achieving these 
goals are labelled ‘problems,’ disruptions to the natural order, impediment that must be 
removed” (Berlin 482). This positivistic perspective prevents any critical assessment of 
the individual’s writing goals instead emphasizing the pursuit of those goals through a 
managerial problem-solving approach. The ideology employed by cognitive rhetoric 
aligns directly with the ideology of an oppressive corporate America. With its uncritical 
approach to the alleged “problems” of writing cognitive rhetoric assures “the pursuit of 
self-evident and unquestioned profit-making goals in the composing process” that 
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parallel “the pursuit of self-evident and unquestioned profit-making goals in the 
corporate market places” (483). The impossibility of critical self-appraisal reflects the 
formalism latent in cognitive rhetoric leading cognitive models to inevitably support an 
oppressive status quo.  
What Berlin terms “expressionistic rhetoric” appears, on its face, to resist this 
status quo, but ultimately embraces an ideology that supports existing corporate 
structures. While expressionistic rhetoric opposes “in no uncertain terms the scientism 
of current-traditional rhetoric and the ideology it encourages” (Berlin 487), the extreme 
individualism of its underlying assumptions makes it “easily co-opted by the very 
capitalist forces it opposes” (Berlin 487). From the perspective of expressionistic 
rhetoric “power within society ought always to be vested in the individual” (Berlin 485) 
meaning that “the correct response to the imposition of current economic, political, and 
social arrangements is thus resistance, but a resistance that is always constructed on 
individual terms” (Berlin 487). This view not only limits the possibilities for “gestures 
genuinely threatening to the establishment” (Berlin 487) but makes expressionistic 
rhetoric all too easily available “to reinforce the entrepreneurial virtues capitalism most 
values: individualism, private initiative, the confidence for risk taking, the right to be 
contentious with authority (especially the state)” (487). As a result, expressionistic 
rhetoric naturalizes the success of individual elites who, Berlin claims, “see their lives 
as embodying the creative realization of the self, exploiting the material, social, and 
political conditions of the world in order to assert a private vision, a vision which, 
despites its uniqueness, finally represents humankind’s best nature” (487). The critical 
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limitations of expressivism prevents it from actually challenging the capitalist system it 
hopes to resist and, in many ways, actually supports that system. 
The lack of critical capacity and alignment with capitalist ideology that it 
engenders in cognitive and expressive models is not simply a political problem, but 
reflects the reductive, inexpert nature of these models. In the logic of composition’s 
professional model—and Berlin’s perspective—a complex understanding of writing 
demonstrates the critically resistant character that marks it as distinct from current-
traditional rhetoric, that is, as anti-formalist. As a result, the ways in which a rhetorical 
approach attends to the contextualized, epistemic aspects of writing supports a truly 
critical, and thus anti-formalist, understanding. For such an approach, which Berlin calls 
“social-epistemic rhetoric,” “the real is located in a relationship that involves the 
dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social group) in which 
the observer is functioning, and the material conditions of existence” (Berlin 488). 
Knowledge exists as the dialectic of all three of these elements which is, in turn, 
“grounded in language” (Berlin 488). The situated character of language and writing 
revealed by social-epistemic rhetoric means that knowledge is “an area of ideological 
conflict: there are no arguments from transcendent truth since all arguments arise in 
ideology” (Berlin 489). As a result, questions of truth “must be continually decided by 
all and for all in a way appropriate to our own historical moment” (Berlin 490). The 
complex nature of writing and its recognition demonstrates that particular rhetorical 
structures are the result of power enacted in exclusionary fashion to privilege an elite 
few. A socially-situated, rhetorical approach to writing “thus offers an explicit critique 
of economic, political, and social arrangements” (Berlin 490) and thereby “inevitably 
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supports economic, social, political, and cultural democracy” (Berlin 490). A complex 
perspective on writing attends, then, to the constructed nature of reality and thereby 
makes reality available for critique which cognitive, expressive, and current-traditional 
rhetorics fail to do. The ideology they support links cognitive and expressive rhetorics 
with current-traditional formalism by revealing the reductive views of writing they 
share. 
The social turn, then, was as much an affirmation of post-industrial composition 
as it was a collective realization of the inherent superiority of a rhetorical model of the 
writing process. But by affirming the professional model through a turn toward a more 
rhetorical axiology, the social turn equated rhetoric with professional composition’s 
expert critical method of anti-formalism. A truly anti-formalist approach was a 
rhetorical approach, it seemed, and so expert writing instruction was rhetorically-based 
writing instruction. This explains Durst’s other complaint about the rut composition is 
in—the overwhelming consensus regarding the social turn that “composition specialists 
largely have accepted . . . regularly organizing courses around (and publishing works 
on) topics of political and cultural import and linking their course with service and 
community work” (98). The results could hardly have been otherwise once social 
process advocates were able to define anti-formalism as a rhetorical axiology dragging 
the assumed connection with more inclusive, socially just politics along with it. 
Expressivist and cognitivist process models might linger in particular teaching methods 
or individual understandings of the writing process, by 1990 neither could be asserted as 
the basis for a legitimate writing pedagogy. 
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Expanding Anti-formalism, Explaining Rhetoric 
We can begin, then, to flesh out the model Matsuda sees as established by the 
process movement but continuing to inform the rhetorical positioning of subsequent 
movements in the field. The caricature process fashioned in creating current-traditional 
rhetoric as a theoretical entity was an exaggerated rendering of a monolithic and 
uniformly applied focus on the formal features of textual products, a focus process 
advocates linked implicitly with inexpert instruction and conservative politics. What 
process advocates opposed to this model was an anti-formalist approach understood as 
attendant to the complexity of writing and thus resistant to the social and educational 
status quo. This professional model would continue to be redefined and narrowed as it 
was deployed to rhetorically position expressivism and cognitivism as providing 
insufficiently complex views of writing and therefore characterized as inexpert 
instruction. The “social turn” in composition saw composition scholars such as Young, 
Bizzell, and Berlin distinguishing social process models by linking cognitivist and 
expressivist models of process with features of formalization—particularly assumptions 
about authors and the writing process—that social process advocates claimed were 
shared by current-traditional rhetoric. Post-process discourse, Matsuda explains through 
an analysis of claims made by John Trimbur and Thomas Kent, has claimed the terrain 
of “the social” for itself while narrowly equating “process” pedagogies and theories 
strictly with cognitivist or expressivist views (Matsuda 74).   
Given the success of social process critiques of cognitivism and expressivism, 
the caricature of process as associated with these devalued approaches amounts to an 
attempt by post-process advocates to position process itself as inexpert and uninformed. 
116 
While post-process arguments draw on a variety of theories and arguments not 
forwarded by process advocates, post-process advocates seek the available rhetorical 
high ground by linking their position with social perspectives on process that have been 
widely-accepted as reflecting the anti-formalism and leftist politics that define 
professional composition. Thus, just as the process movement opposed itself to an 
oversimplified view of the field when it was dominated by current-traditional rhetoric, 
so now post-process discourse “seems to be on its way to constructing its own narrative 
of transformation with process as the necessary caricature” (Matsuda 74). But that 
caricature is rhetorically effective because it links the opposed theory to a formalist 
tradition to which the true model of composition is itself opposed. Recognizing the 
existence and nature of this model of true composition allows us to begin to answer the 
question of how the process rhetorical model is able to shape the rhetorical positioning 
of subsequent movements in the field.  
But the effort to denounce expressivist and cognitivist approaches to process as 
formalist on which so much of social process rhetoric relied required constantly 
expanding the definition of formalism to make connections between seemingly anti-
formalist perspectives and inexpert current-traditional rhetoric persuasive. The focus on 
superficial features of mechanical correctness that Young describes as the “overt” 
feature of current-traditional rhetoric is opposed by expressivist pedagogies as much as 
it is challenged by rhetorically based models. Rhetorically positioning expressivism 
outside of professional composition demands refiguring formalism in a more 
generalized fashion than simply a pedagogical emphasis on students’ written products. 
Young can only link expressivism to current-traditional formalism by defining 
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formalism in more expansive terms such as the inability to theorize invention. Likewise 
Bizzell’s association of cognitivism with formalism requires defining current-traditional 
practices as a denial of the social, or outer-directed, aspects of writing. The consistent 
redefinition of formalism implied a corresponding redefinition of anti-formalism as 
well. By the time Berlin critiques expressivism and cognitvism in the late 80s, anti-
formalism was critical self-appraisal evident in an ideological commitment to resisting 
existing capitalist structures.  
The assumed connection between anti-formalism and leftist politics at work in 
composition’s professional model meant that each expansion of anti-formalism—or 
each new iteration of rhetoric—was a more democratic and socially just approach. 
Joseph Petraglia’s discussion of social constructionist theory in composition provides an 
example of how developments converged in new intellectual movements in the field. 
Petraglia describes social constructionism as “a counterbalance, to a field that has for 
too long accentuated the role of the individual writer and ignored the social forces that 
shape the writer’s perception of reality” (Petraglia 51). Instead, social constructionism 
embraces a rhetorical, or anti-formalist view focusing “on the ways in which the 
audience (that is, the community) shapes the discourse of its members” (97). The anti-
formalism of social constructionism provides a means of addressing the full complexity 
of writing that frames composition in the familiar terms of post-industrial writing. The 
epistemic powers granted to rhetoric through social constructionism emphasize the post-
industrial character of composition as a discipline employing rhetoric as its expert 
knowledge. If reality is constructed through social interaction, then rhetoric becomes 
not only the means of knowledge organization and dissemination, but of creating reality 
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itself. As a result, “The appreciation of rhetoric as a foundational discipline, critical for 
understanding any other academic enterprise, is thus a recurring theme in much 
constructionist literature, especially in English studies and rhetoric” (Petraglia 99). 
Social constructionism’s anti-formalist bent suggests it as a means of fully capturing the 
complexity of writing, eliminating any formalist possibilities in the teaching of writing. 
The anti-formalist qualities of social constructionism, reflecting as they do the 
basic assumptions of composition’s claims to professional status, generally prevent 
critiques from being levelled at social constructionism. Petraglia notes the widespread 
and “uncritical” acceptance of social constructionists by compositionists, characterizing 
the deployment of social constructionism in the field as “a closed dialogue” that at once 
overlooks the “criticisms and controversies surrounding ‘social construction’” (95) 
while attempting to “downplay or ignore a wealth of critical thought available in related 
disciplines—speech communications and social psychology in particular” (95). These 
limited challenges to constructionism result, in large part, from the connection between 
social construction as an advance in the anti-formalist critical method of professional 
composition and the leftist politics such an advance is assumed to support. Petraglia 
observes that social constructionism “has often been construed in such a way as to give 
further impetus to a political agenda, common in contemporary English departments, 
that centers on issues of social justice and empowerment even though there is little in 
constructionist theory itself that suggest a moral or political stance” (Petraglia 51). As a 
result, any “call for a review or for a reframing” of social construction “becomes 
associated (unnecessarily) with a repudiation of those values” (Petraglia 52). While 
Petraglia characterizes the linkage between social constructionist theory and progressive 
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politics as logically unnecessary, the model of true composition makes that linkage 
rhetorically necessary for the use of social constructionism in the field of composition. 
But the connections between anti-formalism and rhetoric framed the turn to 
process and the rejection of rhetoric as a result, historically, of the re-emergence or 
return of rhetoric. This not only supported the sense of binary history that would come 
to dominate composition’s history, it suggested the social turn’s methods were 
themselves a model for what came after. As Anderson notes, narratives of return like 
that supported by the social turn “often entail some pivotal event that enables the return, 
perhaps a psychological epiphany or transformation” which in turn acts as “a moment 
of self-recognition, of coming into one’s own, of finding one’s true self” (“Property” 
451). A “true self” as Anderson goes on to observe, implies a proper role, a distinct way 
of doing things that conforms to one’s authentic inner character and function 
(“Property” 451). Part of that function and inner character was the self-critical view of 
composition that the social turn’s methods exemplified. There was as Joseph Harris 
points out, “a shift in the 1980s toward historical and meta-critical work in 
composition” driven by the work of prominent social process advocates (128). 
Appropriations that supported that self-critique, such as classical rhetoric, linguistics, 
reader-response theory, or social construction philosophy, were typically associated, as 
Petraglia shows, with the goals of professional composition. Additionally, with growing 
consensus shaping reception, appropriations of theories that seemed to ensure anti-
formalist perspectives on writing began to be implemented more quickly and on a 
broader scale by writing instructors. Lee O’Dell has described this aspect of the field 
development, arguing that compositionists engage in “serial monogamy. We embrace 
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one conceptual framework, then, another, and then another, each time talking as though 
we have indeed found the love of our professional lives” (152-3). As is common with 
new loves, the flaws or difficulties new appropriations created for composition were not 
always apparent from the start. 
Continuing insecurity over the demonstration of expertise in writing instruction 
drove continued expansions of the definition of anti-formalism and with it rhetoric and 
the means for achieving an inclusive writing pedagogy. By 1992 Sharon Crowley was 
critiquing process itself in ways that demonstrated these developments in practice. 
Predictably, Crowley’s challenges process on the grounds that process pedagogy is 
simply a new form of current-traditional rhetoric. Such a claim would seem a hard sell 
to compositionists who had challenged current-traditional rhetoric on a number of 
process-based assumptions and then seen the process movement further developed into 
a seemingly unassailable rhetorical approach to writing instruction. Crowley herself 
admits the differences between process pedagogy and current-traditional rhetoric by 
noting the affective distinctions between teaching the composing process instead of the 
finished product. Crowley writes, “With the advent of process pedagogy the classroom 
truly was a more interesting place to be . . . [and] was also much more interesting to 
think about than it had been prior to the advent of process . . .” (“Composition” 190). 
The key to this improvement was indeed the emphasis of the composing process in 
writing instruction over the written product, but it was an emphasis that obscured the 
connections between the two.  
As with expressivist and cognitivist models of process, the formalist tendencies 
of process were lurking beneath the surface and required a new definition of current-
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traditional rhetoric to draw them out. For Crowley, current-traditional rhetoric operates 
on modernist foundationalisms chief of which is the coherent self, existing prior to 
discourse and in complete control of that discourse. It is this assumption that process 
pedagogy fails to address and so leads process to enact current-traditional rhetoric 
despite its ostensible rejection of formalist pedagogy. As Crowley argues, process 
pedagogy “retains the modernist composing subject of current-traditionalism—the 
subject who is sufficiently discrete from the composing context to stand apart from it, 
observing it from above and commenting upon it” (213). The modernist belief in an 
essentialist, coherent subject limits the recognition of the full complexity of writing and 
so prevents process pedagogy from escaping the pull of current-traditional rhetoric. 
Crowley notes, “The easy accommodation of process-oriented strategies to current-
traditionalism suggests that process and product have more in common than is generally 
acknowledged in professional literature about composition, where the habit of 
contrasting them conceals the fact of their epistemological consistency” (212).  
Crowley’s critique thus rejects process on the very model by which process rejects 
current-traditional rhetoric. But this rejection depends on defining anti-formalism—and 
thus rhetoric—as anti-foundationalist. Foundationalist beliefs, then, become a mark of 
an oppressive pedagogy18. 
A number of prominent figures in composition took up similar critiques of the 
field itself for its reliance on foundationalist or modernist principles in crafting theories 
of composing and pedagogies for teaching writing. Lester Faigley’s Fragments of 
                                                 
18 As early as 1977 Crowley had argued in an article entitled “Of Gorgias and Grammatology” that the 
basic tenets of sophistic rhetoric and post-structuralist theory align in many respects. This perspective was 
not widely taken up, however, until the late 1980s and 1990s. Certainly the critical power and left-
oriented politics of many post-structuralist and postmodernist theories made such anti-foundationalist 
perspectives perfect for appropriation into the burgeoning project of self-critique in composition. 
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Rationality: Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition, Bizzell’s “Foundationalism 
and Anti-Foundationalism in Composition Studies,” Crowley’s Methodical Memory: 
Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric, Victor Vitanza’s “Three Countertheses: Or a 
Critical In(ter)vention into Composition Theories and Pedagogies,” Lynn Worsham’s 
“Going Postal: Pedagogic Violence and the Schooling of Emotion,” and a number of 
others including the aforementioned work by Thomas Kent on post-process have 
critiqued composition for its perpetuation of modernist foundationalisms and have 
advanced an anti-foundationalist perspective on rhetoric, often as a means of supporting 
the critical work necessary to ensure social change. The continued insecurity over 
composition’s professional status that the continuous honing of self-critique represents 
has made the critical power of anti-foundationalism as welcome addition to the toolbox 
of compositionists working to ferret out the vestiges of formalism hiding in the latest 
theories or pedagogies.  
Anti-foundationalism as a general rejection of essentialist or modernist claims to 
transcendent truth has consequently enjoyed widespread and rapid acceptance. David 
Smit commenting on the “sheer onesidedness of the argument” in support of anti-
foundationalism in contemporary composition studies discourse, explains that “scholars 
in composition and rhetoric are overwhelmingly anti-foundationalist” (134). For Smit 
the lack of “any organized or serious opposition” (135) to anti-foundationalism from 
composition scholars is odd given critiques of anti-foundationalism in related fields 
such as communications and philosophy and anti-foundationalism’s “many conceptual 
problems” (135). One of those conceptual problems facing compositionists’ wide 
adoption of anti-foundationalism is the pressure it puts on the critical goals of the 
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profession. The forms of inclusion and leftist politics of the sixties and early seventies 
on which much of composition’s professional ethics are based derived from 
foundationalist concepts that were themselves potentially dissolved by the caustic 
critical power of the very theories compositionists were turning to advance these ideals. 
As Fleming explains, “. . . even the most radical political and cultural movements of the 
1960s were thoroughly dependent on classically modern narratives of freedom, truth, 
and enlightenment” (“Form” 124-5). Within the discourse of composition’s professional 
model, each expansion of the definition of anti-formalism had necessarily advanced 
inclusive politics, but with the turn to anti-foundationalism the critical method of 
professional composition came into direct conflict with its critical goal. 
Contradiction and Idealization 
The turn to anti-foundationalism, then, was as much of a problem as it was a 
solution for composition’s self-critical impulses. The deep-seated formalism—in the 
form of foundationalist principles—that anti-foundationalism revealed in composition 
suggested its usefulness in explaining the full complexity of writing, but its critical 
reach brought the critical goal of professional composition itself under critique. An anti-
foundationalist critical method threatened the very heart of composition’s professional 
identity even as it seemed to ensure its perpetuation. The connection between anti-
formalism, however defined, and inclusive leftist politics undergirding composition’s 
professional identity had been sufficiently naturalized in the discourse of the field to 
prevent any suggestion that either anti-foundationalism or inclusion should be set aside. 
The myth of intellectual progress on which the field’s development and self-
representation were based suggested that these two seemingly conflicting concepts were 
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simply that, only apparently in conflict. The various means of attempting to bring them 
together would have a significant impact on composition’s continued development, its 
instructors, and its students.  
James Berlin’s pedagogy provides a prime example of how this problem 
affected composition and what its ultimate effects were. As described in his 
posthumously published work Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College 
English Studies, Berlin’s pedagogical approach relies heavily on anti-foundationalist 
critique. Drawing from Paul Smith’s work that itself borrows from Luce Irigaray and 
Julia Kristeva, Berlin views his application of social-epistemic rhetoric to the social 
justice goals of composition instruction as reliant on the “contradictory complex of 
which subject formations are made” (“Poetics” 73) as a means of creating space for a 
dialectic among subject positions out of which “emerges the possibility of political 
action” (“Poetics” 74). As Berlin notes in his application of post-structuralist thought to 
his pedagogy, “the subject is not the source and origin of [speaking and acting] but is 
finally their product. This means that each of us is formed by the various discourses and 
sign systems that surround us” (“Poetics” 65-6). The social constructivist sources of 
Berlin’s pedagogy demand a view of the student subject of the composition classroom 
as fragmented and multiple. The post-structuralist effort to destabilize the individual 
subject is as much at the heart of Berlin’s pedagogical project and for Berlin this allows 
for the larger effort of challenging existing socio-political conditions that challenge the 
status quo. 
Berlin details two course plans: the first he calls “Codes and Critiques” 
(“Poetics” 124) and the second he titles “The Discourse of Revolution” (“Poetics” 140). 
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“Codes and Critiques” draws on sources from popular culture as a means of examining 
the cultural codes at work in cultural expressions. Two examples Berlin employs are the 
television sitcom Family Ties, a show that Berlin notes “prospered during the 1980s 
when economic success for those at the upper income levels was a reality” (“Poetics” 
130), and the T.V. show Roseanne, produced during a time of even more “glaring 
disproportions” (Berlin “Poetics” 130) in wealth distribution.19 Berlin’s choices are 
deliberately dated in order to grant his students some cultural distance from both 
examples and to ensure that both examples reveal subtle yet observable differences in 
the cultural codes they employ allowing for a historicized and deconstructive reading of 
each. These codes are demonstrated to depend on eliding the contradictions that lie at 
the heart of the ideology they express. For example, Berlin notes that he leads students 
to discuss how “in the ingratiating actor Michael J. Fox’s hands, ruthlessness [in the 
character Alex] is made charming” (“Poetics” 131) by representing the character’s 
rebelliousness “in a socially approved manner, working hard to be rich” (“Poetics” 
131). The conflicts on the show become, then, a moment in which resolutions that 
“cannot stand the light of close analysis” (“Poetics” 131) are made to appear attractive 
to the viewer by appearing in forms that the dominant culture accepts. Berlin’s course 
aims to help students develop a sense of the ways in which actual conflicts are resolved 
in an imaginary fashion in cultural expressions such as television programs. 
In this way Berlin’s pedagogy hopes to identify exclusionary narratives 
developed by the dominant public and empower students to actively challenge them. 
But Berlin’s instructional methods, because they embrace this post-structuralist account 
                                                 
19 Berlin’s lesson also includes the use of the films Other People’s Money (1991) and Roger and Me 
(1989). The approach to these films, however, involves the kind of deconstructive reading and reflection I 
describe below and so, in the interest of space, I include only the television programs. 
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of meaning, depend on the fragmented sense of self and truth that underlies his 
deconstructive reading as class practice. Indeed, as Berlin himself notes, “the binary 
conflicts that an audience discovers in a film [or television sitcom] as well as the 
resolution of these conflicts are as much a product of the historical conditions of the 
audiences as the elements of the film” (“Poetics” 133). While it is difficult to argue with 
the implications Berlin draws from the assumptions of his deconstructive approach, 
those assumptions clearly depend upon post-structuralist views of truth and subjectivity. 
Likewise the aims of Berlin’s pedagogy are revealing in this respect as well. The goal of 
this instruction is for students to “become reflective agents” (“Poetics” 132) but “unlike 
classrooms that insist that each student look within to discover a unique self, this course 
argues that only through understanding the workings of culture in shaping 
consciousness can students ever hope to achieve any degree of singularity” (“Poetics” 
132). Berlin’s aims are clearly admirable, directed as they are to helping students 
achieve a consciousness of the ways in which powerful cultural forces shape their lives 
so that they may engage those forces more actively.   
“The Discourse of Revolution” operates in similar ways but draws on a reading 
of texts produced in England in response to the American and French revolutions by 
authors composing from a variety of viewpoints. This course seeks to historically 
situate conceptions of reading and writing practices in order to allow student readers “to 
locate the conflicts and contradictions addressed, resolved, ignored, or concealed” 
(“Poetics” 141) within each text “with a view to considering their significance to the 
formation of subjects” (“Poetics” 141). This course thus replicates the work of the 
previously described “Codes and Culture” but does so through the use of written texts in 
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order to allow students practice in applying the deconstructive methods of post-
structuralist theory to print communication in an even more distanced historical moment 
that is more overtly politically oriented. The goal of the course is “a consideration of 
signifying practices and their relation to subject formation” (“Poetics” 141). Again we 
see the assumption of post-structuralist views of the individual subject as the guiding 
principles of Berlin’s course and how these assumptions inform even the reading 
practices he claims should be privileged in composition classrooms in order to 
challenge the status quo. 
Importantly, the teaching Berlin describes carries problematic assumptions 
about the relation of anti-foundationalist critique to democracy and social justice. As 
Anderson observes, throughout his work Berlin figures his reading of the implications 
of critique as inevitable and proper; we are told by Berlin that students “‘must come to 
see,’ ‘must realize’ (93), ‘must learn’ (111), . . . ‘recognize’ (120), . . . become ‘aware’ 
(116), . . . and ‘begin to understand’ (131)” (qtd. in V. Anderson “Confrontational” 
205). Once Berlin’s anti-foundationalist readings reveal the contradictions he sees at 
work in the dominant culture, there is only one outcome available to students. In this 
pedagogical dynamic, students who resist Berlin’s reading of the world and challenge 
the conclusions of his deconstructive critique are, as Berlin puts it, “deny[ing] the 
obvious” (“Poetics” 102). For Berlin any argument over the propriety of leftist inclusion 
is finished once the anti-foundationalist critique is in place; once the contradictions of 
the dominant culture’s foundationalist principles are revealed and the contingency of 
truth is asserted the result “inevitably supports economic, social, political, and cultural 
democracy” (“Rhetoric” 489). The anti-foundationalist critique students employ in 
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Berlin’s course is assumed to produce democracy reflecting the assumed connections 
between this critical method and professional composition’s critical goals despite their 
apparent conflict. 
The problem facing Berlin and those like him who would figure democratic 
inclusion as emerging naturally from anti-foundationalism, is that an understanding of 
the perspectival nature of truth seems just as likely to lead a person to read into it 
license to pursue domination as it does to foster some sense of radical democracy. Thus, 
Berlin’s representations of his pedagogy contain “markers of Berlin’s struggles with his 
own contradictions . . .” (V. Anderson “Confrontational” 205), the contradictions of 
figuring foundationalism as the result of anti-foundationalist critique. Berlin smooths 
over this contradiction by failing to admit “that the pictures we paint of postmodern 
reality are truth claims and . . . like all truth claims, they cannot be merely asserted as 
starting points. As activist teachers insist about everyone else’s theories, they must be 
argued for” (Anderson “Confrontational” 207). What Anderson is suggesting without 
saying as much, is that the privileging of inclusion is a belief and figuring this belief as 
a foundationalist principle grants it persuasive force but only at the cost of removing it 
from the field of rhetorical play. As a result, “we beg the basic question, assuming as a 
starting point that we would do better to try to prove” (Anderson “Confrontational” 
207). Berlin’s answer to the question of how to connect an anti-foundationalist method 
and a foundationalist goal is ultimately to ignore it, or, in other words, to make a 
foundationalism out of the connection itself. Berlin’s pedagogy relies too heavily on the 
assumed connection thereby drawing it to the surface and making it available for 
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critique and revealing the underlying strains of this connection in the broader trends of 
professional composition. 
A number of scholars critical of Berlin’s methods have recognized the 
foundationalist principles of democratic inclusion and social justice that underpin his 
own post-structuralist critiques of foundationalist beliefs. J. A. Rice, discussing Berlin 
as an example of widespread pedagogical practices in composition, notes the logical 
disjunction underlying Berlin’s approach. According to Rice, the critical aspects of 
Berlin’s pedagogy depends on a liberal tradition that privileges concepts such as 
equality, freedom, democracy, and justice which function as ideals that are beyond 
question even as Berlin employs anti-foundationalist critique as the means to bring 
these ideals to fruition. For Rice, such an effort represents a “gap between critical 
method and ethical certitude” (??). The ideals of these pedagogies can in fact never be 
called into question—Rice asserts, “liberalism is no better at questioning its own 
foundations than the discourse it denounces” (??)—because they function as the 
justification for the critical work that would question them. Because pedagogies like 
Berlin’s employ anti-foundationalist critique but “base themselves in an ethical 
certitude, these humanist critical pedagogies exceed their own theoretical conditions; in 
doing so, they are less strategies of social change than assertions of it” (?? Rice). Rice 
sees the anti-foundationalism that has come to function as professional composition’s 
critical method as in conflict with its longstanding critical goal. Michael Murphy 
describes this problematic disjunction more succinctly quoting Berlin throughout his 
observation that, “The progressivist discourse of educational democracy—along with its 
allied sense of duty (‘our responsibility as teachers and citizens” [493]) and social 
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welfare (‘the greater good of all’ [490])—is so fundamental a part of the language of 
composition scholarship that it can effectively underwrite the work of even as guarded 
an anti-foundationalist as Berlin” (355). Berlin’s pedagogy represents the assumed 
connections between professional composition’s critical method and critical goal which, 
with the appropriation of anti-foundationalism, have become thoroughly problematic. 
The alternative, it seems, is to embrace anti-foundationalism more thoroughly, a 
perspective perhaps best represented by Victor Vitanza in his critique of Berlin. That 
critique is ultimately the very familiar one that Berlin’s pedagogy is formalist and thus 
ineffective and oppressive. For Vitanza, the assumed connection Berlin makes between 
the critical examination of the contradictions of dominant discourse and a resulting 
political action constructs a grand narrative of emancipation built strictly on reason. 
Berlin and others like him “speak of the contradictions in society and the curriculum, 
which must be laid bare so that students might ‘resist. But this laying bare is to be 
attempted by way of the game of knowledge. And ah, there’s the rub!” (Vitanza 
“Countertheses” 142). Such an emancipatory narrative is limited in its effectiveness 
because it eliminates the non-rational aspects of desire and thereby oversimplifies the 
complex work of discourse to construct subjects. As Vitanza explains of Berlin and 
others like him, “Simply put, they have not fully confronted and embraced the problem 
of the ethical subject or the gross limitations of the rationalist-leftist approach to this 
problem” (“Countertheses” 157). Thus, even though Berlin asserts “that the social is 
saturated with ideological constructs that ‘speak us,’” his anti-foundationalist methods 
are undercut by the foundationalist effort “to advocate a certain, uncertain view of 
emancipation” (Vitanza “Countertheses” 157). As a result, Berlin’s pedagogy fails to 
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account for the full complexity of discourse and writing and thus remains ineffective in 
getting students to enact political change.  
But in addition to being ineffective, Berlin’s foundationalist pedagogy is, of 
course, oppressive. Drawing heavily from the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Vitanza 
argues that the grand narrative of emancipation of Berlin’s approach is necessarily 
exclusionary because of its totalizing character. Such totality is obtained only by 
negating those aspects that do not align with the rationalist systematizing of 
emancipation “because systematization is the result of exclusion. Wherever there is 
system (totality, unity), there is the trace of the excluded” (Vitanza “Negation” 4). As 
positive as the effort to ensure leftist political visions of democracy may seem, it 
depends on a logic of negation that excludes whatever does not fit into the grand 
narrative or the creation of a stable identity. This negation, Vitanza explains, “is 
extremely dangerous (E.g., a little girl is a little man without a penis! Or an Aryan is not 
a Jew! And hence, they do not or should not – because in error – exist.)” (“Negation” 
12). While the pursuit of leftist politics grounded in foundationalist concepts such as 
democracy, justice, and freedom appears a laudable goal, it ultimately embraces a logic 
that results in saying “No to females, Jews, gypsies, queers, hermaphrodites, all others” 
(Vitanza “Negation” 12). As Vitanza’s examples of oppression suggest, the fact that 
“Grand narratives of emancipation do not emancipate” (“Negation” 14), does not mean 
that emancipation is not worth pursuing.  
If compositionists are to embrace the critical method of anti-foundationalism, 
the answer to the problem of disjunction is, then, to re-imagine the critical goal of 
professional composition in anti-foundationalist terms. Expert writing instruction would 
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then focus on an anti-foundationalist elimination of totality itself in order to become 
fully inclusive. Vitanza argues that the anti-foundationalist project of composition 
should move forward “By denegating that which gives us the conditions of exclusion” 
(“Negation” 13). Only the radical inclusivity of an anti-foundationalist dismantling of 
totality would prevent the dangerous negations on which a foundationalist politics rests. 
For Vitanza this means including even those whose beliefs are exclusionary. And so 
Vitanza concludes “If someone cum-a-radical-many wants change, it is necessary ‘to 
Yes’ everything” (“Negation” 220). Such inclusivity paradoxically undermines the very 
concept of negation on which totalizing foundationalisms depend for their exclusivity. 
Vitanza asserts this paradox writing, “To Yes the excluders by saying No to their No. 
By saying No to all reactionary thinking and acting. In another word, by denegating the 
excluders’ No” (“Negation” 220). The rejection of exclusion is accomplished by 
favoring inclusion without boundary and thus makes inclusion as a general concept—
not as a specific effort to include a specific someone into a specific somewhere—the 
ethical standard for compositionists. So encompassing is the understanding of inclusion 
according to this logic that, as Vitanza argues, “Finally, then, if there is to be exclusion, 
the very principle of exclusion itself must be excluded!”  (“Negation” 233). Inclusion is, 
therefore, defined not in positive terms of the addition of a given someone to a given 
space—since such inclusion would imply the exclusion of totality—but negatively and 
in the idealized form of the very absence of exclusion. 
Berlin’s and Vitanza’s approaches draw into sharp relief the nature of the 
challenge faced by composition instructors as Jeff Pruchnic has explained. So central 
has Berlin’s pedagogical method become in Pruchnic’s view that Berlin’s 
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“foregrounding of ‘bias’ (and its associated categories of dominant/marginal, 
complicit/resistant, exploitive/liberatory) remains the coin of the realm for the majority 
of pedagogical scholarship on systems of social power” (64). The challenge of ideology 
that this “iconoclastic gesture” (64) involves amounts to positing a correct ideology of 
which the dominant discourse, with its unjust systems of power, is a distortion. Berlin’s 
pedagogy, as noted above, represents the swapping of one totalization for another. But 
the other option available to expert writing instructors is a critical perspective that limits 
the possibilities of leftist political action. Pruchnic describes this approach, which he 
associates with Vitanza, as an “amping up of critique qua critique, the unending search 
for higher grounds of valuation only to submit them to hermeneutic disruption” (66). 
This practice, in turn, reduces critical pedagogy to “a wholly negative vein” 
emphasizing what compositionists “cannot do (cannot make claims to truth, legitimacy, 
or meaning, and cannot guarantee an ethical frame or praxis) rather than what they can 
do, or how [critique] might be leveraged for particular purposes” (66). The conflicting 
commitments of professional composition prevent compositionists from happily 
embracing either. As Pruchnic describes it, instructors are “stuck between the Hegelian 
‘hard rock’ of negation and the ‘no-place’ of endless critique” (66).  
Resolution through Displacement 
The model of professional composition created in response to the literacy crisis 
of the mid-1970s set in place the critical method of anti-formalism and the critical goal 
of leftist inclusion as the characteristics of expert instruction. The creation of this model 
made it possible for social process advocates to build consensus among their peers that 
a rhetorical axiology most effectively encapsulated this model but only through a 
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continuous expansion of the definition of anti-formalism that positioned other process 
approaches as outside the professional model. The effort to locate the basic principles of 
expert instruction that the social turn represented was only the beginning of a continued 
effort to locate that form of anti-formalism that ensured compositionists distinction 
from lay perspectives on writing—a distinction that might calm the fears of writing 
instructors that just anyone could teach writing. Anti-foundationalism provided this 
distinct perspective and allowed for the continued self-critique of composition that 
ensured its professional standing. But by defining anti-formalism as anti-
foundationalism, compositionists undermined their own professional identity by 
drawing into question the critical goals that described composition’s professional 
contribution to society. The result was a contradiction between anti-foundationalist 
critique and foundationalist political ideals. This contradiction and its ultimate 
resolution—insofar as it was resolved by composition theorists—amounted to a full 
articulation of what it meant to teach writing in a post-industrial context.  
But these developments when engaged by instructors presented the immediate 
problem of how to include all student perspectives while excluding those student views 
that undermined the political goals of an expert composition pedagogy. As early as 
1991, Patricia Bizzell was describing this problem when she addresses the issue of 
authority in the democratic classroom. Hoping to use her authority to foster critical 
consciousness while also recognizing such a use of authority countermands her 
pedagogical goals, Bizzell finds herself trapped in a sort of pedagogical and ethical 
double-bind. Situating her predicament within the larger framework of the field, she 
writes, “On the one hand, we wish to serve politically left-oriented or liberatory goals in 
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our teaching, while on the other, we do not see how we can do so without committing 
the theoretically totalizing and pedagogically oppressive sins we have inveighed against 
in the systems we want to resist” (“Power” 54). Ultimately, as a means of escaping from 
these conflicting commitments, Bizzell offers a solution to this problem by suggesting a 
vision of socially constructed authority tacitly bestowed upon her by her students. 
Bizzell’s solution is, however, problematic in that her claim that students willingly offer 
her the position of classroom authority works only insofar as we see the demand of a 
college degree for social mobility as a “choice” made by students rather than as itself a 
coercive social system imposing this “decision” on them.  
My aim here is not necessarily to critique Bizzell’s work. What interests me 
most about the passage from Bizzell’s article is that it makes explicit references to the 
discursive influences creating the problem she wants to address. In this passage we can 
see Bizzell struggling to reconcile a foundationalist adherence to a particular 
ethical/political viewpoint while also attempting to enact the critical expectations of an 
anti-foundationalist perspective. Bizzell’s assertion that we cannot see how to pursue 
our liberatory pedagogy without totalizing and universalizing its truth speaks to the 
foundationalist assumptions on which her pedagogy is based. But the very fact that this 
foundationalist approach gives Bizzell pause, speaks to a conflicting rejection of 
foundationalism and universalization – those “theoretically totalizing and pedagogically 
oppressive sins.” Bizzell is explicit about the leftist democratic politics that drive her 
pedagogical goals and which lead her implicitly to make space for a particular spectrum 
of beliefs while excluding others. The foundationalist nature of her investment in 
“politically left-oriented . . . pedagogy” requires her to establish a standard that marks 
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some perspectives as the “right” ones to embrace and others as the “wrong” ones. But 
this standard bothers her because it demands that she totalize her particular view; that is, 
she attempts to embrace an anti-foundationalist and foundationalist perspective at once.  
With the recognition of the crisis and the articulation of a truly anti-
foundationalist perspective, the challenge facing instructors became a question of 
inclusion. Anti-foundationalism required radical inclusion while the political agenda of 
expert instruction required the exclusion of, at least, some student positions. By framing 
the issue as one of inclusion, the work of Berlin, Vitanza, and others like them made the 
challenge of reconciling the critical method and the critical goal and ethical one. That 
ethical question was how to include all student perspectives while simultaneously 
excluding those student perspectives that restricted radical inclusion itself. As an ethical 
challenge, of course, this problem became one for individual instructors to resolve as a 
mark of their professional expertise. Failure to accomplish the contradictory practices of 
including and excluding amounted to a professional and ethical failure on the part of the 
individual instructor rather than a result of the conflicting discursive formations by 
which composition’s preferred identity was maintained. The solution of professional 
composition’s identity crisis amounted, then, to displacing the contradiction at the heart 
of that crisis onto individual instructors. In this way the discourse of professional 
composition was able to obscure the sources of this contradiction and perpetuate its 
preferred identity. This displacement, however, was to have long-term effects on the 
field and was to reveal itself as a characteristic of post-industrial education in the way it 
ensured the existence of the dominant culture in a post-industrial society. 
  
137 
Chapter 4: Catching Students by the Long Tail: The Post-Industrial 
Gatekeeping of Disciplinary Composition 
Over the past 15 years, the issue of religious faith has become an increasingly 
prominent and important part of the landscape of composition scholarship. As Thomas 
Deans has observed, around 2001, “religion was starting to emerge as a topic of interest 
in the field” (408) with compositionists attending to a variety of ways that composition 
instruction and rhetorical theory inform and are informed by rhetorical practices in 
which faith plays a part (408-9). In particular, student faith in the first-year classroom 
and as it affects the teaching of critical thinking and rhetorically-based writing have 
characterized this focus on published research. Scholars such as Doug Downs, Bronwyn 
Williams, Elizabeth Vander Lei, Michael-John DePalma, Shari Stenberg, Geoffrey 
Ringer, bonnie lenore kyburz, and others have taken up the topic of teaching critical 
writing and thinking to students of faith. Major journals such as College Composition 
and Communication and College English have featured a number of articles on student 
faith in recent years and panels on teaching writing to students of faith have appeared 
regularly in the program of CCCC over the past decade. Much of the attention to faith 
focuses on students from Christian fundamentalist backgrounds. As Rebecca Nowacek 
observes, “The compatibility of faith and academic writing—in particular, the struggles 
between fundamentalist Christian students and their writing teachers—has been a focus 
of recent scholarship” (155). How to teach writing as the field currently understands it 
to religious students has clearly become an important question for many 
compositionists. 
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It is tempting to see these developments in terms of a natural progression of 
academic inquiry, especially for a field as concerned with student experience and 
learning as composition is. Since faith-based perspectives represent an important 
subjectivity for many students (Rand 350), the recent scholarship on student faith can be 
seen simply as the work of ethical compositionists attending to an important form of 
student difference. But framing this recent increase in scholarship in such individualistic 
terms can elide the discursive forces that select teaching writing to religious students as 
an exigent focus of study (cf. Foucault Archaeology 38ff.). After all, we have always 
had students of faith in our classrooms and the tensions between faith and academic 
inquiry are nothing new. While fundamentalism may be an increasingly apparent 
phenomenon than perhaps it was in the past, especially in the context of globalized, 
post-industrial capitalism (Hardt and Negri 150), framing the issue as arising entirely 
from the evolution of faith in a post-industrial world suggests compositionists have 
remained immune from these same changes (which, I hope I have demonstrated already 
that we most certainly have not). What discursive developments then are creating the 
exigence for this focus on student faith and writing in this disciplinary moment? What 
makes addressing student faith so important for compositionists?   
As I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous two chapters, a significant 
part of any development in composition involves the discursive context of 
composition’s model of professionalization and the contradiction that has developed in 
that model. The contradiction between professional composition’s anti-foundationalist 
critical method and its foundationalist critical goal threatens the very existence of 
compositionists’ claims to professional standing. As a result, composition theorists have 
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attempted to solve this contradiction by redefining the field’s critical goal of an 
inclusive, leftist political agenda in anti-foundationalist terms—as the absence of all 
exclusion. Faced with such an idealization of inclusion, teachers committed to expert 
writing instruction must include all student perspectives as the means for advancing a 
leftist political agenda. But the very political goal compositionists intend to serve 
through the radical inclusion of anti-foundationalist critique requires an exclusion of 
those views and perspectives that oppose the field’s preferred leftist politics. In the face 
of student subjectivities invested in an exclusionary, totalizing belief system, instructors 
must find a way both to include and also exclude those student subjectivities. The work 
of disciplinary composition has created an ideal that is impossible for composition 
instruction to enact. 
Tellingly, this contradiction represents the exigence commonly constructed in 
scholarly considerations of student faith in composition. For instance, Amy Goodburn 
begins an examination of the challenges critical instructors face when including 
fundamentalist Christian beliefs by asking, “When students’ main sources of authority 
are fundamentalist in nature, how can critical teachers legitimize such beliefs in relation 
to their pedagogical goals?” (347). Goodburn’s question reflects a felt imperative to 
legitimize student belief while simultaneously recognizing an implicit opposition 
between these fundamentalist beliefs and the pedagogical goals of her course. Juanita 
M. Smart frames her discussion of an evangelical student in her writing class in very 
similar terms, writing, “The charge that I face regarding my student’s evangelical 
discourse seems clear: Somehow I both need and want to help him claim ‘[his] place,’ 
and ‘the right to have [his] part matter,’ without disallowing his profession of faith” 
140 
(20). Here Smart genuinely wants to integrate her student’s belief into her pedagogy 
even as she suggests that accomplishing this integration necessarily requires her to 
disallow that belief. In a 2013 College English article, T.J. Geiger III agrees with 
Lizabeth Rand’s call to include evangelical students into the classroom. But Geiger is 
careful to note, “Even as Rand presents a compelling objection to the exclusion of 
evangelical epistemologies . . . writing teachers who allow or bring politicoreligious 
inquiries into their classrooms must also account for the potential of faith discourses to 
exclude” (252).  Geiger, like Smart and Goodburn, seems at once ethically compelled to 
include faith-based perspectives but simultaneously finds reasons for excluding those 
beliefs.  
Since faith-based subjectivity represents an important identity for many 
students, the mandate to include all students necessarily involves legitimizing faith-
based perspectives. But the exclusionary and totalizing nature of many religious beliefs, 
particularly those of fundamentalist Christians, mark those same subjectivities for 
exclusion in the effort to advance a leftist politics. These students thus pose a thorny 
problem for the individual instructor by foregrounding the need to include but also 
exclude these students’ views. As such, students of faith reveal the impossibility of anti-
foundationalist instruction in actual practice and consequently draw into relief the 
contradiction at the heart of composition’s professional identity. Students of faith, then, 
represent an instructional problem that must be solved not only as a demonstration of 
the professional and ethical standing of the individual instructor, but also to ensure the 
systemic contradictions defining instructional expertise remain obscured. Only by 
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solving the “problem” of teaching students of faith can composition’s professional 
identity perpetuate itself. 
In this chapter, I will argue that pedagogies emerging from the idealization of 
inclusion and the professional mandate to include, yet exclude function as gatekeeping 
mechanisms that discipline students to accept the fluid consumer identities required by 
post-industrial capitalism and its increasing reliance on niche-market economics. To 
demonstrate this I will first describe how the saturation of existing markets has driven 
post-industrial capitalism to intensify market potential by fragmenting mass markets 
into a collection of niche markets. Drawing on the work of Chris Anderson and others 
to describe “long-tail” market economics, I explain how these niche markets rely on 
consumers embracing a fluid identity that supports both an intense association with 
specific niche demographics while allowing this association to be replicated across 
multiple niche markets. Having demonstrated this need, I then discuss how disciplinary 
composition’s role of creating the research knowledge that makes expert instruction 
possible positions the discipline to pass its definition of rhetoric as anti-foundationalist 
and the resulting mandate for radical inclusion on to individual instructors.  
Examining two examples of pedagogy that directly addresses the felt need to 
include and exclude students who embrace exclusionary discourses, I show that the 
prevailing method for escaping this bind is to encourage students embrace anti-
foundationalist definitions of their identity that allow students to retain their 
exclusionary identities while simultaneously allowing them to embrace the course’s 
critical perspectives. While such pedagogies resolve the contradiction facing instructors, 
it does so only by eliminating the foundationalist principles that marked student identity 
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as different. An anti-foundationalist view of rhetoric thus allows instructors to enact the 
gatekeeping dynamics of assessing students’ willingness to abandon foundationalist 
principles while ostensibly assessing students’ rhetorical capacities. This pedagogical 
approach that derived from the emergence of post-industrialism thus enforces the fluid 
identities required for market intensification in post-industrial capitalism. I conclude by 
drawing out the implications of these developments for our understanding of 
composition history and the role that better understanding the discipline’s history can 
play in mitigating composition’s complicity in supporting the inequities of existing 
socio-economic power structures.   
Niche Markets and Post-Industrial Subjectivity 
The application of knowledge to knowledge that defines the post-industrial era 
relates to economics primarily through the increasing finance character of markets. This 
notion of finance as the basis for market activity involves creating profit through the 
intensification of existing markets, making more out of what already exists. The 
dominance of capitalism around the globe and the expansion of multinational 
corporations means that new profits and the creation of new markets that drive the 
expansion necessary for capitalism to work must increasingly come from within 
existing markets: “Capitalism today seeks to saturate and deepen—intensify—its hold 
over existing markets, insofar as global capitalism of the twenty-first century has run 
out of new territories to conquer” (Nealon 26). Post-industrial capitalism exhibits this 
tendency to intensify primarily through the dominance of finance in the global economy 
as the making of money through the manipulation of markets rather than by creating 
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new commodities, products, or services.20 But this financialization of global capitalism 
appears as well in consumer markets as market saturation requires new possibilities for 
consumption to be created within current market domains.  
In consumer markets this intensification takes the form of the fragmentation of 
existing markets into ever more narrowly defined niche markets and boutique services. 
21 The advent of digital technologies has made this intensification through niche 
markets possible as Chris Anderson explains through the concept of long-tail market 
economics. The long-tail describes the statistical representation of sales in which a line 
charting those sales starts at a peak on the left with the top selling “hits” and then 
descends rapidly as the graph moves right, flattening out as the graph moves into the 
less popular products down this long tail of the market. This curve, according to 
Anderson, determines industrial-era production and marketing because the costs of 
physical shelf space in brick-and-mortar stores requires retailers to only offer the hits. 
As Anderson explains, industrial production is “not much interested in the occasional 
sale, because in traditional retail a CD that sells only one unit a quarter consumes 
exactly the same half-inch of shelf space as a CD that sells 1,000 units a quarter. 
There’s a value to that space—rent, overhead, staffing costs, etc.—that has to be paid 
back by a certain number of inventory turns per month” (9). The rigidity of mass appeal 
                                                 
20 The explosion of global financial markets as the drivers of post-industrial capitalism can be traced back 
to Nixon taking the U.S. off of the gold standard in 1971. The unmooring of U.S. currency from its basis 
on the backing of U.S. gold reserves—however tenuous that basis might have always been—made 
possible the wide fluctuation of currency values around the globe leading to booms and busts of various 
currencies and, often, the ruination of entire national economies as currency speculators deliberately 
devalued various currencies to increase profits. 
21 Though my focus here is consumer markets, boutique services have been important in the financial 
markets as well particularly in the area of financial consultation. A 2006 article in The Economist noted 
the growth of these boutique consultation services reporting that independent boutique financial advisors 
“advised on 55% of the 20 biggest mergers” of 2005 when “In 2000 they accounted for less than a third, 
all done by just two companies” (par. Par. 4). For more see “Boutique Banks: Niche Market.” The 
Economist August 24, 2006. http://www.economist.com/node/7843315 
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imposed by industrial production and distribution necessarily limits the potential for 
profit by excluding the potential demand latent in the desires of individual consumers or 
narrowly-defined consumer demographics. By attending to these more specific desires, 
companies can create new markets for new goods and services expanding the potential 
for profitability through a diversification that exploits underserved consumer demand. 
In addition, niche markets also allow consumers to find products more suited to a 
particular taste and are often willing to pay more for it—what Rogers calls “high value” 
over “high volume.” 
As the information storage and dissemination capacities of digital 
communications technologies has increased, the potential for tapping underserved niche 
markets has increased proportionately. Digital technology reduces the cost of storing 
songs, movies, books, or any kind of information to the extent that online retailers can 
stock a seemingly infinite variety of offerings attending to niche consumer demands. 
This variety and its management that online retailers like Amazon.com, iTunes, and 
Netflix facilitate allows demand to keep on going “into niches that were never even 
considered before—instructional videos, karaoke, Turkish TV, you name it” (Anderson 
130). Because of the sheer volume of niche offerings made available by digital storage, 
the relatively low sales, or even almost non-existent sales, of a particular offering can 
still add up. As Anderson explains, “But what we do know is that with the companies 
for which we have the most complete data—Netflix, Amazon, and Rhapsody—sales of 
products not offered by their brick-and-mortar competitors amounted between a quarter 
and nearly half of total revenues—and that percentage is rising each year” (24). In long 
tail markets, the “hits”—blockbuster movies, chart-topping songs, the New York Times 
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bestsellers—remain “hits,” but the niche markets of marginally popular or even 
unpopular offerings make up a greater portion of the post-industrial economic pie. In 
this way, the niche market consumption of the long tail accomplishes the market 
intensification that supports the continued expansion of a globalized capitalist economy.  
While the variety and availability necessary for market intensification 
characterize the long tail, it functions effectively only if consumers are willing to 
explore down the tail and can manage the process of doing so. “Simply offering more 
variety,” Anderson explains, “does not shift demand by itself. Consumers must be given 
ways to find niches that suit their particular needs and interests. A range of tools and 
techniques—from recommendations to rankings—are effective at doing this. These 
‘filters’ can drive demand down the Tail” (Anderson 53). While Anderson’s emphasis 
on digital filters and search mechanisms frames consumer niche preferences as given, 
niche preferences, as I noted in chapter one, are marketed as the means of 
demonstrating one’s individuality with this commodification of individuality actually 
promoted as resistance to mainstream appropriation. “Different is good,” as the Arby’s 
ad goes and so “One no longer attempts to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ in their spending 
habits as much as they want to discriminate themselves, however superficially, from an 
abstract other . . .” (Pruchnic 68). The desire for difference and the description of 
difference in terms of niche market consumption serves, then, as a cultural driver 
helping to push consumption down the tail in the search for ever more obscure and 
individualizing tastes. While “The world of imperialism is, by definition, a world where 
‘different is bad’—otherness is an obstacle, there only to be excluded, demonized, or 
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assimilated” (Nealon 41), in the post-industrial world of long-tail markets, difference 
“isn’t there to be overcome; it’s there to be intensified” (Nealon 41).  
The effort to distinguish individual difference supports market intensification by 
encouraging consumers to inhabit niche markets. The result is a kind of connoisseur 
logic in which individual difference from the mainstream operates as an identifier of 
individual intelligence or sophistication of taste regardless of what exactly it is that one 
is differing from the mainstream about. This is reflected as well the more intensely a 
particular consumer inhabits a particular niche. Customization represents the logical end 
of such niche market intensification providing the possibility of individual customer 
preferences and so has become an increasingly important part of marketing consumer 
products and services. For example, “Coca-Cola Co., has in recent years rolled out its 
‘Freestyle’ machines in locations such as restaurants and movie theaters, allowing 
people to choose from hundreds of its soda brands, and mix flavors. McDonald’s has 
been testing a ‘build your own burger’ program in California” (Krashinsky B3). 
Customization of market experience is also evident in the rise of guerilla marketing 
campaigns that employ advertising that encourages a sense of consumer agency through 
participation either in the form of interpretation as with corporate street art or surrealist 
advertising or direct action as occurs in advertiser sponsored flash mobs or campaigns 
that allow customers to vote.22   
The effort to distinguish individual difference supports market intensification by 
encouraging consumers to inhabit niche markets. The result is a kind of connoisseur 
logic in which individual difference from the mainstream operates as an identifier of 
                                                 
22 Even more mainstream marketing has begun to employ this practice, at least in a very limited way. 
Content organizing websites like Hulu or YouTube allow viewers to select an “ad experience” or to 
choose to skip ads after a few seconds.  
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individual intelligence or sophistication of taste regardless of what exactly it is that one 
is differing from the mainstream about. This is reflected as well the more intensely a 
particular consumer inhabits a particular niche. Customization represents the logical end 
of such niche market intensification providing the possibility of individual customer 
preferences and so has become an increasingly important part of marketing consumer 
products and services. For example, “Coca-Cola Co., has in recent years rolled out its 
‘Freestyle’ machines in locations such as restaurants and movie theaters, allowing 
people to choose from hundreds of its soda brands, and mix flavors. McDonald’s has 
been testing a ‘build your own burger’ program in California” (Krashinsky B3). 
Customization of market experience is also evident in the rise of guerilla marketing 
campaigns that employ advertising that encourages a sense of consumer agency through 
participation either in the form of interpretation as with corporate street art or surrealist 
advertising or direct action as occurs in advertiser sponsored flash mobs or campaigns 
that allow customers to vote.23   
But while customization is prized, full market intensification results from 
consumers being as inclusive as possible about the variety of identities the long tail 
allows, by inhabiting as many niche markets and, thus, as many consumer identities as 
possible. Consumers must be able, then, to inhabit the mainstream while still 
descending down the tail in order to support intensification. The dynamics of breaking 
out of any limitations imposed through the mass of mass consumption must likewise 
operate among the niches. Niche identities cannot be allowed to foreclose the possibility 
of inhabiting other niches. In other words, it does little good in terms of market 
                                                 
23 Even more mainstream marketing has begun to employ this practice, at least in a very limited way. 
Content organizing websites like Hulu or YouTube allow viewers to select an “ad experience” or to 
choose to skip ads after a few seconds.  
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intensification for a niche identity to become the consumers mainstream in the sense 
that it prevents continued habitation of other niches. This does not mean, as I hope to 
show below, that intensification depends on preventing full identification with a 
particular niche identity, but rather that any such identity cannot be defined in terms that 
potentially limit consumer acceptance of any variety of other niches. One can claim 
body building as one’s primary identity—buying supplements, protein shakes, gym 
memberships, etc.—but for intensification to function fully, that primary identification 
must not conflict with being a Trekkie or scrabble lover. Even weightlifters have “cheat 
days” when they can build their own burger at McDonalds. In other words, 
intensification requires that customization be a fluid process that involves embracing 
multiple identities and, thus, customizing through a mix and match of multiple niche 
possibilities. 
While Anderson’s theory of the long tail has proven popular among a number of 
marketing and business professionals, recent studies have complicate the concept in 
important ways. One of the difficulties for long tail market theory that these studies 
have revealed is that providing the infinite choice Anderson suggests allows for full 
market intensification is not actually possible because “as the sales proceeding further 
and further into the long tail become so small the marginal cost of tracking them in rank 
order, even at a digital scale, might be optimized well before a million titles and 
certainly before infinite titles” (Bentley, Ormerod, Madsen 7). More importantly, these 
same studies have found that the hits of the mainstream continue to remain nearly as 
important as always. While some studies found that the statistical curve toward the tail 
has flattened somewhat, the blockbusters in a range of information and entertainment 
149 
formats remain not just important but absolutely dominant. For example, in their study 
of keywords used in Google searches, Bernd Skiera, Jochen Eckert, and Oliver Hinz 
found that at any given time about 100 primary “keywords are important for generating 
the vast majority of searches, clicks and conversations” (494). Not only is infinite 
choice not available as a result of technological innovation, but initial study findings 
have suggested that consumers have yet to generate market intensification from the 
variety that is available. 
But such a view depends, as these same studies imply, on an outmoded 
industrial-era distinction mainstream and niche and consumer and producer that is 
becoming less and less applicable in the post-industrial context. The “hits” these days 
are themselves more often than not, representations of what were once niche markets of 
extremely narrow appeal. Blockbuster movies of the past several years are a list of 
formerly niche titles including the Lord of the Rings and The Hobbit trilogies (fantasy 
tales involving elves, goblins, orcs, and sorcerers), The Avengers (a superhero comic 
book title), a Star Trek franchise reboot, and a number of films based on young adult 
fiction like Harry Potter (wizards), Twilight (vampires), The Hunger Games (dystopian 
science-fiction), and the Divergent series (dystopian science fiction).24 The original 
source material for the highest grossing film of 2014, The Guardians of the Galaxy, is 
an obscure comic book franchise from the 1970s that was not even a top selling title 
when Marvel studios began production on the picture. That the new blockbuster 
increasingly represents a former niche suggests that the continued importance of the 
                                                 
24 These popular titles from young adult literature suggest a broader culture industry emphasizing the 
sense of difference from the mainstream as positive. In each of these stories an outcast protagonist 
becomes a heroic figure locked in an important struggle based precisely on the difference that made the 
protagonist an outcast in the first place. 
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blockbuster is part of a more complicated dynamic than simply a consumer market 
distinction between mass media and niche interests.  
Studies themselves suggest such complexity as well by indicating the 
increasingly rapid turnover of what counts as a blockbuster product. Bentley, et al. point 
out that the top “y” number of brands in most retailer markets increasingly reflect the 
dynamics of consistent rotation that characterize the fashion industry noting that 
“although the distribution of sales may look very similar over time, taking snapshots of 
it at different points in time, the positions of the individual items within it will vary” (2). 
So while the head of the tail may still be the most important part of the statistical market 
curve, the turnover that now characterizes the mainstream necessitates “a reduction in 
the number of titles to be treated as ‘blockbusters’” (Bentley, et al. 7). Likewise, Skiera, 
et al. reported similar findings among Google keyword searches explaining that “the set 
of top 100 keywords varies over time, and new keywords, as well as keywords that 
previously did not perform very well, may replace some of the top 100 keywords” 
(494). The accelerated rotation of those products marked as blockbusters by sales 
volume and the ever greater number of formerly niche products that become 
blockbusters means that “blockbuster” is not so much a static position that a given 
product inhabits or that it inhabits and then passes out of for good. More and more 
“blockbuster” represents the position held by a particular niche at a particular time and 
which that niche may hold again as the wildly popular “reboot” or “remake” among 
movies and television or the tendency to “retro” styles in fashion demonstrate.  
As such the relationship between the head and the tail perpetuates intensification 
through innovation that results from the breakdown between consumption and 
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production that customization itself represents. As former niche products become 
mainstream hits, the willingness of niche consumers to embrace both the mainstream 
and the niche increases. A fan of the Avengers comic books will certainly go see the 
blockbuster Avengers movie. But this mainstreaming of the comic paradoxically 
emphasizes the difference of the niche connoisseur from the mainstream by at once 
making highly intensified niche consumption more culturally relevant while also 
providing a mainstream engagement with the niche product that highlights the 
connoisseur’s distance from that mainstream understanding. The adjustments and 
exclusion of source material required to mainstream a long-running, highly fantasized 
title like The Avengers that the niche consumer recognizes provides the sense of 
intellectual superiority and sophistication that distinguishes him or her from the 
mainstream. But as Benghozi and Benhamou point out, “One of Anderson’s most 
convincing arguments [regarding long tail markets] is that encouraging consumers to 
purchase best-sellers directs them towards less well-known titles through a trickle-down 
taste effect” (50). The sense of differentiation the mainstreamed product provides the 
niche consumer can also drive neophytes down the tail in pursuit of this same 
differentiation. The blockbuster introduces consumers to a new niche product but the 
mainstreaming of that product means differentiation requires descending down the long 
tail of that particular niche. If you want to be different by liking The Avengers, the sheer 
popularity of the franchise means you are going to have to embrace the consumer 
possibilities of that niche all the more intensely to define your individuality, going down 
the specific long tail of Avengers consumer product niches—comic books, collectible 
figures, comic book conventions. 
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Customization becomes a primary means of doing this very work through what 
Alvin Toffler has called the “prosumer” phenomenon. Prosumers are consumers who 
employ production itself as part of their consumption. The very digital technology that 
makes the long tail economically feasible has likewise democratized the technologies of 
production. Home computers and consumer software now enable individuals to create 
books, movies, music, and art that rivals in quality the slick productions of corporate 
publishers, record labels, and Hollywood itself. Prosumers are not generally paid for 
this work. In fact, as Anderson explains, “One of the big differences between the head 
and the tail of producers is that the farther down you are in the tail, the more likely you 
are to have to keep your day job. And that’s okay. . . . We make not just what we’re 
paid to make, but also what we want to make. And both can have value” (Anderson 78). 
But that value is not simply personal enjoyment. Prosumer creations can quickly 
become niche markets of a sort themselves with, for example, online groups forming 
around Avengers fan fiction. This customization of consumer experience through 
production is thus a potential source for the next blockbuster and the perpetuation of the 
process of mainstreaming and differentiation. As Bentley, et al. describe this process, 
“As innovation is increasingly encouraged by Internet blogs, youTube, music 
production software, and so on, the result should not only be that popular culture 
changes faster, but also [because innovation will create more turnover] that 
‘Blockbuster’ stores should shrink their inventory further and further” (Bentley, et al. 
7). The enormously popular book Fifty Shades of Grey, which has now been made into 
a hit movie, began as Twilight fan fiction.25 It has also become the subject of numerous 
                                                 
25 The importance of digital media for contemporary communication is often called upon to support the 
inclusion of multimodal composing in the first-year composition course. The role prosumer multimodal 
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internet memes, blog posts, videos, and more fan fiction meaning it may spawn more 
innovation.  
The distributors and managers of these products like Amazon, iTunes, and 
Netflix currently take the lion’s share of profits from such products and will likely to 
continue to do so. Prosumer innovation thus represents a windfall for post-industrial 
capitalism representing market innovation that pays for itself by offloading the cost of 
market testing onto prosumers in the form of labor and then reaping the profits garnered 
through the distribution of the next blockbuster such innovation produces. While 
entertainment products have been the focus of most discussions of the potential for 
intensification of long-tail market economics, the flexibility of production made 
possible by digital technology and characterizing post-industrialism means this process 
will likely continue to expand into more material production. Clothing manufacturer 
AM4U “enables users to design their own clothing, then have the item manufactured 
on-site in batches as small as one” (Farrow 54). The increasing availability of 3D 
printers suggests the potential for the process of customization of material products to 
be enacted in the same process now beginning to impact movies, books, and music. 
Digital storage of material designs will allow fashion, home décor, and any number of 
products (the first metal gun was made on a 3D printer a few years ago) to be purchased 
and printed at home.  
The increasing dependence on niche markets in the process of production and 
consumption, even of mainstream media content and material products, demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                               
composing plays in the creation of mainstream corporate content suggests composition may need to take 
a more critical view of the multimodal turn but likewise suggests some directions critical multimodal 
instruction might take including helping students consider the power structures and values supported or 
challenged by the creation of particular multimodal and multimedia texts. 
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just how much post-industrial capitalism invest in consumer identity and its potential to 
drive consumption. The need for customization and the narrow identifications that 
define customization must be balanced with a fluidity of identity that ensures that 
consumer identification with a particular niche does not forestall the continued 
exploration of other niches that defines continued market intensification. The ideal 
consumer in such a system utterly customizes experience within a given niche but is 
willing, even desirous, of engaging the same full identification in a number of other 
niches, even those of a contradictory nature. Intensification requires consumers to 
consciously embrace a fluid identity that supports not only radical customization but its 
replication again and again in the process of turnover. Within this system consumer 
identification with a particular niche market must be emphasized even as identity itself 
must be made more fluid. That production and consumption are predicated on this game 
of identity and are only likely to be more so in the future means that post-industrial 
capitalism is playing the game of high-risk/high-reward economics that have become so 
commonly associated with the finance markets at the heart of post-industrial 
intensification. 
It is thus all the more imperative that consumers be disciplined for fluidity in 
order to prevent the intense identification fostered by niche market dynamics from 
providing an identity node around which resistance to the process of innovation and 
intensification itself. The so-called “democratizing” of the digital tools of production 
allow for innovation through customization but they also represent a form of power-
sharing in that they grant prosumers the potential for far-reaching impact and influence. 
Identifications do not take place in a vacuum but rather often depend on connections 
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with more traditional, less malleable identifiers such as family connections, long-
standing cultural investments, or religious beliefs. Those consumers with sufficient 
affluence and social mobility to play the game of long-tail identity economics cannot be 
allowed to wield their production skills and niche identifications in a manner that 
threatens innovation and intensification itself. These consumers, then, must be made to 
retain those identifications but empty them of whatever claims to superiority they may 
possess for the consumer over other niches. In short, descent down the tail must not 
result in dissent coming back up the tail. The continued development of post-industrial 
capitalism depends on it. The first-year composition course as the gatekeeper to the 
university has developed its disciplinary relationship to the first-year course as a means 
of ensuring the needs of post-industrialism are met. 
The New High to an Old Low 
In her famous 1982 article, “The Winds of Change: Thomas Kuhn and the 
Revolution in the Teaching of Writing,” Maxine Hairston boldly declares that the 
change in compositionists’ perceptions of composing and how writing should be taught 
during the 1970s and early 1980s was so radical as to merit description as a Kuhnian 
“paradigm shift” in writing instruction. Drawing heavily from Young’s argument that a 
paradigmatic crisis over invention in current-traditional rhetoric had led to the demise of 
formalist instruction, Hairston argues that the new paradigm of Process pedagogy 
emerged to address invention, leading composition instructors to try to “understand how 
that product came into being, and why it assumed the form that it did. . . . what goes on 
during the internal act of writing [and then] intervene during the act of writing [in order 
to] affect its outcome” (121). For Hairston, the revelations about writing that the 
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process movement had brought about rendered current-traditional rhetoric indefensible 
by any reasonable person. Just as a Copernicus had made Ptolemy’s terra-centric view 
of the universe impossible to continue imagining as true, so had process rendered 
current-traditional formalism not only obsolete but irrational for any informed person to 
accept. 
Despite Hairston’s confidence, other scholars in the field disputed her 
interpretation of the process movement. Critics like Sharon Crowley and Susan Miller 
rejected the idea that such a change in assumptions about writing had actually taken 
place at all. As I noted in chapter three, Crowley saw process pedagogy as an extension 
of current-traditional rhetoric though in a more affectively pleasing form. Like Crowley, 
Miller claimed that the new writing pedagogies of the time standardized the composing 
process to the point that it became itself a kind of product. For Miller this allowed 
process pedagogy to enact the traditional gatekeeping function carried out by current-
traditional rhetoric whereby culturally and socially specific language norms were 
naturalized to preserve the social and economic status quo. Miller observes that, “For all 
their novelty and superiority over rote learning, these ‘new’ constructions of theory and 
practice continue our roles as agents of hegemonic selection. They encourage us to 
believe that we oppose established norms while instead crafting new systems that 
inadvertently maintain them” (9). While writing pedagogy looked different in many 
respects after the process movement, conceptions of writing had not really changed.  
Yet, for all the obvious differences between the positions staked out by Hairston, 
Crowley, and Miller, the similarities that exist among them are perhaps more revealing. 
Miller’s and Crowley’s arguments tacitly enact in some ways the shift they critique 
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Hairston for claiming. Crowley’s and Miller’s critiques of the process movement are 
only persuasive if some shift in focus and values had actually occurred. The 
denunciation of process because it replicates current-traditionalism and the gatekeeping 
function of the composition course is only rhetorically effective if Crowley’s and 
Miller’s audience agrees that current-traditionalism and gatekeeping are regrettable 
aspects of composition’s historical legacy; that is, these arguments are persuasive only 
if the majority of compositionists accept that composition needs to move beyond 
current-traditional rhetoric. Assuming such an audience seems impossible if there has 
not been some kind of sea change, at least in the perspective on current-traditionalism 
among compositionist scholars. Indeed, Crowley’s claim that the common habit is to 
oppose process and product and Miller’s characterization of the perpetuation of the 
gatekeeping function as “inadvertent” suggest both recognize their audience’s 
opposition to traditional instruction. Thus, while Hairston’s idea of a Kuhnian 
“paradigm shift” may be an overstatement, Crowley and Miller rhetorically assume the 
change in perceptions of writing and writing instruction that Hairston claims have taken 
place in composition.   
The turn to research as the basis for expert instruction that compositionists 
embraced in response to the emergence of post-industrialism in the late 1950s and 
1960s had a number of effects not the least of which was dividing composition into a 
hierarchical relationship between disciplinary composition and the composition course. 
Researched knowledge as the source of effective teaching liberated composition from 
subservience to literary studies and the practices of current-traditional pedagogy but 
established the production of research as the necessary precedent to expert writing 
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instruction as opposed to practitioner knowledge, or lore (North 15). This view of the 
relation between research and teaching positioned the discipline of composition once it 
was finally established as the source both of expertise (because it provided the 
researched knowledge that made expert instruction possible) and the advancement of 
leftist politics through resistance to the status quo (because research made instruction 
effective and effective instruction was inclusive instruction). Insofar as disciplinary 
knowledge had not infused the practices of composition instructors, the course remained 
pre-professional and so inexpert and oppressive in actual practice. The work of the 
discipline to eliminate the vestiges of formalist thinking in composition theory might be 
accurately characterized, then, as an attempt to stamp out inexpert and oppressive 
tendencies in the pedagogical practices of the course.  
Tellingly, for Hairston what current-traditional rhetoric remains can be found in 
the first-year course as a result of a lack of research informing practice. As process 
continues to change the field, Hairston writes, “I think, however, that the people who do 
most to promote a static and unexamined approach to teaching writing are those who 
define writing courses as service courses and skills courses; that group probably 
includes most administrators and teachers of writing” (442). Because the course 
requires that they spend their time teaching instead of reading the latest research, 
Hairston explains, writing teachers are the ones perpetuating the old paradigm. 
Crowley’s assertions are more damning, indicating that composition-as-course is 
unredeemable precisely because it is the first-year course: “The ethical technology that 
is the requirement, I submit, supersedes anything that specific composition teachers 
operating in local spaces may want to do for their students in the way of helping them to 
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become writers; it gets in between teachers and their students, in between students’ 
writing and their teachers’ reading” (216-17). Hairston and Crowley, then, that the 
institutional realities of the first-year course prevent disciplinary scholarship—of which 
Hairston, Crowley, and Miller’s arguments are a part—from enacting its 
professionalizing and liberating effects on writing instruction. In other words, the 
discipline is the source of expertise and resistance to the oppressive status quo; the 
course, unfortunately, was where inexpert instruction and exclusionary views of 
language still reigned.  
With the establishment of disciplinary structures in the late 1970s, the 
relationship between the discipline and the course became similar to many other fields 
in which disciplinary scholars produced new knowledge that the course was to 
communicate to students. But since much of composition scholarship has and still 
continues to focus on developing the most effective methods for teaching writing, this 
passage of material from the discipline to the course has been as much an imparting of 
knowledge to instructors as to students. Ensuring the resistant character of the course is 
only possible through the implementation of disciplinary knowledge. The hierarchy of 
research over teaching in composition set in place by the reforms of the 60s and 70s has 
a disciplinary effect on writing instructors, a relationship Strickland notes in the 
“dominance of politically based pedagogies in the 1990 and into the twenty-first century 
. . .” (117). The snowball effect “among compositions scholars to feel the rightness of 
such pedagogies” (Strickland 117) because of their proliferation has resulted in a similar 
effect on instructors. Because pedagogies privileged in disciplinary scholarship “also 
always circulate as managerial tools deployed by writing program administrators, they 
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also function, through their repetition, to seemingly persuade composition teachers of 
their rightness” (Strickland 117). Not only do Writing Program Administrators who are 
members of the discipline pursue the latest developments in the discipline in their 
programs and those instructors who want to be acknowledged as professional—usually 
those graduate teaching assistants earning degrees in composition—attend to and 
implement disciplinary knowledge.  
The reforms that have led to composition becoming a discipline have also led, 
then, to the conceptual control literary studies traditionally exerted over the content and 
purpose of the first-year composition course being replaced by the control exerted by 
disciplinary composition. As a result, disciplinary knowledge has increasingly become 
the explicit content of the course itself, directly engaged not just by instructors who use 
it to improve teaching but by students as the subject matter itself. The “Writing about 
Writing” approach which is quickly gaining the status of an internal movement in 
composition and which attempts to help students improve their writing by engaging 
actual research from the discipline serves in many ways as a marker of this shift in the 
course to disciplinary knowledge. Students can only learn to write by employing the 
knowledge that disciplinary experts have created through research. Literature as the 
traditional content of the first year course worked in the past to recruit students into 
literary studies since every student had to take the course.26 But with the “Writing about 
Writing” approach and similar efforts to make disciplinary knowledge the content of 
first-year composition it seems composition is slowly establishing the instructional 
dynamics for using the first-year course to recruit its own students. Tellingly, the 
                                                 
26 Evan Watkins has noted that the discipline of English “is always in the business of recruiting” (9). 
Watkins goes so far as to argue that the foregrounding of theory in English “in one way or another, under 
whatever name” is a result, in part, of facilitating the recruiting of students into the discipline. 
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“Writing about Writing” approach has been framed by the two scholars with which the 
movement is most directly associated, Elizabeth Wardle and Douglas Downs, as 
teaching first-year composition as an “Introduction to Writing Studies” course (558). 
Disciplinary composition has, thus, become to the composition course what 
literature once was, what Susan Miller described as literature’s traditional “high” to 
first-year composition’s “low” (53). Not surprisingly, then, the relationship between the 
discipline and the course reflects the relationship that existed between literature and 
composition. Those engaged in the scholarly work of the discipline are typically tenured 
or work on the tenure track while those teaching the course continue to be employed 
contingently as graduate teaching assistants, adjuncts, or lecturers. Scholars in the 
discipline enjoy greater material rewards, associated as their scholarship is with the 
creation of new disciplinary knowledge and the ideals generated by disciplinary 
research. Writing instructors are often underpaid and overworked, their teaching 
involved in the real world of teaching and interacting with students who have not yet 
been initiated into the discipline. These divisions are generally obscured by the fact that 
composition research so often concerns itself with teaching.27 Since scholars research 
                                                 
27 The recent claim by some scholars that composition should divest itself of its traditional focus on 
pedagogy in favor of theorizing writing reflects the low value that continues to be placed on the course. 
Sidney I. Dobrin, one of the most outspoken of these scholars has argued this position in the familiar 
terms of the course’s oppressive character: “Theory attached to classroom practice is necessarily, always 
already co-opted and cannot, by definition, be emancipatory since classroom practice is sanctioned by the 
institution. Thus, any hope of real emancipatory work in theory, in composition studies, must be 
disassociated from the classroom” (Dobrin 13). One cannot help but wonder where Dobrin does his 
theorizing if not in and as part of the institution of the University of Florida. Watkins’ points out astutely 
that the critical work we want students to take into the world with them is critical work that we are able to 
do precisely because our jobs provide the resources in time, support, and professional demand for us to do 
that work (3-4). One of the problems for students to enact the critical theories we supply them with in the 
“real world,” then, is that students often do not work and live in these same circumstances. In other 
words, Dobrin’s sense that the site of the first-year course prevents emancipatory possibilities of 
instruction applies just as completely to the work of theorizing writing. As I hope is clear, I see that work 
as supported by the institution precisely because it serves the same institutional purposes Dobrin claims 
apply only to first-year composition. 
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practices like teaching and administration, composition is commonly seen as a teaching-
focused discipline—especially teaching in the first-year course—despite the fact that 
advancement in disciplinary composition is based on research and the “superstars” of 
the field are those who have broken new disciplinary ground with their scholarship. Of 
course, such “superstars” are assumed to be good teachers (because of the subject of 
their scholarship), but if you want a job in English but don’t want to teach first-year 
composition, your best bet is to get a Ph.D. in Composition and Rhetoric.  
As the high to the low of composition, literary study served to define an ideal of 
writing that imposed a single cultural and linguistic standard on students through 
current-traditional instruction. The sense of great literature expressing universal truth on 
which this dynamic was based was not present with the advent of literary studies in the 
late 1800s but emerged only as critics challenged the primarily historical and 
bibliographical scholarship that defined the early days of literature’s professionalization 
(Cain 92-94). Likewise, having taken up the high position in relation to the course, 
disciplinary composition has spent several decades working out its disciplinary ideal 
through the methodological debates of the late 1970s, the social turn of the 1980s, and 
the anti-foundationalism of the 1990s (Nystrand, Greene, and Wiemelt 273), which it 
now passes along to the composition course. As I have demonstrated, that ideal is a 
professional mandate to composition instructors to create a radically inclusive, anti-
foundationalist pedagogy in the first-year composition classroom. As the definition of 
“good writing” based on literary ideals and expressed by current-traditional rhetoric 
molded students for production and consumption in the industrial era, so disciplinary 
composition’s definition of “good rhetoric” based on anti-foundationalist theories 
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similarly prepares students for life within the framework of the dominant culture in 
post-industrial society. In other words, the ideal of inclusion the discipline both 
provides for the course and demands of instructors imposes on students the fluid 
identity required for long tail market economics to maximize market intensification. 
A Pedagogy of the Ideal 
The hierarchical relationship between disciplinary composition and the 
composition course leads to the creation of pedagogies that impose on students the fluid 
identity required by the niche-market economics of post-industrial capitalism. As a 
reflection of composition’s professional model, expert instruction must advance a 
critical perspective on the status quo, an effort often framed as developing students’ 
critical consciousness. Because such pedagogies challenge views in which many 
students are invested, students resist the political goals of such courses. While this 
resistance is to be expected, it represents a crisis for professional instruction in that it 
demonstrates the exclusionary, and thus, unprofessional, character of that pedagogy. 
Professional instructors must, then, find ways to validate students’ resistant perspectives 
while still advancing the critical goals of the course. Expert instructors must find a way 
to include the student perspectives that are necessarily excluded by the political goals of 
the pedagogy. In other words, instructors must eliminate the contradiction between the 
politics of instruction and students’ resistant perspectives. Because the professional 
model of composition frames the politics of critical composition courses as resulting 
from anti-foundationalist critique, student resistance becomes the result of a retained 
foundationalist, or a-rhetorical, perspective on the part of students. The expert 
instructor’s job becomes, then, helping students redefine their resistant identity in anti-
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foundationalist terms which at once eliminates student resistance to professional 
pedagogy even as it allows students to nominally retain their resistant subjectivity. In 
this way, composition instructors embracing the mandate of the field’s professional 
model foster perspectives on identity that serve the post-industrial economy. 
These pedagogical dynamics are increasingly becoming the norm in the field of 
composition instruction as reflected in scholarship on writing pedagogy. In her 2002 
study, “Critical Pedagogy’s ‘Other’: Constructions of Whiteness in Education for Social 
Change,”   
Jennifer Seibel Trainor examines the crisis of exclusion that student resistance 
represents in the context of teaching white students whose “rhetorics of being” (637) are 
bound up in inequitable social systems. Trainor begins by describing how resistance by 
students who embrace racist systems of white power demonstrates the exclusionary 
character of critical pedagogies by requiring these pedagogies to position such students 
as “outsiders” to the ethical goals of multiculturalist critical instruction. Trainor is 
cognizant of the problems students’ exclusionary discourses pose for her practice of 
professional instruction noting, “we can’t include within our borders those who 
advocate that to which we are morally and politically opposed” (636). But, as an ethical 
instructor who values radical inclusion, Trainor also recognizes the need to include 
these students and so comes to a clearer articulation of her difficulty asking “how do we 
bring those outsiders in without compromising the ethical integrity of the critical 
project?” (637). While the ethical goals of critical pedagogy demand the exclusion of 
student perspectives that support existing systems of racist domination, the expectations 
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of professional composition instruction require professional writing teachers to find 
some means of including these same viewpoints. 
The mandate to include these excluded students leads Trainor to conduct her 
study on students’ responses to the critical composition pedagogies being taught in three 
different writing courses. Trainor’s discussion of her study focuses on the responses to 
this pedagogy by two white students with particular attention given to a young man 
Trainor names Paul who strongly resisted the critical goals of the course. As Trainor 
explains, in response to accounts of historical injustices perpetrated by whites, Paul 
objected to the “bias” of course texts offering rationalizations of patriarchy and 
European oppression of Africans in ways that drew heavily from “cultural discourses 
widely available in the United States and rightly understood as part of the cultural and 
linguistic apparatus that rationalizes the current social order . . .” (642). In one instance 
Paul criticized a course text for “‘racism’ against whites and the biased nature” of an 
author’s point of view and consistently embraced, by his own later admission, 
“misreadings” or “simplified, resistant readings” (Trainor 643) of course texts. Through 
his resistance, Paul represents the exclusion necessary to advance the political goals of 
the course which thus positioned him “as the problematic other that vexes the practice 
of critical pedagogy” (Trainor 642).  
As Trainor’s study reveals, the source of Paul’s resistance was primarily the 
result of his adherence to an essentialist view of his white identity. For Paul, the course 
texts like James Loewen’s Lies My Teacher Told Me and Elizabeth Martinez’s 500 
Years of Chicano History: In Pictures that described historical oppression and current 
injustices by whites were a personal attack that painted him as a racist. As Trainor 
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explains, “When I asked Paul if he felt the texts or his classmates were literally blaming 
him, personally, for past injustices or current inequalities, his answer was an emphatic 
‘yes’” (643). Paul’s perception of course texts and activities were thus read through a 
lens of a “powerful essentialism” (Trainor 643) regarding his white identity that linked 
him to the injustices perpetrated by whites everywhere and at any time. The result was 
that “Paul’s strong identification with the ‘bad guys’ in each text made him a defensive 
and emotional reader, less inclined to suspend judgment or to hypothesize sympathetic 
intentions on the part of the writer” (Trainor 643). Paul’s strong sense of “guilt by 
association” (Trainor 643) made him “unable to locate in the texts or discussions a 
positive articulation of his identity, of whiteness” meaning that for him the class 
represented “a negation of identity, of self, of humanness, altogether” (Trainor 645). 
While Paul was a major participant in the course, his subject position was conceptually 
excluded from the politics of the course—as it had to be—which in turn revealed the 
unprofessional nature of the pedagogy.  
By locating the source of Paul’s resistance, Trainor demonstrates that critical 
pedagogies that leave essentialist identities in place fail to meet professional 
composition’s standards of radical inclusion. Truly inclusive pedagogies will “help 
students articulate antiessentialist identities as whites and to work through the 
paradoxes of constructing an antiracist white identity” (Trainor 467). While Trainor 
does not go into detail about how instructors might accomplish this redefinition of 
student identity, her study demonstrates how the radical inclusion mandated by the 
professional model of composition leads to pedagogies that encourage students to 
embrace fluid definitions of identity which disassociate students from subject positions 
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they have naturalized as central to their sense of self. The demands of radical inclusion 
create the exigence for finding ways to eliminate the foundationalist beliefs that put 
students in opposition to the foundationalist political ideals of disciplinary composition. 
In other words, the professional model of composition as imposed on instructors by the 
discipline encourages pedagogies that foster fluid constructions of identity in students. 
As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, these dynamics are especially 
prominent in scholarship regarding teaching critical consciousness to students of faith. 
The work of Shannon Carter provides a more detailed account of how these dynamics 
play out in actual classroom practice. Taking up the question of student faith in her 
article “Living inside the Bible (Belt),” Carter begins her discussion of teaching 
students of faith with the crisis exclusion poses for professional composition. Carter 
frames her encounter with student faith by noting that “the evangelical Christianity with 
which a number of my students most identify functions—rhetorically, ideologically, 
practically—in ways that appear completely and irreconcilably at odds with my 
pedagogical and scholarly goals” (572). Yet while Carter admits that fundamentalist 
Christian students “push her tolerance for difference” (572), she laments that writing 
instruction in the university, by denouncing faith-based perspectives as “‘anti-
intellectual,’ ‘close-minded,’ and even counterproductive” (Carter 578), encourages 
students to surrender their faith-based identities, “something we absolutely want to 
avoid” (592). She goes on to denounce “the hostile ways in which [students’] Bible-
based reasoning was received [in the academy] forced them to keep their Bible-
believing identities ‘in check’” (576). Even as Carter pursues pedagogical goals with 
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which her students’ faith-based perspectives often conflict, Carter feels compelled to 
find ways to validate students’ evangelical identities.  
To address these conflicting demands, Carter turns to the concept of rhetorical 
dexterity. Derived from New Literacy Studies and activity theory, rhetorical dexterity 
“calls upon students to effectively read, understand, manipulate, and negotiate the 
cultural and linguistic codes of a new community of practice based on a relatively 
accurate assessment of a more familiar one” (579). The concept of literacy on which 
rhetorical dexterity operates is expansive and figures literate practices as highly 
contextualized. As Carter explains, “Literate practices, at least as I am seeing them here, 
are those sanctioned and endorsed by others recognized as literate members of a 
particular community of practice” (579). This includes the values and beliefs that 
particular communities hold making literacy “both a set of socially sanctioned, 
community-based ‘skills’ and content that is validated, produced, and reproduced within 
that same community of practice” (Carter 579). Consider literacy in these terms reveals 
the claims of faith-based perspectives to be a literate practice linked to a particular 
community. As Carter argues, “As in any community, the literate practices of 
evangelical traditions of Christianity are those sanctioned and endorsed by other literate 
members” (579). 
The disconnect obtaining between the teaching of a critical academic discourse 
and student faith for Carter thus results from a foundationalist view of literacy. 
Explaining that the disconnect between academic and faith-based literacies is “not 
something to be glossed over as given and irreconcilable” (581), Carter argues that 
academic claims that faith-based perspectives are a result of false consciousness or a 
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result of ignorance fail to recognize the contextualized character of their own literate 
practices. From the perspective of an anti-foundationalist conception of literacy, the 
hostility toward the Bible that Carter’s students experienced “may be better understood 
as a dispute over appropriateness” (Carter 580). When academics reject students’ use of 
the Bible in their academic writing, these academics are, in fact, asserting the literacy 
practices privileged in the academic community. Students who use faith-based 
arguments in the academy are working from the assumption that the literacy practices of 
their evangelical community are a “universal, portable skill-set and/or content,” (Carter 
588) applicable in any situation. Conflicts arise because both academics and 
evangelicals embrace a view of literacy as autonomous and a-contextual. In other 
words, the assertion of one truth over another, for Carter, represents a separation of 
truth from literacy practices which reflects a failure to understand literacy. 
Because academic literacies are privileged in the academy and the academy 
represents the path to social mobility, the assertion of academic literacy as a universal 
practice can lead students to abandon their faith-based perspectives as Carter notes 
happened with a student she calls “James” (588). Carter bemoans her failure to help 
James retain his evangelical selfhood, expressing the influence of composition’s 
demand for radical inclusion by asking, “How are we to give students like James some 
control over [the academic] environment so that they don’t commit heretical acts within 
this community of practice that considers the Bible heretical yet aren’t required to give 
up that Bible entirely as their ‘primary sense of selfhood?’” (586). Carter’s answer is to 
have evangelical students develop rhetorical dexterity by examining the literate 
practices of their faith-based communities of practice to demonstrate the contextual 
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nature of the community’s literacy skills and content knowledge. Having recognized 
these practices as thoroughly contextualized, students will be better able to understand 
how academic literacies also operate as a context dependent and “dynamic sign system 
and academic discourse [functions] as an experience of overlapping communities of 
practice” (Carter 588).  
By revealing situated character of evangelical and academic truth claims, Carter 
argues that rhetorical dexterity can help prevent students from feeling the need to 
abandon their Bible-believing identities. Discussing the implications of her conception 
of literacy and truth claims as context-specific, Carter explains that rhetorical dexterity 
means that “instead of one literacy’s being inherently more significant or valuable than 
another, their respective worth is determined by appropriateness to context” (579). The 
flattening of the hierarchy between academic and non-academic practices that an anti-
foundationalist perspective provides means students need not stop being Bible-believing 
Christians even as they enact a more appropriate academic literacy in the university. 
The two are not incompatible or in conflict because neither practice can claim a 
universal truth that functions as more legitimate than the other apart from the context in 
which it is practiced. As a result, Carter concludes that taking and teaching the 
perspective of rhetorical dexterity allows students to “maintain both their faith-based 
and their academic literacies without being required to substitute one for the other” 
(574).  
Carter’s concept suggests the limits of academic literacy’s claims to superiority 
over non-academic practices, but it accomplishes this feat only by imposing the same 
limitations on faith-based practices. In other words, Carter’s pedagogy encourages 
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students to define their faith-based identities in anti-foundationalist terms that deny the 
claims of faith-based literacies to be “inherently more significant and valuable” than 
other literacies. As with Trainor, the need to include students that characterizes 
professional composition instruction developed in response to the emergence of post-
industrialism leads Carter to develop a pedagogy that accomplishes that inclusion by 
defining a student subjectivity that could limit the number of niche markets evangelicals 
might inhabit as a fluid, anti-foundationalist practice that carries no such restrictions. 
Tellingly, Carter explains that an anti-foundationalist perspective on literacy positions 
evangelical identities alongside community practices like fantasy football, plumbing, 
and computer programming (574) as well as factory work, fishing, Xerox repair, 
midwifery, and academic work in composition (580). The potential for such a pedagogy 
to support market intensification is hard to overlook. That this results from the ways in 
which Carter’s pedagogy aligns with the outcomes of the historical process I have 
described in previous chapters only further suggests this connection. 
Revising the Story of English 
The emergence of post-industrial society and the globalized, niche-market 
capitalism with which it is associated has meant that the story of post-industrial higher 
education is, in many ways, the story of the decline of literature’s institutional place in 
the university. As Bill Readings notes, in Anglophone adaptations of the German 
Research Model, literary studies once served an important role in unifying the disparate 
specializations of the university by functioning “as the major discipline entrusted by the 
nation-state with the task of reflecting on cultural identity” (70). Literary Studies and 
the English department that housed it did the serious work of ordering the disciplines in 
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service of the nation-state by reminding everyone of their shared culture. The unifying 
core of the university as culture is no longer a viable one in the face of the social 
fragmentation and globalization of post-industrial society because post-industrialism 
undermines the very concept of a monolithic culture. Readings observes, “The 
economics of globalization mean that the University is no longer called upon to train 
citizen subjects, while the politics of the end of the Cold War mean that the University 
is no longer called upon to uphold national prestige by producing and legitimating 
national culture” (14). As persons increasingly align themselves with more 
individualized sources of identity and the culture of the nation-state becomes less 
important as a source of identity or collective action, the usefulness of cultural 
reproduction in the university becomes more difficult to argue for. 
The collapse of literature as a profession and the elimination of its culturally 
unifying role in the university means that the conceptual and ideological basis it 
provides for current-traditional rhetoric is no longer viable as a selection mechanism for 
the dominant culture. Literature, in short, can no longer serve as what Susan Miller has 
called the “high” to the first-year composition course’s “low” (53). It can no longer be 
tasked with providing the ideal that disciplines student subjectivity precisely because 
the monolithic culture embodied in that ideal no longer serves the interests of the 
dominant culture. The resistance to current-traditional rhetoric disciplinary composition 
pursues and which it imposes on the composition course amounts, then, to a rejection of 
a position now generally abandoned by the dominant culture and which is, in fact, 
counterproductive to the needs of domination in a post-industrial context. As Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri have demonstrated,  
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When we begin to consider the ideologies of corporate capital and the 
world market, it certainly appears that the postmodernist and 
postcolonialist theorists who advocate a politics of difference, fluidity, 
and hybridity in order to challenge the binaries and essentialisms of 
modern sovereignty have been outflanked by the strategies of power. 
Power has evacuated the bastion they are attacking and has circled 
around to their rear to join them in the assault in the name of difference.  
(138) 
 
The very resistance to the mainstream that disciplinary composition imagines itself as 
enacting is, in fact, what drives the economic systems by which the status quo remains 
in place. With the definition of anti-formalism expanded to anti-foundationalism, 
disciplinary composition embraces the rejection of modernist principles which itself 
supports the dominant culture in a post-industrial society. 
As disciplinary composition has instantiated its hierarchical relationship with the 
course and its role in providing the ideal with which to enact the gatekeeping function 
of the course, composition programs have increasingly become separated from English 
departments and made into “stand alone” programs. Even within many English 
departments composition programs continue to develop an increasingly autonomous 
character with expanding numbers of faculty in composition taking greater control over 
English department writing programs in the form of curriculum development and 
program administration. Literary study remains prominent in most English departments, 
of course, despite falling numbers of majors and its increased marginalization in the 
corporate academy that values the creation of marketable research commodities. 
Literature’s continued importance is in part a result of the inertia of existing conditions 
but is also a reflection of its role in recruiting exploitable labor to staff composition 
courses. For while composition—the discipline and the first-year course together—can 
increasingly carry the burden of enacting the gatekeeping apparatus without literature, 
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what it cannot yet do is generate enough composition graduate students to staff the 
sections of the first-year course.  
While literary studies is no longer capable of serving as the cultural hub of the 
university, that traditional role remains appealing to a niche market of students. The 
sense of cultural refinement and a critical perspective that provides those who “get” 
works of literature and dense literary theory with a strong sense of difference from the 
general public retains its power to attract enough students to serve as composition 
instructors. As Marc Bousquet points out, the abysmal job market for literature graduate 
students means that the work of teaching composition as a MA or PhD student can no 
longer be described as an apprenticeship for a faculty position in English, but is instead 
all the career most literature students will have (13). Bousquet explains that this 
circumstance is not an accident, but how the system is meant to operate in order to keep 
labor costs down and undermine faculty influence. The notion that graduate study in 
literature is a dead end has become a part of the black humor of graduate student life in 
English departments across the country. But these conditions only reinforce the sense of 
critical perspective and cultural refinement that the study of literature allegedly 
represents. For the graduate student seeking a sense of distinction from the mainstream, 
the fact that the study of literature is not valued as a profession by an increasingly 
corporatized university or the broader culture is only a mark of its incompatibility with 
an uncritical and unjust society.  
The conditions of contemporary English and the relative standing of disciplinary 
composition, the first-year composition course, and literature reflect the shifts that have 
taken place from an industrial to a post-industrial educational model. But the changes in 
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the socio-economic context that position resistance to current-traditionalist pedagogies 
as no longer resistant are precisely what the binary master narratives of composition 
history obscure. Composition’s historical master narratives accomplish this feat by 
embracing a wide perspective of the history of the course, wide enough to link its 
creation with the industrial revolution, anxiety over immigration and dialect 
degeneration, the creation of land grant universities, social upheaval, and the 
development of the research university. This perspective is useful because it 
demonstrates the links between the creation of the composition course and the needs of 
the dominant class to maintain an oppressive status quo that serves their interests. In 
contrast, histories of the discipline take a narrow perspective wide enough only to frame 
composition’s emergence into academic legitimacy as the result of intellectual 
developments in research on language or, at its broadest, the result of grass roots 
movements on the part of the politically, culturally, and economically marginalized. 
The abrupt narrowing of historical perspective that characterizes the shift from the 
history of the course to the history of the discipline excludes the significant role played 
by post-industrialism in order to elide the potential complicity with the dominant culture 
in the post-industrial context and frame disciplinary composition as the heroic struggle 
of compositionists resisting the injustices of the status quo. Reintroducing the post-
industrial context into composition history thus breaks down the binary master 
narrative, revealing that the history of composition is not simply the long quest to 
liberate composition from its devalued status in the university by pursuing a more 
rhetorical or liberatory approach to writing instruction.  
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Instead, composition’s secondary status in the pre-professional era and its 
increased academic legitimacy in the professional era reflect two different forms of 
gatekeeping serving the dominant culture in two different contexts. Composition’s 
history can thus be defined as a process of adjusting language instruction to serve the 
needs of the dominant culture in shifting socio-economic contexts. Though this revision 
suggests the ways in which the allegedly resistant work of disciplinary-era 
compositionists has been complicit with capitalist structures, it reflects the distinction 
between intention and outcome as well as the ways that resistance and complicity 
articulate a vexed and complicated relationship. This provides, perhaps a useful 
perspective on the past by complicating as well the idea that figures like A.S. Hill and 
Charles William Eliot of Harvard were only trying to exclude working class and 
minority students from the university. Eliot’s lament about men “leaping from farm or 
shop to court-room or pulpit” (Qtd. In Douglas 126) might be read not just as an 
expression of the anxieties of the dominant class but as a genuine desire—if thoroughly 
classist in its assumptions—to educate such men to ensure the prosperity of the nation. 
Such re-readings of the past that the revision presented here enables suggest as well that 
our own work does not always result in the liberatory outcomes we desire. Composition 
historians likely naturalized the narrowed perspectives that framed disciplinary 
composition as resistant because, at the time, much of what they were doing to reject 
current-traditional practices was resistant.  
This perspective also reveals the rhetorical situation of an imagined literacy 
crisis as the means by which democratic educational intentions are fully appropriated in 
the service of the dominant culture. Compositionists in the 1960s embraced anti-
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formalist pedagogies in response to the demands of post-industrialism, and in many 
ways advanced an expanded access to higher education by doing so. This anti-
formalism invited a more rhetorical and process-oriented approach to writing instruction 
that seemed to genuinely improve, if nothing else, student experience in writing classes 
and the sensitivity of writing instruction to the differing dialects students brought with 
them to the classroom. The literacy crisis that attended the drop in test scores that 
resulted from expanded access threatened the continued use of these resistant 
pedagogies. The crisis expresses, then, the anxieties of the dominant culture in the face 
of widespread socio-economic change and, because it is expressed by those in power, it 
requires a rhetorically effective response. As a persuasive act, the response to literacy 
crisis embraces perspectives of the dominant culture—the cultural refinement of 
literature in the 1870s, the claim to professional expertise in the 1970s—and thereby 
amounts to a politically directed development that favors the expectations of those in 
power. In other words, writing instruction that results from response to crisis is 
necessarily dependent on a perspective of writing and rhetoric that is limited by the 
acceptability of that response to the anxieties of the dominant class. 
The response to the crisis of the 1870s thus amounted to a reductive view of 
rhetoric as attention chiefly to matters of style reflecting the emphasis on writing as an 
expression of taste. Certainly style is part of writing and rhetoric, but it is not the 
fullness of rhetorical practice. Figuring style as that fullness served the political ends of 
emphasizing cultural taste to naturalize the dialect of the upper classes in first-year 
composition courses. The response to the literacy crisis of the 1970s was a claim to 
professional expertise. Academic expertise, particularly expertise framed initially in the 
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scientific discourse of cognitivist psychology, was a rhetorically acceptable response, 
invested as the dominant culture has been in expertise since the end of the nineteenth 
century. But this claim to expertise positioned professional composition in direct 
opposition to traditional formalist pedagogies that, combined with the continued search 
for a demonstrably disciplinary-specific knowledge to position composition as beyond 
the reach of public tampering, led to an anti-foundationalist definition of rhetoric. The 
fact that the widespread and enthusiastic acceptance of anti-foundationalism in 
composition derives from a response to the literacy crisis that the dominant culture 
found rhetorically acceptable suggests that the anti-foundationalist views of rhetoric we 
employ are the source of our complicity.  
A richer historical perspective on composition’s disciplinary history does not, 
then, only change our view of the past forty years but raises important questions about 
current practices. By challenging the binary master narrative of composition’s history, a 
history that includes the post-industrial context provides the opportunity to critically 
appraise current practices. Since resistance to current-traditional rhetoric can no longer 
act as the basis for a liberatory pedagogy, the inherently resistant nature of 
constructivist and anti-foundationalist perspectives must now be called into question. 
The pedagogical efforts to eliminate dissensus in the classroom that result from an anti-
foundationalist perspective on rhetoric prevent the inquiry that arises from engagement 
with student difference. Instead of always presuming that an anti-foundationalist theory 
will ensure the emancipatory character of our work, we must now take the responsibility 
of choosing what perspectives we need to take to advance the inclusive goals of our 
pedagogy in the shifting contexts of the world around us. A broader view of our 
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disciplinary history means we have difficult decisions and challenging developments 
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